Wednesday, March 26, 2014

'Protect Me From Geula Cohen'

From the Israel State Archives on the Peace Process

The US proposal and the reactions of Egypt and Israel (10-11 September 1978)

Carter and his team used the day off to put the finishing touches to the US proposal on the basis of the draft drawn up by State Department and NSC experts before the opening of the conference. They knew that it would be very difficult to change Begin's attitude...In the West Bank and Gaza the Arabs would receive full autonomy; after a transitional period of five years the final status of the area would be determined. The IDF would withdraw into specified security locations. The plan also included elements which it would be difficult fro Begin to accept:
  • The principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and other elements of Resolution 242, such as the statement that it applied "on all fronts" i.e. including the West Bank and the Golan Heights;
  • Recognition of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people and their right to take part in determining their future;
  • The final status would include Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 boundaries with minor modifications.

There were also paragraphs on a solution to the refugee problem, including the Jewish refugees (from Arab states) and Jerusalem. The status of Jerusalem would be determined in the negotiations on the West bank and Gaza. Israel, which had extended Israeli law to Jerusalem, wanted it excluded from the talks altogether. But the issue was important to the Saudis, whose political and financial support for Egypt was vital to the success of any agreement...

After the break, Barak presented the changes which Israel proposed, including the deletion of the reference to Resolution 242 "in all its parts" and the principle of "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory". Carter said that he would not have convened the conference unless Israel agreed to accept the resolution. The formula was important to Sadat in order to persuade Jordan to join the talks. As usual Dayan tried to direct the discussion away from abstract principles and legalities to practical problems. Israel was concerned about the possibility that this formula might commit it to withdraw from Judea and Samaria and the Golan. But the present negotiations were not on these issues. Israel had agreed to withdraw from all of Sinai and to abolish the military government in Judea and Samaria. A peace treaty would be made with Jordan, not the Palestinians...At 3 a.m. the meeting ended. Carter invited Dayan to his cabin for a talk. He claimed that Begin was an obstacle to peace and asked for Dayan's help. Dayan replied that Begin truly wanted an agreement.

...Meanwhile the Israeli delegation tried to persuade Begin that Israel could accept the formula that the agreement would be based on Resolution 242 "in all its aspects" with regard to the Palestinian problem. Begin pressed Rosenne, who supported this stand, to give way, and said that this was an American-Arab formula. Dayan accused Begin of forcing his views on the delegation: "It has become impossible to express any views which are different from yours." Begin protested: "Since the [war of ] attrition on the Suez Canal such a war of attrition has not been directed at one man." In the end he accepted the proposal of Barak and Rosenne, saying "It will all fall on my head. I will ask Ezer to protect me from [extremist Knesset member] Geula Cohen."


But why term her "extremist"?

Why not just 

"Tehiyah MK strongly opposed to territorial concessions"?



mrzee said...

Why? Because to the State Dept, any (non-palestinian - palestinians are all moderate) who disagrees with them is automatically an extremist.

Nothing's changed

Unknown said...

1978? Likud