The defendent, G [
The judge threw that out and, at line 10, notes that praying in and of itself, as a cause for an improper behavior charge is "most problematic" since Chapter 9, Sub-section 7 of the Criminal Code defends the right to pray.
The State demanded removal from the Temple Mount for 60 days and the judge reduced that to 15 (and lowered the self-guaranteed deposit) since he nevertheless was convinced that the defendant's actions could have aroused a situation of a disturbance of the public.
I am not sure why he didn't note the Law for the Protection of the Holy Places but maybe the general Criminal Code is better?
It is only Magistrate's Court but still, progress.
P.S. I'll update on legal interpretations.
Here, October 4, 2012:
A Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court judge said Wednesday that the police should allow Jews to pray on the Temple Mount – an exceptional remark given that the High Court of Justice has ruled that policy on the Temple Mount is the sole purview of the police.____________
Police currently enforce the Muslim ban on Jewish prayer at the site, citing security concerns.
“There is room to allow for Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount,” said Judge Malka Aviv, during a remand hearing for Hagai Weiss, the son of Prof. Hillel Weiss, who was arrested on suspicion of trying to pray at the site.
She added that “the [police] explanation that Muslims don’t approve of Jews praying on the Temple Mount cannot, in and of itself, prevent Jews from fulfilling their religious obligations and praying on the Temple Mount.”
To her mind, she said, Jewish prayer should be permitted on the Temple Mount “in a structured fashion, in a place designated for it,” that would maintain the security of Jewish worshipers.
It should be noted that despite her clear, unequivocal statements, Aviv was not instructing the police how to act, but merely expressing her opinion.
Israel today fears “altering the status quo at the site” by allowing Jewish prayer as that may “serve as a provocation, resulting in disorder, with a near certain likelihood of subsequent bloodshed,”...The Supreme Court has largely accepted that rationale, holding that Jewish rights are to be balanced against the threat to public order, especially when there is a “near certainty” of violence. In making that assessment, the court has noted that while the police must not “recoil from using force” against criminals, “the force available to the police is not unlimited.” (See e.g., HCJ 83/292 Temple Mount Faithful v. Jerusalem District Police Commander).Background I.