Getting It Wrong on the Altalena Affair

This blog post appeared in the Times of Israel (having been translated from the Hebrew by the author and expanded) on the Altalena Affair here titled "Altalena Was the Moment Israel Chose to Become a State" and I wish to comment on some of it (I am not permitted to comment there).

The excerpts and my reactions:

Altalena’s enduring lesson is that sovereignty survives only when no camp, cause or elected authority is allowed to own a piece of the state.

The issue was not the state's sovereignty. It was the immoral ethical behavior of Ben-Gurion who decided, at the last moment, to alter an agreement's terms that had been reached in two different meetings on May 16, and June 16 and to lie to the government to ahcieve their agreement for the use of force.

On June 1, 1948, the Irgun, Menachem Begin’s pre-state underground organization, agreed to integrate into the newly created Israel Defense Forces. When Altalena arrived laden with arms, Irgun leaders sought to direct some to their forces in Jerusalem, which remained outside the June 1 integration arrangement, and some to IDF units composed of former Irgun fighters.

The Irgun did integrate and Irgun units had been in Jerusalem since 1931. So, too, the Hagana. Jerusalem was outside the state's sovereign borders. And begin didn't "seek". That was in the agreement's understanding.

A party, underground movement, commander or fighting force does not choose their destination. The state decides who receives them...

Again, that was in the agreement.

If the Irgun may decide where the arms it brought go, then tomorrow the Palmach, Lehi or any other armed formation inherited from the pre-state era can claim the same right. 

The arms were intended for the Irgun, in part. 20%. And the same privilege was awarded the Palmach until it was disbanded. In fact, it had a separate command from the IDF until November 7, 1948 due to Mapam's opposition. They, seemingly, were never criticized by the same people who criticize the Irgun for the same basic behavior.

Had Ben-Gurion blinked, the concession would have become precedent, leaving Israel with separate armed loyalties instead of one national army.

See above. There was: the Palmach.

The danger begins when a state applies that rule selectively — when some armed actors are confronted as a challenge to sovereignty while others are indulged because their cause, identity or politics are familiar.

His example of George Washington and Charles DeGaulle are silly because, until B-G ordered Dori to disband the Palmach in late September, three (!) months after the Altalena, selectivity was okay.

He goes on and drags in "settler violence" and priviate citizens funding IDF units (which has been ordered discontinued) which I will not get into.

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What to Keep in Mind Regarding the Altalena Incident

The Hagana in Europe was aware early on that the Irgun had purchased a ship and were preparing it for sailing to Israel with arms and men/women to fight early in 1948.

At one point, given the expense of keeping the Altalena in port (rental fees, etc.), the Hagana was offered to purchase it from the Irgun.

On June 16, a meeting was held in Tel Aviv between the Irgun High Command and Yisrael Gallil, Levy Eshkol and other Defense Ministry officials to arrange its arrival.

The arrival location, Kfar Vitkin, was a Mapai moshav.

Defense Minsitry officials were update on Saturday night, June 19, that the Altalena had reached the area off of Tel Aviv and would be proceeding to the off-load area near Kfar Vitkin.

The talks broke down on the beach at Kfar Vitkin over the division of the arms and Begin was given 10 minutes to stand down his men. The people who were there with whom I spoke insist it were the IDF soldiers under Moshe Dayan's command who first fired on those on the beach.

The Altalena was shadowed by navy corvettes on its way to Tel Aviv. As the ship neared the coastline, the corvettes began firing at it with bursts of machine gun fire, and stopped after fighters on board. 

According to the book Altalena by journalist and political analyst Shlomo Nakdimon [he], Ben-Gurion instructed the Israeli Air Force to sink the ship on the high seas, long before it approached the shore. This would have resulted in much greater loss of life aboard. Gordon Levett, a Mahal volunteer pilot, wrote in his book Flying Under Two Flags that Heiman Shamir, deputy commander of the Air Force, tried to convince non-Jewish pilot volunteers to attack the ship. However, three pilots refused to participate in the mission, one of them saying, "You can kiss my foot. I did not lose four friends and fly 10,000 miles in order to bomb Jews."

On June 22, the day the Altalena reached the Frishman Street area of the Tel Aviv shoreline, where subsequently it was fired upon, the Palmach arms ship Inaco slipped into Jaffa Port indicating that the excuse that the Altalena should not have set sail as the UN Truce had begun was only applied to the Irgun, not the Palmach.

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A Missing Letter to the Editor on the Altalena

David Geffen published a piece on the sinking of the Altalena arms ship by the IDF seventy years ago opposite the Frishman Street beach in Tel Aviv last month.

I read it, thought things were missing or misrepresented and sent a letter to the editor.

The letter was not published. Someone else's letter, however, was. That letter did not address the issues I thought were important from a historical viewpoint.

My letter did, however, contain a slight, well, imprecisivity. 

One of my points was that the day of the shelling went unmentioned in Geffen's piece.  In a response, I was told that it was - "in the picture caption."

I replied, 

"But not by Geffen as I presume picture captions are a separate editor's job. If Geffen pointed it out, you have my permission to edit that bit out."

And the JPost reaction to that was

We actually note in our letters section that letters may be edited. Readers aren't privy to the process of how a story is edited and laid out, so don't assume.

I waited another week to see if my letter would be published but I guess that for daring to assume I earned enough negative points.

So, here is my letter. Why should you be denied facts and perspective because of my presumptions.

There are a few errors of fact in David Geffen's overview of the Altalena Affair ("A Sad Saga 70 Years Later", June 15).

June 20, 1948, was a Sunday, not a Monday. The date of the ship's shelling at Frishman Street beach, inexplicitly missing, is June 22. Menachem Begin did not meet David Ben-Gurion at all during or preceding these events but other Irgun High Command members such as Shmuel Katz and Yaakov Meridor met with Israel Gallili, Levi Eshkol and other senior officials who briefed Ben-Gurion. Not only were meetings and deliberations conducted in Israel but in France, Hagana commanders were conferring with Irgun leaders since March, and reporting back to Mandate Palestine HQ. 

Communique 113 of the government, published on the Palestine Post's front page on June 22, 

misleadingly declared to the public that the Altalena's arrival "was referred to the Provisional Government" by the army's High Command when actually the Hagana and Mapai leadership had known for a long time about the ship and its imminent arrival and had informed the army that it would dock at Kfar Vitkin. Geffen quotes Ben-Gurion's June 16 diary entry that the arms brought "should not be sent back. They should be disembarked".  At Kfar Vitkin, Begin was not "hoping for a compromise" but rather that the government fulfill the agreement mutually reached and keep to its conditions but that was not to be.

It need be emphasized that in using "force", Palmah members shot at, and killed, Irgun members who were swimming ashore and physically could not even have fired back if they had sought to do so. Already the previous day, Ben-Gurion had authorized the naval units to use force to prevent the Altalena from leaving the Kfar Vitkin area.

In addition, generally unknown, on the same day of the events at Tel Aviv involving the Altalena, a smaller Palmach arms ship, the Inaco, slipped into Jaffa Port, undisturbed by the IDF, the government or the UN*. That organization seems to have had no political or ideological difficulties with Ben-Gurion.

____

*

From a Palmach source:

Begin felt that he had to let the Ministry of Defense know of the vessel’s arrival. On the 16th June Begin called Galili, Eshkol and David HaCohen to an urgent meeting with himself, Ben Eliezer, Meridor, Landau and Feiglin. The important item on the agenda was: In view of the cease-fire did the government want the vessel to come in? Or should they direct it back to France or somewhere else? Begin did not know that the Hagana was waiting for a vessel of its own – “Inaco” - that was carrying dynamite and half-tracks to Tel Aviv. He also did not know that the Hagana had all the information about the load and the passengers that the Altalena was carrying. Eshkol reprimanded Begin for carrying arms and men on the same voyage and Galili asked Begin if Etzel would sell the arms to Tzahal. Begin answered that the weapons were the holy property of the Jewish people; Galili said that he would report that to BG.

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The Zionist Titanic Pose

Haaretz has a weird, self-destructive sense of humor. 

From its June 27th issue, Galaria section, p. 18:

"Things That Never Happened": the film Altalena with Geulah Cohen and Menachem Begin in the classic Titanic bow pose.  Artist: Yizhar Shkedi.

Referring to the story of the search for the ship's remains.

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Altalena NOT Yet Found

There's a YNET story with this headline:

Report: Altalena wreckage located 

But:-

a) it has NOT been found;

b) what is needed is more sophisticated - and expensive - equipment;

c) if you read it carefully it is a double doubt. "suggests", "probability" -

"The acoustic signatures suggests that there is high probability that the wreckage is the Altalena, but more advanced equipment must be employed for a definite answer."

d) it is more Yariv Levin's pitch for press coverage.

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On Daniel Gordis' Use of A Too Forceful Pen

Daniel Gordis had written an op-ed, Before we preach to Israelis living abroad, and in it he wrote:

At moments like this, it’s hard not to think about the Altalena affair. Tragic though it was, it was the defining moment at which Ben-Gurion made it clear to all that there would be one central authority in the Jewish state. Those who sought to subvert it would be treated in accordance with what they were – threats to the state’s very existence. One prays that some progress can be made here without the use of force. But if it cannot, it’s worth remembering that we once had a prime minister who knew what had to be done.

I had noted it here, as a mischaracterization.

I realize that it is easy, too easy, to understand that as implying that shooting could be employed - "what had to be done". But it is not explicit. Nevertheless, I think he was sloppy with his historical comparision and I am sorry that Gordis, in using the phrase "the use of force" in the context of the Altalena when Ben-Gurion ordered the IDf to shoot at other Jews, is more than being an unfortunate error but one that completely distorts the Altalena affair.

The arrival of the Altalena was agreed upon in principle by the representatives of Israel's government, including the landing point at Kfar Vitkin. The Altalena was known to Hagana and Mossad L'Aliyah in France in February already. The 10-minute ultimatum handed to Begin there on the beach by General Dan EDden was an impossible situation.

Moreover, shooting unaremd Jews in the water is niot using force but acting criminally.

In any case, as a Rabbi, Gordis should have been more clear whether he was giving his blessing to killing Jews or simply the right of the government to use police force.

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Yossi Sarid Advocates Murder and Fratricide

In his op-ed today at Haaretz:

Where is the "holy cannon" when you need it - as David Ben-Gurion dubbed a weapon that fired on the Altalena in 1948. Where are all those pretending to continue in Ben-Gurion's path?

He also promotes reasoned and calm discourse, like:

For the record, all the settlements were built against the law, and now they're trying to sanitize the latest ones, on stolen private land. True, Ariel Sharon, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu all stood by the cradle, but still a bastard was born. They were all accomplices and one crime led to another.

or

The torch procession is still thundering toward the Temple Mount mosques, to the great conflagration that will rage in all corners of the Temple. The denouncers can prepare their fire extinguishers and fire-and-brimstone preaching.

and the title of the piece:

The Israeli leaders who denounce Jewish terror are responsible for it

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Barr Bares Mandate History

A new book, A Line in the Sand, retells the story of French and English involvement in the bringing too an end of the Ottoman Empire.

Curtesy of the author's site, here are some extracts from the first chapter on the issue of "Palestine to who?", to be followed by a comment on "Zionist terror" and the Jewish war for liberation from the oppressive Mandatory regime.

On the early history:

Late in the morning of 16 December 1915, a promising young politician named Sir Mark Sykes hurried into Downing Street for a meeting. The prime minister had summoned the thirty-six-year-old baronet to advise him and his war cabinet on how they might resolve a row about the future of the Ottoman Empire

- - -

‘I feel we ought to settle with France as soon as possible, and get a definite understanding about Syria,’ Sykes proposed.

‘What sort of an arrangement would you like to have with the French?’ asked Balfour.

‘I should like to retain for ourselves such country south of Haifa,’ replied Sykes, gesturing to his map.

...‘What do you mean to give exactly?’ pressed Balfour, referring to the French.

Sykes sliced his finger across the map that lay before them on the table. ‘I should like to draw a line from the “e” in Acre to the last “k” in Kirkuk,’ he said.

- - -

It was 25 April 1915. Constantinople, and victory, were just one hundred and fifty miles away.

The French and British both anticipated the division of the spoils. In France a small but thick-skinned group of imperialists, the Comité de l’Asie Française, began to put pressure on Delcassé to lay claim to Syria and Palestine...the Comité’s secretary-general, an aristocratic diplomat named Robert de Caix, reached for the history books to make his case. He argued that France had a ‘hereditary’ right to Syria and Palestine because it was ‘the land of the Crusades...where Western activity has been so French-dominated since the beginning of the Middle Ages that all the Europeans who live there are still called “Franks”’.

- - -

My understanding, it was obvious too all that Palestine was not going to be an independent Arab state. As here

The Sykes-Picot agreement drew a line east-west from north of Acre across to the Iranian border, ‘giving’ some of modern Turkey, all of Syria and Lebanon and some of Iraq to the French, while what became Jordan, the bulk of Iraq and Israel ‘went’ to Britain.

And now, as for Barr's treatment of the period of 1946-1948, we learn that

a)

Barr suggests that the climax of the struggle between the two, which lasted right up to the establishment of Israel in 1948, was French support (at what level is not clear) for acts of Jewish terrorism against the British.

His most striking piece of evidence came from a report written in 1945 by an MI5 officer and never before published (and not sourced here). It was at the time when the Yishuv was struggling to get the first pitiful remnants of the concentration camps into Palestine, and Britain was resisting both Jewish and Arab unrest with tough, even brutal, measures.

Barr quotes the MI5 man as reporting, from top-secret sources, that it was known that "French officials in the Levant have been clandestinely selling arms to the Hagana and we have received recent reports of their intention to stir up strife in Palestine."

Barr, a newspaperman by profession, adds his own gloss to this suggestion: "In other words, while the British were fighting and dying to liberate France, their supposed allies the French were secretly backing Jewish efforts to kill British soldiers and officials in Palestine."

b)

Barr even argues, not very convincingly, that the reason Zionist terrorists such as the Stern Gang and the Irgun were able to get some weapons and financing from France, to enable them to carry out the devastating attacks which eventually forced Britain out of Palestine, was because the French wanted to get even for the way Britain had helped Syria and Lebanon secure their independence. This might be stretching the story of Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant a shade too far. But it makes for enjoyable reading.

c)

Violence carried on and it seems that the French were rather encouraging it ; they might even have backed it up. James Barr argues that Zionist groups like the Stern Gang received weapons and finances from France who wanted to destabilise Palestine as much as possible to force the British into a difficult position. The reason behind all this ? Revenge. "It was the French who played a vital part in the creation of the state of Israel, by helping the Jews organise the large-scale immigration and devastating terrorism that finally engulfed the bankrupt British mandate in 1948".

d)

one of his original contributions, based on declassified documents, is the extraordinary discovery that the French secretly provided arms and financial support to the Zionist terrorist groups the Stern gang and the Irgun, as well as the Hagana. This was their revenge for British encouragement of Lebanese and Syrian independence. The Zionist gangs made havoc of London's plans for Palestine. It was two members of the Stern gang who, in 1944, ambushed and murdered Lord Moyne, resident minister of state in Cairo, member of the British cabinet and leading advocate for a Greater Syria.

And he doesn't mention the Altalena?

Consider this:-

The ship Altalena...brought arms and ammunition provided to the Irgun Tzvai Leumi underground militia by the French army. Documents revealed here for the first time attest that France's Foreign Ministry believed that helping the Irgun (the National Military Organization, known also by its acronym Etzel), would prevent Jerusalem from falling into Jordanian hands, which would strengthen the position of France's rival in the region: Britain...

...One of the most important documents is testimony the French deputy chief of staff, General Henri Coudraux, gave to France's Defense Ministry during an internal inquiry into the affair. Coudraux, who had played a key role in transfering the arms to the Irgun in June 1948, said in his testimony on November 15, 1949, that France "reached a secret agreement with the Irgun, which promised it advantages if it were to come into power (in Israel)."...Ariel testified, confirming that the Irgun signed a secret agreement with the French government whereby the latter would "provide arms to the Irgun to fight the Arabs."
...The writer of these lines recently discovered in a French archive the report written about 60 years ago by France's Ministry of Defense and the testimonies used in it. The documents cast light on the French motives in the affair, and indicate that a secret agreement concerning the arms supply included stipulations which, Coudraux said, were aimed at the provisional government in Israel. The Irgun representative said the targets of these political provisos were the Arabs.

The written agreement has not been found, but from the documents one concludes that foreign minister Georges Bidault deeply feared occupation of Jerusalem by the Jordanian Arab Legion, with British support; in the second half of May 1948, the Legion had damaged French Catholic institutions and France's consulate in Jerusalem. Years later Ben-Gurion hinted that the French gave the Irgun the arms in return for a commitment to protect the Catholic institutions in the city. On May 24 the French Foreign Ministry sent communiques to Jordan's King Abdullah, Israel's government and British and Arab legations in Paris, demanding that they avoid attacking religious and diplomatic institutions in Jerusalem. Irgun representatives in Paris received a similar notice...

Bidault decided to provide arms to the Irgun, an organization that opposed the interim government, and which was receiving clandestine aid from France, not only to protect French institutions in Jerusalem from the Arab Legion. He also knew this move would anger the British Foreign Office, which was closely following the Altalena's course...he may have had another to thwart a British-Jordanian move to control Jerusalem.

In the summer of 1944, French intelligence succeeded to recruit an agent in the Syrian government, who subsequently provided information about clandestine British activity in Syria and other Arab countries. As foreign minister in Charles de Gaulle's provisional government, Bidault witnessed the efficiency of the British secret services, which played a major role in expelling the French from Syria in 1945. Bidault, a devout Catholic, attributed great importance to maintaining Jerusalem's status as an international city, and saw a vital French interest in the creation of the state.

According to the French documents, Paris suspected that Britain had adopted a "double policy," which it used effectively in Syria: Alongside the declared policy about ending the Mandate and evacuating British forces from Palestine on May 15, 1948, the French believed that Britain's secret services sought to prevent establishment of a Jewish state, or at least to limit its size.

History is such an intersting subject.

Is the Altalena in Barr's book?

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Read The New Book on the Altalena Tragedy

Here's the cover of Jerry Auerbach's latest book:

which is described as:

Brothers at War is Jerold Auerbach’s probing and poignant new exploration of the tragedy of the Altalena, the doomed ship whose arrival in Israel ignited Jewish fratricidal conflict only weeks after the 1948 declaration of statehood. This is the first history of the Altalena by a historian and the first to explore it within the context of ancient Jewish and contemporary Israeli history. The Altalena remains embedded in memory, Auerbach suggests, still framing unresolved issues of political legitimacy in the Jewish State.

At the dawn of the Israeli state, the tragic destruction of the Israeli ship Altalena — by Israeli soldiers no less — threatened to tear the new country apart, and has lessons still for Israeli politics and peace. The first full book in English on this fascinating event, it tells the story, and the present profound implications, of a moment in the birth of modern Israel.

I thank him for mentioning me in the Acknowledgements.

It is a great and important read.

So, read it.

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Will The 'Altalena' Arise?

First, we were informed that the canon that sunk it might be on display at an IDF Museum.

Then Hillel Dalesky who actually fired the canon shots that set the ship's decks soaked with machine oil alight died this past week.

Now we have the real thing:

SS Altalena may finally reach shore
Israel may extract remnants of SS Altalena, which was sunk in 1948 by IDF while carrying Jewish passengers, display them at museum; cost of project estimated to reach millions

The legendary SS Altalena might soon reach shore: An initiative is being discussed by the Knesset to salvage and display the remnants of the ship, which was sunk by the IDF in 1948 while carrying Jewish passengers, Yedioth Ahronoth revealed Wednesday.

Heading the initiative is Chairman of the House Committee Yariv Levin, whose great uncle was the SS Altalena's military commander, Elyahu Lankin. A few months ago Levin presented the issue to senior officials at the Prime Minister's Office, who asked him to come up with a detailed plan and to coordinate it with the Navy.

Levin plans to submit the plan for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's approval in the coming days. According to senior Likud officials, Netanyahu is likely to sign off on the initiative. It is unclear how the project, which is estimated to cost millions of dollars, will be funded.

"We must feel a personal commitment to the founding generation in general and for the Altalena specifically, and bring the ship to shore," Levin said. "We are considering different possibilities , but the idea is that if the ship is extricated, it will be displayed in one of the museums, like the IZL Museum or the Menachem Begin Heritage Center."

(Kippa tip: SH)

The Boat Yet Floats

Interested?

Come back tomorrow.

The Burning Altalena as a Backdrop

The lady in the above picture, taken on June 22, 1948 on Tel Aviv's beach, is Miriam Tzur. Like almost all of Tel Aviv's population that day, she also rushed to the beach to see what all the commotion was about.

She was 16 at the time and she requested a photographer to take her picture.

It appeared in a special Independence Day supplement of Haaretz.

Foreman vs. Medad

Here's David Foreman's version of events:-

It was one of David Ben-Gurion's most difficult decisions. After the establishment of the state, the provisional government resolved to unite all pre-state military factions into the newly formed Israel Defense Forces. On June 1, an agreement was signed whereby Menachem Begin's Irgun would be absorbed into the IDF and, as a result, would cease all independent arms acquisitions.

However, prior to acceptance of this agreement, the Altalena, a ship carrying arms and fighters for the Irgun, was scheduled to land at the Tel Aviv port on May 15, 1948. For fear of it being sabotaged en route, no cables were sent to the Irgun headquarters in Paris, which would have included information of the agreement.

After a delay in the scheduled departure, Begin informed Ben-Gurion that the ship had set sail on June 11 without his knowledge and was scheduled to dock on June 20. Ben-Gurion gave his consent to allow 20 percent of the arms to be transferred to the Irgun's Jerusalem Brigade, which was still engaged in combat. However, this decision was conditioned on Begin's commitment to first turn over all arms aboard the vessel to the IDF for distribution.

When the ship anchored off the coast of Kfar Vitkin, Brigade Commander Dan Even ordered Begin to surrender the ship's cargo. In the meantime, Ben-Gurion commanded acting chief of General Staff Yigael Yadin to mass troops and heavy armor off the Mediterranean shore to force Begin's hand. Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, making a clash inevitable; whereupon Ben-Gurion issued the order to open fire on the Altalena.

While there is much debate as to whether the confrontation could have been avoided, Ben-Gurion's decision not to tolerate a militia operating independently of a unified army was courageous. He understood that a paramilitary group acting on its own would have a devastatingly destabilizing effect on the new nation and its future as a democracy.

This historical backdrop has served Israel's public relations campaign well when it singles out the inability of the Palestinian Authority to disarm its paramilitary forces - Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, Izadin al-Kassam Brigade, Islamic Jihad and a host of other private armies.

Here's my version:-

David Foreman's history of the Altalena affair is a bit off-the-mark ("Counterpoint: Israel's fifth column", Jan. 17). His chronology is skimpy, misleading and ignores certain elements.

Already on May 15 after midnight, Menachem Begin informed Yisrael Galili, of the new Defense Ministry, of the existence of the ship Altalena and even suggested the Hagan purchase it. On May 17th, Mossad agent Z. Schind informed Galili that they were aware of the ship's existence for some time and suspected the British were aware of its existence. Whereas Foreman's chain of events would imply David Ben-Gurion being surprised only on June 11, that is not the case.

But more important, Foreman writes that "Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, making a clash inevitable; whereupon Ben-Gurion issued the order to open fire on the Altalena". It would be more correct to have written that faced with an ultimatum that contradicted the terms of the agreement Begin had concluded with Galili to land the boat at Kfar Vitkin, Begin sought to communicate with Ben-Gurion. IDF troops then opened fire at Kfar Vitkin beach, killing two Irgun men whereupon the Altalena upped anchor and set sail for Tel Aviv. There, Palmach men opened murderous fire on the ship and at men swimming in the water. Fourteen more Irgun men were killed at that location by small-arms fire. Ben-Gurion then order a cannon to fire on the Altalena even though Begin had withheld return fire from the boat.

In writing "While there is much debate as to whether the confrontation could have been avoided", Foreman avoids the main question: if Begin initiated informing the new government of the ship, had agreed to a major compromise over the distribution of the weapons, had agreed to land at Kfar Vitkin, a Mapai moshav, and that almost 90% of the arrivals disembarked and had set off already for Netanya, why did Ben-Gurion need to use military force when Begin proved that in deliberations he was willing to seek national unity?

Could it have been that he was seeking to destroy Begin and the Irgun as a political force or even eliminate Begin altogether?

Responsible Broadcasting

Could this be a precedent for Channel Two's upcoming Altalena docudrama?

War veterans demand changes to 'politicized' Yom Kippur War film

The Israel Broadcasting Authority has postponed screening a documentary on the Yom Kippur War, to enable changes to be made in the film at the request of some of the soldiers whose battles it portrays.

The documentary, produced by Ido Sela, was supposed to be screened Sunday, to mark the anniversary of the war's outbreak on October 6, 1973. However, IBA Director General Mordechai Sklar decided to postpone the broadcast for a week following a meeting on Friday with Sela and veterans of the Armored Corps' 14th Brigade.

The film had been screened for the veterans about 10 days ago, and afterward, several of them demanded that it not be shown on public television, charging that the film was politicized - among other things, several of those interviewed in it harshly criticize the Second Lebanon War - and distorted history. Sela responded that he had noticed two minor historical errors himself and intended to fix them, but refused to make any other changes. Itai Landsberg, who heads Channel 1's documentary department, backed him up.

...In response, the IBA said that Sklar "attached great importance to holding the meeting with the fighters and representatives of the bereaved families and hearing their arguments, particularly given that this is the brigade that paid the heaviest price of the war. In the end, a decision was made to postone the broadcast by one week, during which time a number of factual corrections will be made in the film."

Talkbacks on My Altalena Op-ed

If you revisit my JPost op-ed (who have already read it once, yes?), I've left a comment in response to some of the talkbacks there and here it is:-

There is a whole body of literature termed "counterfactual history" or, the "what-if" syndrome. If Lerner had applied himself to portraying Ben-Gurion as bringing on the Altalena more arms, a plan the Irgun suggested to the Hagana months earlier, what would have happened in the war against the Arabs. Now, that's what I call good theater drama. But Lerner is ideological, not an artist. Too bad since he does write well.

Altalena Video Clip

Here's a video clip from Channel 10 news (in Hebrew) on the new Altalena docudrama.

And here is an interview (in Hebrew) with the actor that portrays Begin.

On the Altalena and a New DocuDrama - My JPost Oped

Take liberties with history, and you can fool millions

THE JERUSALEM POST
Sep. 19, 2007

At the Venice Film Festival early this month, British director Peter Greenaway spoke of his latest effort, Nightwatching, a movie about Rembrandt van Rijn. The film, in the style of docudrama, zeros in on three women in the painter's life.

"I can't prove every single fact, but you can't disprove it either," Greenaway told a press conference.

Maybe you can get away with that kind of approach on a Rembrandt docudrama and just hope for the best, but what if elements of Israel's history were portrayed on the basis of the "but you can't disprove it either" school of thought?

Israeli playwright Motti Lerner has shown he has no problem with taking just that line.

Lerner, the grandson of one of two woman presumed to have revealed to the Turkish authorities the spying activities of Sarah Aharonson in Zichron Ya'acov in 1917, leading to her arrest, torture and eventual suicide, is a theater personage of note. He has previously staged Messianic Pangs, The Murder of Isaac - with its infamous urination scene - and Bus 300, as well as Kastner's Trial among others.

In A Battle in Jerusalem, a television drama shown over Channel 1, IDF soldiers during the 1948 war are assigned to take an Arab position near Jerusalem. After a day of difficult fighting they retreat, but blow up the position with their wounded in it.

IN DESCRIBING the plot of The Murder of Isaac, Lerner explained that he sought to inculcate into his art the idea "that religious fanaticism was and is grounds for innumerable wars; and the fact that nationalistic and racist fanaticism still constitute[s] a central component of our culture."

The play was refused a stage in Israel, so Lerner took it to Germany for production. But it was the Kastner play that attained for him a place in all Israeli law schools - and no small amount of notoriety - when the subject of "freedom of expression" is taught.

In its script, produced for Channel 2 television more than a decade ago, Lerner takes liberal license with his Hannah Szenes character and suggests she handed two Palestinian Jewish parachutists over to the Hungarian police.

The incident not only didn't take place; it couldn't have. Szenes was already imprisoned when the parachutists arrived in the Hungarian capital. The scene was a figment of Lerner's imagination.

High Court president Aharon Barak decided, in the majority opinion, that an artist's right to freely express himself even if he actually falsifies what happened is protected from libel action. Justice Mishael Cheshin passionately dissented, arguing that the historical truth must take precedence.

LERNER, as he's written in a paper presented at Brandeis University, believes that Israeli society suffers from a "disease" - "that most Israelis do not recognize the simple and clear truth that there is a Palestinian people… [this] disease is the total denial of the Palestinian narrative… we, Israelis, must admit that this disease, which I've just described, is not very different from the same old racism that we suffered from for more than 20 centuries."

Now Lerner has a fresh project. Channel 2 will soon be showing a Lerner docudrama that purportedly portrays what happened when the Altalena arrived in Israel in June 1948.

Already, evidence is mounting that Lerner will be taking liberties with history. Yoske Nachmias learned that his character in the series will be firing a submachine gun at IDF soldiers at the Kfar Vitkin beach, a clash that occurred a day prior to the shooting that took place off Tel Aviv's beachfront; and that Menachem Begin will be hiding behind the Nachmias character, trying to protect himself.

The real Nachmias observes that this scene is completely fabricated. But neither the producer nor scriptwriter, as far as we know, appear to be interested in correcting the distortion.

WHATEVER the distortions of the past, Lerner's future crimes against history can still be corrected. In the first instance, the series should contain a prominent and explicit disclaimer stating that this is a work of fiction, and that any similarity with actual events is purely coincidental. If Law and Order can do it, Channel 2's Keshet franchise surely can.

Secondly, instead of calling the ship the Altalena, why not call the boat Shimshon?

Haim Hazaz published a book entitled In One Chain about the Irgun's Meir Feinstein and the Lehi's Moshe Barazani who, sentenced to be hanged, preferred to blow themselves up with a smuggled primitive hand grenade. All the names of the characters, major and minor, were changed. It did not detract from the story, and made it clear that Hazaz was interpreting a historical reality in a fictitious manner.

He could not have known what conversations transpired between the two heroes. But his approach emphasized that history and theatrical interpretation are two different things.

Only about 100 people who were involved in the Altalena incident are still alive. But millions may eventually accept the Motti Lerner docudrama take on the Altalena incident as genuine history. Very few will likely go on to read a genuine history book that would present an alternative to Lerner's narrative.

The medium of docudrama is subtle and facile and prone to convincing an unwitting audience that what they see is real and true.

Given Lerner's propensity for ideological antipathy to many of his subjects, as well as his record of playing fast and loose with history for (questionable) dramatic worth, the playwright should be forced to make these small alterations before his latest work airs on Israeli television.

The writer comments on political, cultural and media themes and blogs at www.myrightword.blogspot.com

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Note: the original version of this article can be read here

My Op-Ed in Haaretz on the Altalena

In the meantime, it's only in Hebrew (on my Hebrew-language site).

When, or if, it appears in English, I'll post it.

But the talkbacks are already fast and furious and mean. Check them out.

Okay, here's the op-ed scanned:-

Yaron London: "Maybe Shoot the Protestors"

In an interview with Aryeh Eldad, Yaron London of Channel 10 News suggested that instead of bring 3000 army and police personnel to expel two families, why not have a platoon come and shoot.

Here's the clip in Hebrew (see at around 11 minutes on the timer) and just at the end, London suggests 'to refresh the spirit of the Altelena'.

New Altalena Photo

The photo below was snapped by Benno Rothenberg (in 1948 - not at it mistakenly appears in the Hebrew caption)