A Thought on Anti-Boycott Legislation

Is this article relevant?

HARM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND PROHIBITION by Victor Tadrosa1, School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

Abstract

What restrictions are there on the scope of the criminal law? One familiar suggestion is that it is wrong to criminalize conduct that is not harmful. Another suggestion is that it is wrong to criminalize conduct if criminalizing that conduct does not prevent harm. The first suggestion focuses on the conduct criminalized. The second focuses on the effects of the decision to criminalize. A third suggestion is that it is wrong to criminalize conduct if that conduct does not wrongfully interfere with the sovereignty of others. None of these suggestions points to a valid principle of criminalization, though each points to part of the truth. Versions of the harm principle can deal with some familiar objections but cannot explain why it is permissible to criminalize interference with some nonharmful conduct, for example, interference with self-sacrificial acts. The sovereignty principle can explain the cases that the harm principle struggles with. But it makes the permissibility of preventing harm through the criminal law depend on interference with sovereignty. This is not attractive either with respect to the protection of those who have the capacity for sovereignty but especially with respect to the protection of those who do not. I conclude that any valid principle of criminalization will be complex, drawing on two independent ideas: of harm and of interference with sovereignty.

^