So, Disengagement is a Negative

Not not only Israel.

The United States (thanks to JD:-

The State Department has asked the Pentagon for more troops to provide security to U.S. facilities in Iraq.  There are some 850 U.S. troops in Iraq at the moment, including a detachment of 50 Marines from Bahrain bolstering security for the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.  Other troops are embedded with Iraqi and Kurdish forces as advisors, and are providing intelligence support and ground liaison for air strikes.The new request is reportedly for some 300 troops to beef up security for the embassy and for a U.S. facility at the international airport in Baghdad.

In early 1973, a major argument for America to adopt a policy of "strategic disengagement" was made.  The idea has been repeated by Stephen Walt now:

No, I don't mean isolationism: What I mean is taking seriously the idea of strategic disengagement and putting the whole region further down on America's list of foreign policy priorities. Instead of constantly cajoling these states to do what we think is best -- and mostly getting ignored or rebuked by them -- maybe we should let them sort out these problems themselves for awhile.

Not only Israel:

...the policy I'm suggesting would mean the United States would stop its futile efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

but

 the United States would also end its military and economic aid to Egypt

 Yet, the opposition is strong:

[D]isengagement is misguided and dangerous,

and here, too:

The Obama administration must recognize that the policy of disengagement both in Iraq and Syria, has failed terribly, and that the rise of a terrorist state in the Levant poses a direct threat to US security and will necessitate American action sooner or later.

Last night, I caught the end of  Ali Khedery on BBC's Hardtalk and he was asked about disengagement.  He said blunt out that disengagement would completely devastate the Middle East although he did not mention israel.  Maybe that's because he's
a former adviser to a string of American ambassadors in Baghdad. and resides in Dubai.

Where was he in 2004?

^

Rabbi Landes and Ghosts Past

Just as an aside, I was present at Rabbi Daniel Landes' talk on the Temple Mount at Limmud UK in late December.  He didn't mention this following aspect of which he now writes in Haaretz today although he made then two errors I caught.

Now, to the op-ed.  Here are a few excerpts from his current article which demands of us that

We must not allow the messianisms of the religious right cloud the call from our greatest religious authorities to return the territories, for the sake of saving life.

and I will make a few comments afterwards on that but, to continue with a few more excerpts:-

...the hardest act is to shake off the messianisms that envelop[s the religious right] society - ranging from overt and imminent “end-time” scenarios, to the hazy metaphor of the “beginning of the dawn of our salvation”...in the actual psyche of the religious Zionist, the persistently suppressed horror of that past repeating itself propels us further - into a delusional messianism that needs to be coupled to a secular rightwing ideology promising salvation by standing ‘strong’ and ‘proud’, that is confirmed by our increasing isolation.

This messianisms [sic] must be confronted...

The greatest Talmudic theologian of modernity was my master, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik...Already back in 1967...was clear that while sanctity of place such as the Temple Mount have great meaning in Jewish law, they are nothing compared to the safety of the Jewish people...

...Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s public position is...one must therefore return the territories out of concern for the danger of war...[out of] concern for pikuach nefesh...

...Ariel Sharon...discovered that despite his high evaluation and ready use of Jewish power, Israel cannot survive controlling the Palestinians...Israel needed to separate from the Palestinians and consequently much of the land they occupy, for what we halakhically call pikuach nefesh.

These old guys, call out to us from their graves – “Wait for the true Messiah, but in the meantime - get out while you can, or you will inevitably join us here.”

Landes is Director of the Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem, where he teaches the Senior Kollel Talmud class and Theology but his views are his own.  I wonder what are the views of his students after they learn from him things like this.

This outlook, of a fear of messianism, has been very central to the less-than-nationalist Religious Zionism camp since R' Binyamin, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Ernst A. Simon and Judah Leib Magnes. It has been visionary but completely out of touch with the reality of Arab hostility.

But I will not enter into an ideological, ethical or/and philosophical debate.  I'll keep to the facts.

As far as I personally know, Rabbi Soloveitchik first announced his views on the future of land and peace in 1968 in response to the Betar position that we would demonstrate against Lord Caradon's appearance at YU (he was the UK Ambassador to the UN and tried to get Israel to  retreat, with a past as a Mandate District Officer in the 1930s).  

By the way, if one is to base himself on Rav Soloveitchik, earlier on, the Rav considered Arabs to be Amalek as I have previously noted:

The Mossad HaRav Kook editon of Ish HaEmunah includes Kol Dodi Dofek and on page 101, RJB writes [my translation YM]: “the evil machinations of the Arabs are not directed only towards the political independence [of the state of Israel] but to the very existential essence of the Jewish community in toto. They aspire to destroy, *chalilah*, the *Yishuv*, from man to woman, from child to infant, from bull to sheep. At one of the assemblies of the Mizrachi, I said in the name of my father, my teacher z”l, that the portion in the Torah “Hashem wages war against Amalek from generation to generation” is not limited in its community application as a *milchemet mitzva* to a certain race, but is inclusive regarding the obligation of rising up against any nation or group that is infused with irrational [crazed?] hatred, and directs its hate against *Knesset Yisrael* …In the 1930s and 1940s, this role was filled by the Nazis and Hitler at their head. They were Amaleks, representatives of the pathological animosity of the last period. Today, the masses of Nasser and the Mufti are substituting for them.”

I wonder what Rabbi Landes would make of that.

As for Rav Yosef, he refused to go along with Ariel Sharon's disengagement. Shaul Mofaz, another CIC of the IDF, couldn't convince him either.  In other words, not every withdrawal can be approved of in a blanket "pikuach nefesh" definition (and someone has no informed me that he would not agree to handing over territory to a terror group).

And, sadly, as for Ariel Sharon, he was very wrong and even one of his sons tried to alter the decision but bowed to his father's authority as a parent.  The rockets and missiles, the two major military operations, his weakness in yielding to Condi Rice over the Philadelphi Corridor and more all indicate a major collapse on Sharon's part, and the failure of the policy.

Landes is misrepresenting the facts and reality of history and the results of the polciy he would have us follow and thus, misleads us all.

I leave him to talk to the ghosts from the graves as he seems to be caught up with a peculiar version of messianism.

^

Tom Friedman: Netanyahu Worse Than Arab Election-rigging Dictator

Tom Friedman hits on Netanyahu yet again.

In his latest op-ed column, Power With Purpose, he supports Ami Ayalon's "unilateral disengagement", what is now modified and termed - “coordinated” and “constructive” unilateralism. he has to take down Bibi.

So he writes:

He avoided early elections by adding a new centrist coalition partner to his right-wing cabinet, giving him control of 96 of the 120 seats in Parliament. There are Arab dictators who didn’t have majorities that big after rigged elections.

The he adds:

...The U.S. election silences any criticism coming from Washington about Israeli settlements. The Israeli peace camp is dead, and the Arab awakening has most Arab states enfeebled or preoccupied. So Israel gets to build settlements, while the Arabs, Americans, Europeans and Palestinians fund and sustain a lot of the occupation.  No wonder then that for most Israelis, the West Bank could be East Timor. “We see the writing on the wall, but we don’t care,” says the columnist Nahum Barnea of the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot, referring to the fact that Arabs could soon outnumber Jews in areas under Israeli control.    

   


I left this comment there [it's now up]:

TF writes in agreement with the claim that "Arabs could soon outnumber Jews in areas under Israeli control" in Judea & Samaria (or does he include the state of Israel as well?).  In any case, that claim is unproven and all recent demographic data, including population registries, birth rate, fertility rates, et al., all indicate a solid Jewish majority while Arab stats fall.
As for "East Timor", well, why not talk about "East Jordan", i.e., the part of the original Mandate which was to become part of the Jewish national home by decision of international law but was removed?  Why not rejoin the geographical unit and redivide more equitably?  Or have the Hashemite Kingdom serve as the political expression agent for Arabs who, living in Israel, cannot identify with the state's purposes as the Jewish national home?
Another item about that nasty East Timor comparison that TF knows well: unlike Indonesia, Israel did not invade an existing political entity in 1967 one bright morning.  It is the Arabs who term themselves "Palestinians", in their 'inventivity model of nationalism', who rejected all diplomatic efforts at compromise since 1920, who have exclusively used terror and violence, who established first the fedayeen and later the Farah to "liberate" Israel.

But Friedman does understand something:

At the same time, Bibi is prime minister for a reason. He was elected because many Israelis lost faith in the peace process and see chaos all around them.

It's just that Friedman doesn't like democracy besides misunderstanding the Middle East, misrepresenting the issues, providing less-than-factual data and promoting his youthful Breira philosophy.

To finish off, he asks:

Does Bibi have the will?     

  

Friedman has no way but hits on others.

P.S.  I left a second comment:

Oh, and in that comparison between Bibi being worse than Arab dictators who rig elections, TF is purposefully fomenting hatred and deprecation. No wonder we have assaults on Israel's democratic character (& I am thinking of the new Beinartism) if this is the type of rational thinking the NYTimes displays.

^

Religious Propaganda Too Successful for Its Own Aims

I recently posted the results of a Yesha Council poll and then this academic paper flitted across my screen:

While not all settlers, or ‘colonists’ as they are called in European newspapers, were religious (and this is a generalization, of course; There are many shades of observant groups in Israel, from light to ultra-orthodox, not to mention ‘secular’ sympathizers), the overwhelming majority was and still is.

The results of that poll were:

National - Religious: 34%
Hareidi - 32%
Secular - 34%

The study from which I culled that above excerpt, which deals with the Gaza expulsion: "Religion and Politics as Passive-Aggressive Partners: Some Reflections on the Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip", 8/2005 by Athalya Brenner, University of Amsterdam (now of Tel Aviv U.), also had this observation:

[I] expected to see how religious propaganda worked to convince—or to create conflict and disparity. This indeed happened, but on a scale smaller that anticipated. Paradoxically, the faith objects and concepts that were used in this largely performative event—performative, since the news media was ever present—achieved the opposite effect. Somehow, the use of religious symbols acted as conflict-resolving, rather than conflict-creating, agent. In that sense, it created [secular] public sympathy for the evacuees but failed to mobilize that public on their behalf and, therefore, no fatal rift occurred. In other words, religious propaganda in this instance should be evaluated as too successful for its own aims.

Her conclusion is even more direct:

Many voices in Israel and beyond proclaimed, at that time, that the degree to which the army and police forces were trained to deal with possible scenarios, their tactics and
superior power and numbers, was the main factor that facilitated the quick and successful evacuation...I believe the ultimate reason lies precisely in the fact that ‘A Jew can expel a Jew’ from the Jew’s home [to put the settlers’ slogan on its head], but—at least in this round—‘A Jew cannot kill a Jew’ for being expelled, certainly not in front of media cameras (the performative element), almost certainly because of the ‘Love thy neighbour/We are all one nation/Think of the Torah’ slogans (ideological elements) that united both sides well, to the chagrin of the slogans’ inventors.

For the settlers, the commonalities of shared [real or manufactured] memories and symbols proved to be a Trojan horse; for the ‘others’, non-religious Israelis, including most of the evacuators, the reminders of such commonalities assisted in checking potential violence against the settlers’ civic and more radical resistance, and in recognizing their very real pain of leaving their homes. Let me emphasize: that commonalities might eventually override differences in any conflict, including a civic conflict in which one side claims to have divine support, hardly needs further substantiation by the present instance. After all, techniques of [peaceful] conflict resolution will always seek common ground to base a solution on. What I found so interesting in the pullout case was the manner in which the technique worked so well that it achieved the opposite of what its initiators targeted. So game and match was won by the Israeli State this time. Religious/biblical symbols were recognized as shared, but ‘identity’ was ultimately resolved by being equated with obedience, or at least only a limited physical struggle with, the State. The stated overruled the Torah in this round.

I think this possesses much food for thought as regards the continuing hullabaloo over the "hilltop" youth phenomenon, that they are extreming themselves out of the mainstream, not only of those who are secular but of those among whom they live.

^

Quotable Words: On Disengagement

.

In historical terms, the problem of disengagement from Gush Katif was a relatively easy one. It never should have been built in the first place. I supported the disengagement, but have changed my mind since witnessing the results. The government should not have uprooted even one tree without a peace agreement, or at least an interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority.

Dan Margalit
Israel Hayom, October 23, 2011

^

I'm in a JTA Story

Six years on, lessons of Gaza withdrawal resonate for West Bank  By Linda Gradstein · July 4, 2011

SHILOH, West Bank (JTA) -- Yisrael Medad remembers when just eight families lived in the red-roofed homes in this Jewish settlement deep in the hills of the West Bank.

Now some 2,500 Israelis live here, and Shiloh has playgrounds, schools and a yeshiva. The red-roofed homes sprawl over several hills, and new homes continue to be built. At the bottom of the hill is the archaeological excavation of the biblical Shiloh, where the tabernacle is believed to have been built. Shiloh is often cited as one of the settlements likely to be uprooted under any final peace deal with the Palestinians. It is relatively isolated, about 28 miles north of Jerusalem, and halfway between the Palestinian cities of Ramallah and Nablus.
But with little movement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Shiloh is not likely to disappear anytime soon. And even in the long term, any discussion of dismantling Jewish settlements in the West Bank is haunted by Israel’s experience six years ago this summer, when the removal of some 9,000 settlers from their homes in the Gaza Strip was followed by a Hamas takeover of Gaza and rocket attacks against Israel. “The expulsion from Gaza should serve as a warning for any withdrawal from Judea and Samaria,” said Hamutal Cohen of the Committee for the Residents of Gush Katif, which was the largest bloc of Jewish settlements in Gaza. “The government totally failed with 9,000 settlers. How can they manage with tens of thousands?”

...Yossi Klein Halevi, a journalist and a fellow at Jerusalem’s Shalom Hartman Institute, says support for Jewish settlers in the West Bank has gone mainstream in a way that support for settlements in Gaza never did.  “Two generations have grown up in Israel who see the settlements not only as part of Israel but as the heart of Israel,” Halevi told JTA. “Any withdrawal from the West Bank would involve mass refusal of soldiers to follow orders, and I am deeply worried about the ability of the army to continue to be an effective fighting force.”
Halevi estimates that Jewish settlers and their supporters make up 40 percent of some combat units; an Israeli army spokesman said the IDF does not release figures “on such a sensitive subject.” Orthodox men, who constitute a wellspring of support for the settlements, continue to volunteer for combat units in large numbers.

...It’s not clear whether Jews who live in settlements like Shiloh would have the option of staying on under Palestinian sovereignty or whether they would want to remain. Some Palestinian officials, including Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, have welcomed the idea, but PA President Mahmoud Abbas has expressed reservations.

“If a Palestinian state is created and my security could be ensured, I would definitely choose to stay,” said Medad of Shiloh, who has lived in the settlement since 1981.

^

This Failure Will Not Happen Again

It won't because there will never be another disengagement, withdrawal or convergence. God-willing and a little help from man.

Inquiry panel: State turned Gaza evacuees into refugees in their homeland

A commission of inquiry into the state's handling of Gush Katif and northern Samaria evacuees offered harsh criticism of the bureaucracy, delays and poor planning by the authorities since the 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

The report concluded that all the issues still facing those the report called "refugees in the homeland" must be resolved by the end of 2011.

...The report, which spans 488 pages, was submitted to the authorities on Tuesday.

...The report's harshest criticism was directed at the failure to build public institutions in the communities to which the evacuees were relocated..."The commission believes that the delay in the construction of the public institutions is unbecoming, and in certain cases a complete failure for which the government is responsible," the report continued.

...The commission further found that the temporary housing in Nitan was built without any legal authority even though they had cost the state millions of Shekels. The report concluded that these temporary structures must be dismantled by the end of 2011.

...The commission wrote furthermore that the "handling of the evacuees is a test case for the Israeli government system...People lost not only their homes, jobs and communities, but they also lost a part of their identity."

"The state has a responsibility toward them in the basic contract that ensures the human rights of every citizen of the state, not to mention citizens who have been turned into refugees in their homeland by the state."

Academic Lack of Perspective

I found this article from 2005 and I ask you to spend two minutes and read the abstract and come to the realization that the reality - continued terror, Hamas takeover, etc. - is missing from this academic analysis:

Disengagement - And What After?
Hasson Shlomo
2005
Abstract of publication #3/37e

What will happen the day after the disengagement? Will disengagement herald tranquility and stabilization for Israeli-Palestinian relations, and enable the parties to resume negotiations and progress toward a permanent status agreement? Or, will the opposite occur, and disengagement will reinforce extreme Islamic factions who believe that only force can influence Israel? This essay examines these questions, through the perspective of four central and prevalent geopolitical approaches in Israel:

* The Inevitability of Separation: this approach holds that demographic and security considerations make Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria a necessity – even unilaterally, if need be.

* The Two State Solution: this approach supports a final status agreement, based on the principle of two states between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean sea, in which both peoples will exercise their right to self determination.

* The Greater Land of Israel: The Greater Land of Israel approach calls for Israel to remain in the territories, for various reasons: National-Religious circles, who believe in territorial integrity, justify their position through national and religious reasoning. Security circles supporting this approach argue that given the present security circumstances, and especially in light of threats of terrorism and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, Israel should not leave the territories.

* Bi-National State: This approach, which characterizes Jewish post-Zionist circles in Israel and nationalist circles among Israeli Arabs, sees a bi-national state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea as inevitable.

The essay presents the various approaches, elaborates the scenarios relating to them, and points out the signs marking the realization of each approach. Analysis of the various geopolitical approaches suggests two main options, which are, in my opinion, those which will stand at the center of the internal Israeli political debate, and around which the main political positioning will be formulated:

1. Containing itself inside the border
2. Deployment in the frontier area beyond the border.

A geopolitical approach is a sort of psycho-political pattern of thought, resulting from life experience and affiliation to a defined cultural group. It reflects one’s personal and collective beliefs and life experience, the opinions one is exposed to, and the social groups to which one is connected. It acts as a filtering lens, through which reality is examined, processed and interpreted. Based upon this processed reality, one reaches conclusions regarding the desirable course of action.

Underlying each geopolitical approach is a basic assumption; an irrefutable axiom. This assumption is sometimes displayed as an imperative, or as an inevitable process. The Inevitability of Separation approach assumes that the demographic process endangers the State of Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish and democratic state, and therefore, that disengagement is inevitable. The Two State Solution approach assumes that moral imperative and economic needs necessitate separation and the achievement of peace. Supporters of the Greater Land of Israel believe that settling the Land of Israel accomplishes a national vision and fulfills a divine imperative. The Bi-National State approach is based on the assumption that both communities, Jewish and Arab, are irreversibly intertwined, territorially and community-wise.

Despite substantial differences between the four approaches, they all share the historicist approach: the view that historical development is not a matter of chance, and that there is a constitutional logic at its foundation, which determines the direction of events. The approaches differ regarding the identity of the factor which determines historic development. Each emphasizes a different, exclusive factor which determines historic development in general, and, specifically, the nature of the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These factors, which include demography, morality and progress, national vision and divine promise, and irreversible intertwining, determine the history of the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. These factors determine who will take part in shaping history, and which political views and strategies will shape the settlement map.

The essay is guided by an approach of skepticism regarding the validity of the historicist worldview, that is, the worldview which seeks out a logic which determines the path of history. It also distances itself from philosophical-political relativism, which assumes that every geopolitical approach is legitimate. Policymakers must base their geopolitical approach upon a system of criteria maximizing the number of advantages. The essay presents six criteria, whose essence is the existence of a Jewish democratic state, living in security and peace and enjoying internal solidarity and international support. True statehood is the choice, between geopolitical options, which strives for harmony between the various principles, while moderating the contradictions between them and preserving proportionality in their realization.

The geopolitical option proposed in the essay in light of these principles, is an Israeli initiative to rein in within the borders and to stabilize the frontier beyond the border. This option fits the Inevitability of Separation approach, but is also aware of the dangers indicated by Greater Land of Israel devotees. It does not stop at the inevitability of separation, rather continues in the direction of a two state solution, while understanding that the process will be slow and paved with crises, as predicted by the Inevitability of Separation approach. The two state solution scenario will not be manifested in a complete separation, due to the special circumstances of the two states as indicated by the Bi-National State approach, and a certain amount of common space will exist in the future as well.

However, most of the public in Israel oppose such a state, whether as the Greater Land of Israel or as the post-Zionist version of a bi-national state. Israel cannot eternally maintain a situation of separation amidst increasing enmity; reality necessitates progress from unilateral separation to a two state solution of the conflict.

Worthless dribble for which he got paid.

For the Record and For Reflection

IDF general who evacuated Gaza settlers calls pullout 'utter nonsense'

The decision to evacuate Gaza Strip settlements in 2005 was "utter nonsense," the head of the Israel Defense Forces' ground troops during the Gaza disengagement said Thursday.

Israel Defense Forces General (Res.) Yiftach Ron-Tal made the comment during an interview on Army Radio, a day before the fourth anniversary of the disengagement on the Hebrew calendar.

"Today it is clear to everybody, that what at the time was an argument over a difficult event, was utter nonsense from a security perspective," he told Army Radio.

"I opposed it from the deepest meaning of the word opposition - from a security aspect, from a religious aspect and from a national aspect."

But don't worry -

Ron-Tal added, however, that he decided without hesitation to participate in the disengagement.

"I suffered and didn't sleep at night, but the decision was completely wholehearted. In my opinion, the alternative for the people of Israel was even worse."

This is great thinking (not really but that's Israelis for you).

Better Late Than Never

Poll: 68% of public that supported disengagement have changed their mind

Sixty-eight percent of the public who supported the disengagement in 2005 have changed their opinion on the issue, Army Radio reported Tuesday, according to a poll ordered by the Committee of the Gush Katif Evacuees.

Two thirds of those polled said that the government's handling of the evacuees was seriously flawed.

The Hebrew-language item notes that almost 5 billion New Shekels were expended for the disengagement.

How much for a significant portion of the Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria then?

A bit too exorbitant, no?

The Opportunity To Support 'Disengagement'

Finally, I can now support a 'disengagement' policy, as Jennifer Rubin describes Obama's predicament:

It was always going to be a challenge for the Obama administration to maintain a policy of engagement with regimes and actors who so obviously have no interest in being engaged...there has been precious little evidence that these players [N. Korea & the PA] are interested in adopting fundamental changes (e.g. giving up nuclear capability, recognizing a Jewish state, etc.) — which is the desired end result of engagement. But in the last few weeks the veneer of plausibility has been chipped away, country by country.

North Korea was the first to go...

Then we had Israel and the Palestinians. Happy talk toward the “Muslim World” and harsh words for Israel. The Palestinians balk when the Israeli Prime Minister reminds them this is all about recognizing a Jewish state. What’s changed? Who is to be engaged? Well there’s a head-scratcher. In the meantime, Obama can pester Israel about settlements.

Then comes Iran...

...One senses the Obama team is longing to hold on to the shreds of their tattered engagement vision...[but]...It is time for a new approach that does not entail self-delusion and doesn’t require historical distortion.

Moreover, the pipe dream that engagement could keep the world at bay and conflicts quiet...is proving unrealistic...

Aren't You Proud You Wrote That?

At the Claremont Institute site, I found this September 2005 opinion/analysis piece and read the following which sort of starts off funny but gets better:-

...Ariel Sharon's abandonment of Gaza is the act of a statesman.

For disengagement is in Israel's interests. Israel has no partner for peace among the Palestinians, nor any interest in waiting for one...It is, or should be, in Israel's diplomatic interests...And disengagement is in the interests of Palestinians, who will soon have their chance to build a state. Theoretically, that is.

There is little to suggest that Palestine will avoid the fate of its Arab neighbors: poverty, misrule, nepotism, and violence. But they won't have occupation to blame. The impending disaster of Palestine belongs to them, not Israel.

* * *

...The Israeli sin is occupation and the Palestinian sin is terrorism. But now Israel makes redress. What have the Palestinians done? Nothing. Actually, that's not true: they've been busy partying. And praising themselves: "This pullout is the result of our sacrifice, of our patience," said President Mahmoud Abbas. In another speech: "The credit [for the withdrawal] goes to the martyrs." Abbas has no plans to confront the terrorists under his dominion...

...The cutthroats of Hamas, like Jack the Ripper in his infamous letter to a London paper, have informed their pursuers that they shan't quit ripping till they do get buckled. Islamic Jihad took potshots at departing settlers, and even attempted a suicide bombing on the first day of evacuations...There is a war process. Israel must meet the next wave of Palestinian shootings, stabbings, rocket attacks, and suicide bombings with retaliation swift and fierce.

But this time around, after withdrawal, Israel need only concern itself with attacking, not defending, in Gaza. Nor can Palestinian aggressors dupe anyone with claims about "resistance to occupation." (Or maybe they can.)...

...Israel fights to preserve its democracy; Hamas fights to establish theocracy. Israeli politicians seek public support by promising solutions and calm; Palestinian leaders do so by pledging struggle and martyrdom. Israelis are saddened when their army causes injury to innocent Palestinians and prosecute their soldiers who violate the law. Palestinians greet atrocities carried out in their honor with cheers, rationalization, and fireworks...

...disengagement cannot bring peace; the withdrawal is from the land, not the struggle. Nothing can bring Israel peace until Palestinian terrorism is routed. Victory precedes peace, and it is on victory that Israel must now concentrate.

The author is Joseph Tartakovsky.

Words To Be Quoted For the Record

Peres: I was wrong about disengagement

President Shimon Peres said Wednesday that he had erred in supporting Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza...

"Whatever will happen in the future, we shall not repeat the mistakes we made in leaving Gaza," Peres said in a question and answer session with a group of American Jewish leaders. "It should have been done otherwise. I was for leaving Gaza. I feel myself as one of the persons mistaken."

...although "lessons must be drawn" from the 2005 unilateral Gaza pullout, demographic and democratic considerations still necessitate the creation of a Palestinian State..."I want to make sure that the State we have remains Jewish."

The Failure of the Disengagement Policy

From Martin Sherman's "Obssesive or Obtuse?"

...any dispassionate observer of events is easily able to discern that Disengagement brought a quantum leap in the scale of the activities of Palestinian terror in terms of operational execution, logistical capabilities and political empowerment.

This is clearly reflected in a paper published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) Israel's War to Halt Palestinian Rocket Attacks, authored by Israel’s former ambassador to the UN, Dore Gold. It points out that although:

"Qassam rocket fire did not start with Israel's Gaza disengagement...nonetheless, after disengagement the number of confirmed rocket strikes against Israel increased by more than 500 percent …The disengagement … led to the loss of Israeli control over the Philadelphi route …allowing for a significant increase in the range and quantity of rockets in the Palestinian arsenal. What is dramatically new in the rocket attacks in 2008 are the range and quantity of rockets being fired...[and as a result of increased tunneling] the quantities of explosives and foreign-produced, longer-range rockets that could enter Gazan territory increased dramatically...in early 2006 [it was reported] that the amount of explosives smuggled into the Gaza Strip … had grown drastically - by more than 300 percent...[and] between $50 -$70 million in cash has been smuggled into Gaza in order to finance the Hamas terrorist operations."

...the JCPA paper points out: "The 2005 Gaza disengagement provided Hamas with a sense of empowerment and self-confidence …Politically, this led to the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections in January 2006."

...The difference in the severity of the realities confronting Israel in the pre- Disengagement era and post- Disengagement one are so clear and stark, that to attempt to suggest that there is any equivalence between them is a ludicrous as to suggest that a mild cold and terminal pneumonia are similar simply because they can both be diagnosed "viral infections."

Disengagement has been a staggering failure – at least in the conventional sense of the word. All the envisioned benefits that its proponents advanced as reasons for its implementation have not materialized. All the ominous forebodings of the dangers that its opponents warned of as reasons for eschewing its implementation – and which were scornfully dismissed by its proponents – have indeed materialized. The ascendancy of the radicals, the expanding threat to Israel's civilian population, the emerging strategic dimension of the weapons in the hands of radicals…

When Hindsight Turns Out To Be Assinine

Politicians Swore Gaza Pullout Would Bring Security to South

Channel 2's political correspondent Amit Segal has gathered together statements made by many of Israel's leading politicians prior to the 2005 Disengagement from Gaza. Politicians rejected warnings of rocket fire from Gaza as "absurd," and many of those who now blame the retreat from Gaza for attacks on the south, actually voted for the withdrawal.

Then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated the purpose of the Disengagement from Gaza in his December 2003 speech to the Herzliyah Conference. He said:

“The purpose of the Disengagement Plan is to reduce terror as much as possible, and grant Israeli citizens the maximum level of security…These steps will increase security for the residents of Israel and relieve the pressure on the IDF and security forces in fulfilling the difficult tasks they are faced with. The Disengagement Plan is meant to grant maximum security and minimize friction between Israelis and Palestinians.”
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Herzliya Conference, December 18, 2003

Statements from members of Knesset made from the Knesset floor:

MK Meir Sheetrit, Kadima (Formerly Likud): There is an argument according to which there will be a threat… a threat and a fleeing… a threat on the Negev communities… I have never before heard such a ridiculous argument %ad%

MK Ran Cohen, Meretz: The disengagement is good for security. The right wing people stood here and talked about Kassams flying from here to there… I'm telling you, whoever wants to spare not only Sderot but also Ashkelon, both of them, must understand: if we don't go out of the Gaza Strip in two or three years, maybe after one year, the range will reach Ashkelon.

MK Orit Noked, Labor: I want to believe that, as a result of the evacuation, and the exiting of Gaza, the moderate Palestinian leaders will become strong, and terror will be reduced.

MK Shaul Mofaz, Kadima (Formerly Likud): I am convinced the act is necessary and right, it can grant greater security for the residents of Israel and can reduce the burden on the security forces, it can break the current stalemate and open a door to a new reality that will enable, when the day comes negotiations for coexistence.

MK Ofer Pines-Paz, Labor: Honorable Knesset Chairman, before I arrived in the Knesset today, I brought my son to the Tel Hashomer base, he received his first call-up order to the IDF. I must thank Ariel Sharon for the hope he gives me and my wife that my son, when he is recruited, will not have to serve the nation of Israel in the Gaza Strip.

MK Binyamin Netanyahu, Likud Chairman: Make no mistake, in a referendum I will support the (disengagement) plan

MK Yuval Shteinitz, Likud: I think that this plan, under the conditions, is appropriate for our confidence. It's not a simple plan, but it has a high probability of improving our geo-strategic situation.

What Was Given Up Three Years Ago

What Israel Gave Up in Hopes of Peace - Gaza Withdrawal Aug. 2005

100% proportion of the Gaza Strip was evacuated and handed over to the Palestinians. [16]
300 square miles of the West Bank evacuated. [17]
21 Israeli settlements uprooted in the Gaza Strip. [18]
4 Israeli settlements uprooted in the West Bank. [19]
48 graves uprooted in Gaza’s former Gush Katif Cemetery, including six graves of area residents murdered by terrorists. [20]
9,000 approximate number of Israelis, including 1,700 families, who lived in Gaza and the northern West Bank. All of them were moved out as part of the withdrawal. [21]
38 synagogues dismantled in the Gaza Strip. [22]
5,000 school-age children who had to find new schools. [23]
42 daycare centers that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [24]
36 kindergartens that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [25]
7 elementary schools that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [26]
3 high schools that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [27]
320 mobile homes, ordered by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, to serve as temporary housing for settlers. [28]
45,000 Israeli soldiers and policemen who participated in the Gaza withdrawal. [29]
$1.7 billion the approximate cost to the Israeli government for the withdrawal initiative. [30]
166 Israeli farmers who were moved out of Gaza. [31]
800 cows, which comprised the second largest dairy farm in Israel, moved out of Gaza’s Gush Katif community. [32]
$120 million value of flowers and produce exported annually from Gush Katif and lost following the evacuation. [33]
1 zoo, the “Katifari,” that housed hundreds of animals and was moved. [34]
10,000 people who were employed in agriculture and related industries in Gush Katif, including 5,000 Palestinians. [35]
60% proportion of Israel's cherry tomato exports that came from the Gaza Strip. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza extinguished this economic resource. [36]
3.5 million square meters (almost 1,000 acres) of greenhouses abandoned in Gaza. [37]
70 percentage of Israel's organic produce grown in Gaza – another economic resource lost in the evacuation. [38]
60 percentage of herbs exported from Israel that came from Gush Katif. [39]
15 percentage of Israel agricultural exports that originated in Gaza – exports lost following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. [40]
$360,000 expected average compensation amount Israel expected to pay to relocate each family. [41]
$870 million approximate cost for Israel to facilitate the resettlement of former West Bank and Gaza residents elsewhere in the country. [42]
$500 million amount of money Israel's security establishment spent to relocate Israel Defense Forces bases outside the Gaza Strip and build new border crossing facilities. [43]

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[16] Israeli Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, June 6, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israels+Disengagement+Plan-+Renewing+the+Peace+Process+Apr+2005.htm

[17] “Israel’s Disengagement Plan,” American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Feb. 9, 2005, http://aipac.org/result.cfm?id=1749

[18] Israeli Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, June 6, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israels+Disengagement+Plan-+Renewing+the+Peace+Process+Apr+2005.htm

[19] Ibid.

[20] Interview with Dror Vanunu, Head of Public Relations for Gush Katif, July 7, 2005; Interview with Dror Vanunu, Head of Public Relations for Gush Katif, June 15, 2005

[21] Interview with Dror Vanunu, Head of Public Relations for Gush Katif, July 7, 2005

[22] “Engaging Disengagement,” The Jewish Agency for Israel, Department for Jewish Zionist Education, June 20, 2005, http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Home/#did

[23] Plushnick-Masti, Ramit, “Israel to use 45,000 troops in Gaza, West Bank pullout,” Detroit Free Press, July 6, 2005

[24] “Engaging Disengagement,” The Jewish Agency for Israel, Department for Jewish Zionist Education, June 20, 2005, http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Home/#did

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Plushnick-Masti, Ramit, “Israel to use 45,000 troops in Gaza, West Bank pullout,” Detroit Free Press, July 6, 2005

[28] Ibid.

[29] Klein, Zeev, “Haber: HCJ ruling will raise disengagement cost to NIS 500m,” Globes: Israel’s Business Arena, June 5, 2005

[30] Arrow, Minda Lee, “Gaza settler relocation: new progress, ongoing complications,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 15, 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2326

[31] Lazaroff, Tovah, “Gush Katif dairy farmer has sleepless nights over cow remo(o)val” The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2005

[32] Stahl, Julie, “Gaza farmers say government has no plan for them,” Cybercast News Service, April 11, 2005

[33] Ettinger, Yair, “Even the animals won’t leave Gaza early,” Haaretz newspaper, June 21, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=590195

[34] “Israel,” Freedom House, July 6, 2005

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] “Rabbi rules Gaza graves must be moved; ZAKA refuses to lend a helping hand,” Israeli Insider, May 4, 2005, http://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Politics/5469.htm

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

HaEtzni's Piece on the Disengagement Folly

From The price of disengagement by Elyakim Haetzni (father of future Likud MK Boaz HaEtzni) which asserts:

Gaza war shows that fortunately for Tel Aviv, there was no West Bank pullout

Excerpts:

We are seeing a rare consensus: The slogan “land for peace” has disappeared. The Gaza disengagement, which created a new equation - “land for rockets” - left the “peace camp” with a minimalistic objective, bordering on the primitive: “Changing security realities” – a euphemistic expression of a notion that people used to disparage: We’ll hit them so hard that they won’t dare do it again.

Along the way, the mystical belief in negotiations and agreements was also abandoned...

...It isn’t worth it to pay the price of seeing Tel Aviv bombed, Jerusalem divided, and a small-scale civil war in Judea and Samaria just in order to teach the Left, the hard way, that there is no difference between Fatah and Hamas, and that what happened in Gaza will happen in Judea and Samaria.

...why did we embark on the ground incursion? To take over launching sites? And how long will we hold on to them? The truth is that the objective is to kill so many of them so that they “learn the lesson.” In the failed Vietnam War they referred to it as “body count.” However, the other side can also kill, and how many of our own victims compared to their victims will count as “victory?” The answer is that not even one Israeli soldier is worth it.

One does not conquer land in order to kill, but rather, for a substantive and defined purpose. For example, to take over the northern section of the Strip, or to hold on to areas that would enable us to monitor developments in Gaza refugee camps, or to take over the Philadelphi Route and the adjacent areas.

...Retrospectively, it’s already clear: The settlements in Gaza safeguarded Beersheba and Gedera, and by defending them the IDF defended the entire south (using much fewer forces.)

Now look at Judea and Samaria. There has been no second front there, and the IDF operates there as if it is a man in his own home; fortunately for Tel Aviv, there was no disengagement here. Meanwhile, the conclusion regarding the return of the Jews to their communities in Gaza is also clear, yet it cannot be stated in official media outlets as it is politically incorrect. Yet nonetheless, the time for it shall come.

Second Thought; Second Chance

The disengagement was an error.

It erred in the simple task it was supposed to do and created a huge humanitarian crisis among thousands of Jews who have been suffereing financially, psychologcially and spirtitually and now, with the inadequate protection at places like Nitzan, physically, as well.It erred by creating a precedent of forced expulsion of Jews from their land without an agreement of either security or peace.

It erred in that it did not provide Israel a respite from terror.

It erred in permitting Hamas to rule.

And now what?

This development:

'We lost our homes for nothing,' says reservist from former Gaza settlement

Three years after being evacuated from settlements in the Gaza Strip, some of the evacuees are now returning - in uniform. Aharon Cruz, a paratroops officer, lived in Netzarim for two years before the disengagement. On Sunday, he and his unit, to which he had been recalled a mere day after his wedding last Thursday, were back at the settlement's ruins in central Gaza.

"On one hand, there's a feeling of 'what did we leave for?'" said his father, Rabbi Ze'ev Cruz. "On the other hand, there's joy that he is returning to a place he knows."

..."It's a very difficult feeling," said Ami Shaked, former chief security officer of the Gush Katif settlement bloc, whose son is a paratrooper. "This is the first war in which my son is defending me instead of me, him."

But beyond that, "everything we said then has come true. What is happening today reopens the wounds. The thought arises that perhaps we shouldn't have given in; perhaps we should have been more insistent, ratcheted up the struggle another notch. But that's history."

Yossi Neuman, a reserve officer in Southern Command who once lived in Neve Dekalim...His son Itai, a tank commander, called him yesterday from the ruins of Netzarim.

"It's a destructive feeling," Neuman said. "I'm here on an emergency call-up and my son is fighting for what we once had. We said missiles would haunt Ashkelon and they said we were delusional. We lost our homes and our lives for nothing...

...the son of Zvika Bar-Hai - a West Bank settler who was one of the leaders of the fight against disengagement - was seriously wounded on the first day of the ground operation.

...Itzik Vazana..."We've made a big circle, and in the end, we're returning to Netzarim. Tomorrow morning we won't return to the settlement, but it's a process that will ripen slowly."

"It's a stab in the heart," added another, Eliyahu Ozen. "Today it is clear that when I lived in Netzarim, I was the country's flak jacket. Today, I live with the feeling that I did my job. Too bad they didn't want it any more."

Columnist Klutzky or, Bovine Feces

Yoel Marcus is thought of as one of Israel's more senior - and therefore most influential - columnists. But not necessarily the smartest.

It was to him that Sharon gave his now famous interview basically announcing the plans for a disengagement (*see timeline below) from Gaza.

So, despite support for the current operation, he still ends up writing:

However Operation Cast Lead ends, the important side lesson we can learn from it is that territory is becoming less and less central to an agreement. Nowadays, when missiles can reach the same target from north or south or dozens of kilometers away, it is not as risky to give up some hill or other because it is close to the airport, for example.

The whole territorial business has lost its importance. More and more, holding on to territories and their impact on a political agreement is becoming a thing of the past. A kilometer here, a kilometer there. All of a sudden, it's passe - a relic from another era in missile history.

Remember the movie "Honey, I Shrunk the Kids?" Try "Honey, I Shrunk the Country" on for size.

This, of course, is unmitigated bovine feces, as my friend Dr. Amiel Unger once said of a Kissinger suggestion way back during the post-Yom Kippur negotiations.

I wonder what residents of Ashdod feel and those of Beer Sheva knowing that Marcus thinks that just a few kilometers is, well, nothing. After all, let Ashkelon and Ofakim residents go to hell is his implication.

This is twisted thinking, thinking so representative of Haaretz and a select media elite which supports politically the worse policies for our country. He is promoting Barak and he will fit Barak's thinking (he wrote in that article this about Barak: "Ordering this operation, the brainchild of Ehud Barak, was a stroke of brilliance"; "Barak, whatever the circuitous workings of his brilliant mind") into a framework which is wrong but just palpable enough to be spoonfed to weak minds.

If anything like the Gaza disengagement happens to Judea & Samaria, YESHA, you can forget about using Ben-Gurion Airport, Mr. Marcus.

Of course, you can always apologize later, if you are alive.

Here's what Marcus later wrote:

To my great sorrow, it now seems that the extremist and pessimistic settlers were those who were right. The Palestinians do not wish to recognize Israel and have not accepted its existence. And now, with the election of Hamas, they again are not missing any opportunity to miss an opportunity…They turned the communities of Gush Katif into launch sites against residents of the Negev and particularly the town of Sderot. The warnings of Ariel Sharon and Dan Halutz that ‘If they will fire Kassams after Gaza is evacuated, Israel’s response will be harsh’ has not really frightened them. -Haaretz, November 21, 2006

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*

Disengagement timeline

November 13, 2003
­Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, close confidant of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, tells Haaretz in an interview that "the government of Israel is going to have to address the demographic issue with the utmost seriousness and resolve. This issue above all others will dictate the solution that we must adopt. In the absence of a negotiated agreement... we need to implement a unilateral alternative."

December 16, 2003
At the Herzliya Conference, Sharon announces his "disengagement plan," which he says will include "the redeployment of IDF forces along new security lines and a change in the deployment of settlements ... In the framework of a future agreement, Israel will not remain in all the places where it is today."

February 3, 2004 ­
In an interview with Haaretz commentator Yoel Marcus, Sharon says he plans to remove all settlements in the Gaza Strip and three in the northern West Bank.

March 28, 2004 ­
Knesset votes down bill on holding a national referendum on the disengagement plan.

April 14, 2004 ­
President George W. Bush and Sharon exchange letters. In his letter, Bush recognizes the "new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers ... It is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949." Sharon sees this as U.S. recognition of his demand to hold onto major settlement blocks in the West Bank in any final status agreement.

May 2, 2004 ­
Despite leading in the opinion polls weeks before the Likud referendum on the disengagement, Sharon is humiliated when party members vote against his plan by 60 to 40 percent. He declares he will forge ahead with the pullout.

more

Renoviction

RA sent me here for a possible new word for the 'disengagement' which actually was termed in Hebrew "pinui" which we translate as 'evacuation' but is really 'expulsion'.

Here it is:

renoviction

n. The mass eviction of an apartment building's tenants because the building's owner plans a large renovation. [Blend of renovation and eviction.]


Example Citations:

Forty-seven years later, Mr. McFall and his surviving sister, Mary, 91, still share a second-floor suite...They say they are victims of a new trend in B.C. — nicknamed "renoviction" — in which landlords evict tenants by announcing big renovation plans.
—Jane Armstrong, "Joining forces in face of 'renoviction'," The Globe and Mail, November 11, 2008


Renoviction is a new housing buzzword, perhaps a buzz-saw word. It is a portmanteau word, a blend of renovation + eviction, a neological nightmare for British Columbia tenants. Renoviction is the act of evicting longtime tenants from their rental houses and apartments by moneybags landlords who announce huge renovation plans that require the emptying of apartments and homes to be renovated. —Bill Casselman, "Renoviction: New Canadian word," Bill Casselman's Canadian Word of the Day, November 13, 2008