JINSA on Freeman and There's More

First, JINSA:

The directorship of the NIC is not a confirmable position. The vetting process was internal - no one but Director Blair and President Obama had to be satisfied with his credentials, and clearly Adm. Blair was satisfied. So why did he withdraw? Because once he aroused public and then Congressional interest and knew he would have to explain himself outside his cozy circle, he had neither the desire nor the ability to defend being paid by Saudi Arabia and sitting on the Board of a Chinese state oil company.

It would have been illuminating to watch him try.

Consider this - the Chinese state oil company, on whose board Freeman sits, pumps oil in Sudan. Two weeks ago, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Sudan's President Omar Bashir for crimes in Darfur. Bashir, in retaliation, ousted several of the nonprofit food and medical organizations that keep the people of Darfur alive even as they suffer the depredations of the militias supported by the Sudanese government. A few of the civilized countries, including the United States, tried to get a UN Security Council resolution condemning Bashir for tossing the food and medical people. China has a history of defending Sudan in the Security Council and in this instance threatened to exercise its veto on behalf of its state oil company.

And this from the New York Times whose headline, by the way on this is:

Israel Stance Was Undoing of Nominee for Intelligence Post

With opposition to Mr. Freeman mounting, many in the White House were debating the wisdom of the selection, despite Mr. Blair’s public support for him. “In conversations with people associated with this administration, I never detected any enthusiasm for this pick,” said Ira N. Forman, executive director of the National Jewish Democratic Council.

And the JTA report.



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About JINSA

JINSA has a Two-Fold Mandate:

To educate the American public about the importance of an effective U.S. defense capability so that our vital interests as Americans can be safeguarded; and

To inform the American defense and foreign affairs community about the important role Israel can and does play in bolstering democratic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, non-partisan and nonsectarian educational organization committed to explaining the need for a prudent national security policy for the United States, addressing the security requirements of both the United States and the State of Israel, and strengthening the strategic cooperation relationship between these two great democracies.

Founded as a result of the lessons learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, JINSA communicates with the national security establishment and the general public to explain the role Israel can and does play in bolstering American interests, as well as the link between American defense policy and the security of Israel

JINSA Confirms My Suspicions

I have attempted to alert the interested parties that American training of Palestinian Authority policemen is not all it's cranked up to be.

Israel's security, I wrote, (for eample, here and here and here) is endangered in the mad rush to achieve "peace" before the Bush end-of-term period.

Well, JINSA confirms my thinking on their
JINSA Report #816 of October 10, 2008:

Missing Mandates, Part II (Palestinian Police)

JINSA has commented over time about the American military mission to train Palestinian security forces. Under Oslo, the Palestinians were supposed to be police; counter-terrorism was left to the IDF. Training stopped during the second Intifada, but resumed in 2005. The Palestinians are now called "security forces," and receive counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency training and equipment.

During the recent Flag & General Officers Trip, we questioned various IDF officials about these forces to understand the extent to which the Israelis believe the Palestinians accept the mission to provide security for Israel and "dismantle the terrorist infrastructure" - the heart of the Palestinian obligation under the Road Map. If the Palestinian security forces haven't agreed to do the job, it is irresponsible for the Americans to give them counter-terror capabilities. We met with the commander of the American training mission as well.

The Israelis did not criticize the American military mission directly. We were told the Americans were "good people," but heard several times that the Palestinians have the capability, but lack the will to partner on security issues. A very senior IDF official also noted that Palestinians who participated in the first training mission were active leaders in the second Intifada. "I told (the Americans) we have experience with the Palestinian police since 1994. It is a big risk for us." And asked whether he worried about the Americans "making better terrorists," his one-word answer was, "Yes."

A senior intelligence official said the Palestinians are "very frank about what they will do and what they won't. They don't have support from Ramallah (the seat of the Palestinian Authority government) to partner with us." Furthermore, he added, the Palestinian training mission makes U.S.-Israel security relations more complicated. "We used to talk to the Americans about issues that concerned both countries. Now, they talk to us about Palestinians."

There are two problems here. First, the Americans are training Palestinians to do a job their leadership has not agreed they will do. They focus on providing skills to the Palestinians because that is a job they can do, and they ignore where those skills might be used because that isn't in the mandate.

The American commander expressed faith in the troops he was training, and carefully defined his mission as being West Bank security (not, by the way, "Israel's security"). "Gaza," he said flatly, "can fall into the sea." And there is the second missing mandate. The Americans have nothing to do with Gaza - for good reason - but the result is that we can at best provide security forces for the West Bank, creating de facto three states between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean: Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.

That is not U.S. policy, but it is what emanates from the lack of mission for anyone - U.S., Israeli or Palestinian security forces - to deal with Hamas in Gaza.