The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence Promised Arabs a State in Palestine?

One of the mainstays of those claiming that the Zionists did not deserve to be awarded the territory of Palestine, among several, is that the McMahon correspondence of 1915 alloted to Sharif Hussein that same territory as part of the promise of the Arabs to revolt against Turkey. Henry McMahon being the High Commissioner of Egypt at the time.

Many argue over exactly where were the geographical delineation lines. They even ignore this:

Feisal made the first challenge on 20 January I92I in an interview at the Foreign Office with R.C. Lindsay, representing Curzon, the Foreign Secretary. Feisal claimed that 'nothing in the original correspondence stated that Palestine should be excluded from the Arab boundaries'. To this Lindsay pointed out that Palestine had been 'expressly reserved' from these boundaries and the relevant passage from McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 was read aloud to the Emir in Arabic. After an exchange of views Feisal conceded that it had been the original intention of the British government to exclude Palestine*

*
FO 371/6237, E 986/4/9I, 'Report on Conversation...20 January 1921'. Present: R.C. Lindsay, Major H.W. Young, Col. Cornwallis, Emir Feisal, Brig. Gen. Haddad Pasha, Rustum Haidar; see also FO 37I/6238, E 2I33/4/9I, FO to Herbert Samuel (Jerusalem) 22 February 1921, referring to Lindsay - Feisal conversation; Winston Churchill's statement, Hansard, 11 July I922, cols. 1032-4.

But there is another aspect: did the Arabs fulfill their side of the bargain?

If you saw the film Lawrence of Arabia or read Seven Pillars of Wisdom, you are of one mind.

Here is another mind in this article:

C.S. Jarvis, formerly Governor of Sinai, expressed himself in less complimentary terms: 'The Syrians as a people did nothing whatsoever towards assisting the Arab cause...beyond hold secret meetings and talk. The inhabitants of Palestine did rather less.' Lloyd George recalled ironically that 'the Arabs of Palestine, who might have been helpful in many ways, were quiescent and cowering. Right through the War and up to the end, there were masses of Arab soldiers from Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine in the Turkish Armies fighting against the liberation of their own rule...the Palestinian Arabs were fighting against us.'  Despite much encouragement, when the British troops were already firmly entrenched in Jerusalem, the results of recruiting for the Sherifian forces were disappointing; no more than 150 Arabs were recruited. The verdict of the Palestine Royal Commission was clear: 'It was the Sherif's own people . . who bore the brunt of the actual fighting. The Arabs of Palestine did not rise against the Turks.'

And

`Commenting on The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, General Sir H. G. Chauvel, formerly Commander of the Australian Division in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, wrote: 'Lt. Colonel Joyce has been kept in the background. He was in charge of the Hedjaz Mission, while Lawrence was only the liaison officer between Feisal and General Allenby. Joyce was the organizer of the only fighting force of any real value in the whole of the Arab Army, and I always thought that he had more to do with the success of the Hedjaz operation than any other British officer.' Chauvel to the Director of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, I January I936, Allenby Papers, copy at St Antony's College, Oxford.

This as well

'I must honestly confess', Clayton told Sykes, 'that, viewed as a symbol of Arab nationalism, the Legion has been a failure. It has not been received with any enthusiasm by the local Arabs, in spite of much propaganda.... I cannot say that it is worth either the money or the time of skilled officers which has to be expended upon it.

And this

...the most crippling blow for McMahon was the revelation contained in Feisal's confidential message to his father. From its contents McMahon learned, much to his surprise, that Feisal wrote 'as an upholder of Islam against Christian encroachment' and seemed to imply that had the Turks been 'strong enough to keep Moslem frontiers intact... he would have backed' them rather than the British. McMahon had to concede the bitter truth that the Hedjaz Arabs were 'unlikely to act efficiently in Syria...or to cut the Baghdad Railway'. He advised the Sherif to confine his action to Arabia proper and to recall Feisal. 'We can...safely trust Sherif but we have no guarantee of Feisal's attitude.' 

In summation:

There was thus no unilateral commitment. The Arabs were equally under definite obligations to fulfil their part, and it was on the nature and quality of their performance that the 'permanence and strength' of the agreement depended. That recognition of the 'independence of the Arabs', in specified areas 'south of latitude 37 was conditional on an Arab revolt', was testified also by T.E. Lawrence (in a letter to The Times, 11 September 1919), and confirmed by Lloyd George

Let us not forget what the Jews did: the activities of the NILI spy ring, led by Aaron Aharonson, as well as the Zion Mule Corps, led by John Henry Patterson, and the Jewish Legion, with a first-hand account here and also here and here.

And do not skip this part in the article:

Grey, no less than Kitchener, appreciated the urgency of the matter and was favourably disposed. But suspecting (as it turned out quite correctly) some ulterior motives for the undue haste, he warned the High Commissioner to avoid giving the impression that the British supported Arab interests in Syria merely in order to establish their own at the expense of the French. However, McMahon, without further consultation, dispatched his crucial letter of 24 October 1915 to Sherif Hussein. Two days later he cabled that the matter brooked 'no delay' and he had, therefore, to act 'without further reference'. The Rubicon was crossed. The Arabs won their Magna Carta and Great Britain a standing embarrassment. The responsibility was solely that of McMahon.

Footnote 28:   'As you rightly say, it is very much to the High Commissioner's credit that he boldly took the responsibility on himself of replying to the Sherif without further reference, and I greatly hope that the latter will not stick out about the frontiers.' (Wingate to Clayton, 1 November 1915, Private, Wingate Papers, Box 135/5.) 

One more addition, from the 1922 White Paper:

it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge.

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