The State Department and Zionism 1917-1930

From here:


The Balfour Declaration was welcomed by the political leadership of the US, including both the president and Congress, but the State Department reacted with skepticism to it. Secretary of State Robert Lansing advised Wilson not to endorse it, citing as reasons opposition from the Turks and the dividedness among the Jews themselves on the issue of Zionism.238 Moreover, in a letter written in December 1917, Lansing warned that “many Christian sects and individuals would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to the absolute control of the race credited with the death of Christ.”239 

In their assessment of the situation, the State Department and the Protestant missionary circles overlapped. State Department correspondence of the time also reveals the existence of anti-Semitism within its ranks. Many believed that the Zionists were agents of Bolshevism, a theory which was also inspired by the publication and distribution of the English version of the ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ after World War I.240 The spread of such conspiracy theories, which experienced mounting popularity during these years, strengthened the anti-Zionist case. To those already disposed towards anti-Semitism, Zionism appeared to be an international Jewish conspiracy. Thus, the contradictory claims that the Jews sought to establish a theocracy in Palestine and that they were communist agents, were often levelled at Zionism simultaneously.241 

US support for Zionism was further undermined by a generally isolationist climate under the three republican presidents who followed Wilson, which limited US foreign involvement. In the early 1920s, the State Department thus embarked on a course of active opposition to Zionism. In a series of internal memorandums drafted in 1922, NEA chief Allan W. Dulles and Secretary of State Charles Hughes committed the State Department to a policy of non-intervention in Palestine’s affairs and a rejection of Zionist demands. This tendency became obvious during the draft negotiations for the Anglo-American Treaty on Palestine. Against British wishes and seeming US interests as well, the State Department sought to restrict US rights to intercede with the British mandate in Palestine. This was made in order to foreclose US involvement in the country. In addition, it requested the excision of the preamble, citing the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, US interests were narrowly defined as those of the missionary educational establishment and business interests in the Middle East, not as those of the supporters of Zionism.242 Already at that time it became clear that the State Department’s stance toward Zionism was significantly at odds with that of Congress.

The State Department was convinced that support for Zionism was detrimental to US interests in the region. It was apprised on the situation in Palestine through its Consul in Jerusalem, who tended to have strong opinions on the relevant issues and whose competence was not always beyond doubt. Those who filled the position were usually not well disposed towards Zionism and influenced by the ‘Red Scare’. Reverend Otis Glazebrook, who officiated in Jerusalem since 1914, favored the conservation of the Ottoman Empire under an American mandate and rejected Zionism. His stance had influenced the findings of the King-Crane commission.246 In his reports to Washington, Glazebrook showed little understanding of intra-Zionist dynamics. Probably influenced by the spread of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories after World War I, he believed the moderate Zionist Organization to be a violent, radical Jewish group, hostile to Christianity. 

A report by his successor Addison E. Southard equally described Eastern European Jewish immigrants as “potential troublemakers of Bolshevist tendencies.”247 His successor George C. Cobb showed a more impartial attitude towards Zionism.248 However, charges that the Zionists were tied to Bolshevism resurfaced with Paul Knabenshue, who acted as consul from 1928 until 1932. In 1929, Arab riots erupted in Palestine and culminated in the massacres of the ancient Orthodox Jewish communities in Hebron and Safed. In total, more than 400 Jews were killed or wounded. The State Department was generally unsympathetic to the Jewish victims of the riots. In his reports, Knabenshue ignored the incitement of the SMC and put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Zionist ‘provocateurs’. Moreover, he was of the opinion that the Jews possessed no rights at the Western Wall.249 

American reticence to appear pro-Zionist was also motivated by the fear that such an impression would compromise US interests in the region, which were never defined as including the interests of American Jews. Thus, Knabenshue closely monitored Arabic newspapers, highlighting those articles which were critical of US-Zionist collaboration in his correspondence with Washington.250 The anti-Zionist stance of the State Department was strengthened by the reports authored by the Shaw and the Hope-Simpson commissions, which were published in 1930. These reports investigated the reasons behind the riots. Both ascribed the responsibility for the riots largely to the Zionist policy in Palestine. They were especially critical towards the effects of the acquisition of Arab land and Jewish immigration. The findings therefore recommended a revision of the British policy towards Zionism, suggesting limiting Jewish land acquisition and immigration.251 These suggestions were in line with the thinking in the State Department. The riots in Palestine also had a great effect on public opinion towards Zionism in the US.

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