Shaul Arieli is the left's map man, the expert on drawing lines to divide.
He has an op-ed in Haaretz, home to the harried humanists and zeroed-out Zionists.
He notes that
A common conception of time is also important in understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Three key years in the conflict, 1917, 1947 and 1967, mark three sets of events, each year with its own significance, on which in principle an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians can be based.
...the beginning of the conflict...designate[s] the Balfour Declaration as its opening shot. It is unique in how it created the national narrative of the two sides. The Jewish-Zionist side views it as international recognition of the right of the Jewish people to establish an independent state in the Land of Israel. The Arab-Palestinian side sees it as a historic injustice because it did not apply the principle of self-determination to the Arabs of Palestine, who constituted a decisive majority in the country at the time.
What is missing here is that he leaves out the key phrase "historical connection" adapted into the language of the San Remo decision and the League of Nations Mandate pronouncement. That counters the narrative of a supposedly "indigenous" people who possessed a national ethos which was not true.
As for the rest, it goes like this a la Arieli:
...1917 was therefore the “big bang” that set the conflict in motion. 1947, despite its being the culmination of the process, is one of the consequences of 1917. That is all the more so regarding 1967. That year’s events stemmed mainly from the Arabs’ refusal to accept 1947 as an established fact. Even if 1967 created new possibilities for a settlement of the conflict through Resolution 242, which was adopted in the aftermath of the war, it is clear that it should not be viewed as the point of departure of the conflict, because the negotiations also concern mutual recognition with its origins in 1917, and the refugee issue from 1947...The different narratives cannot currently be bridged, due to the residue of the past and its consequences for the outcomeof the negotiations.
And that is very true. As I pointed out, Mordechai Nisan properly analyzes the insurmountable challenge of achieving any agreement on the Arab side to any feasible compromise that Israel could male on the issues of the conflict stemming from this.
Worse, at least for the Arabs and their supporters, is that all the compromises that were made or agreed to by the Zionist movement in its modern historical development since 1917 were rejected and met with the continued violence which defines their Palestinianism which is not pro-"Palestine" but simply and crudely anti-Israel, anti-Jewish.
While for Arieli
...it is not possible to come to a final peace agreement without complete adoption of Resolution 242, which represents the 1967 conception. The 1967 war was a watershed in the conflict. It brought about fundamental changes that not only brought problems to the surface that required a solution, such as the “legacies” of the 1948 War of Independence - borders, security, Jerusalem and refugees.
I think the Arabs-who-refer-to-themselves-as-'Palestinians' do not see it that way, do not think about it that way, do not conceptualize the conflict that way and certainly do not intend that any resolution "end" at 1967.
Arieli's thinking, that
Bypassing the narratives can make it possible for the Palestinians to maintain the dream of the homeland, meaning all of Palestine of the British Mandate, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River...
is not only irrational in light of the political reality but highlights the "ha-ha" quality of those in Haaretz who promote Zionist depression.
And thank you Ilan Pappe:
I think it is important to go back to even earlier than 1936 in order to understand it. You have to go back to the late nineteenth century when Zionism appeared as a movement. It had two noble objectives, one was to find a safe place for Jews who felt insecure in a growing atmosphere of anti-Semitism, and the other was that some Jews wanted to redefine themselves in a national group, not just as a religion.^
The problem started when they chose Palestine as a territory in which to implement these two impulses. It was clear — because the land was inhabited — that you would have to do it by force and you had to contemplate the depopulation of the indigenous people. It took time for the Palestinian community to realize that this was the plan....
... As far as the West Bank is concerned, you see why a two-state solution is attractive. It could mean the end of military control. One can understand this. But this disregards the other Palestinians: the refugees, the ones from Gaza and the ones that live inside Israel.
That’s one of the difficulties. You have certain groups of Palestinians that, in my opinion, wrongly, believe that this is the quickest way to end the occupation. I don’t think it is.
The second reason is that the two-state solution has a logical ring to it. It’s a very Western idea, a colonialist invention that was applied in India and Africa, this idea of partition. It became a kind of religion to the extent that you do not question it anymore. You work out how best to get there. That is surprising. To my mind it makes very intelligent people take this as a religion of logic. If you question the rationality of it, you are criticized.