Condi Gets It Right And Then Gets It Wrong

From the transcript of her meeting with the Washington Post editorial board, with, of course, my comments in bracketed italics:

But the real issue that we’re seeing played out now in Gaza is what’s going to be on the other side of that boundary. It is going to be a capable state that is able to deliver security and well-being for its own people and willing to fight terrorists in its midst? That’s really the essential question. [yes, and based on the experience of the past 2.5 years, is Hamas to be involved in that state-building enterprise?]

And the last year of Annapolis has focused as much on that question in the West Bank as it has focused on what the boundaries of the state will be. They’ve been co-equal parts. [co-equal? should not one come before the other so that the Gazan experience, and similar experiences in the past, such as the rejection by the Pals. way back in the 1920s of any state-body if the Zionists still are able to get theirs, not be repeated for failure?]That’s why Palestinian security forces are more professional now and more capable now than they were in 2001, ‘2, ‘3, ‘4, ‘5 or ‘6. [and they have a very long way to go] It’s because there’s been a concerted effort to make those forces professional and capable, not a bunch of armed thugs running around with cell phones calling themselves security forces in nine different organizations paying patronage to Yasser Arafat. [oh, really? so that's what they were doing under Bill Clinton's presidency. And Hillary is beinging back Bill's Boys (I hope the gals get left out of things this time)?] That was the nature of Palestinian security forces in the past. [nature, you finally got it right, Condi] These are professional security forces, trained in Jordan, that are taking up their security responsibilities in places like Hebron and Nablus and Jenin. [that's a lot of pooh-pooh]

Secondly, Salam Fayyad often says that he is building the state even under occupation, though he would be the first to say – and I would agree with him – the occupation has to end in order for that state to really emerge. [not really. first get all your acts together: human rights for you own 'citizens', liberites, transpancy, no more embezzelment, etc.] But that’s why he is focused on good governance, on budget control, on a social system for the people, on an educational system that doesn't incite. The institutions of a Palestinian state are, in fact, coming into being. [we're still waiting]

So I think there’s been a lot of work done to deal with what probably ultimately is going to determine both the creation of that state and its well-being, which is its internal character. It helps, too, that Salam Fayyad and Abu Mazen are devoted to democracy as their – the basis of their legitimacy. [another, 'oh, really?']

Now, Gaza, unfortunately, is under quite a different kind of regime. It’s under Hamas, which shows us what it could look like if you’re not very much focused on what the internal character of the state is. It could be [could be? it will, it will] a launching pad for terrorist activities against Israel, which Israel, rightly, will not countenance. It could be a place where the schools are being turned to a hard Islamic – Islamist agenda. It could be a place where gangs and thugs run the streets smuggling weaponry in from Iran. And it could be a place where the people can’t receive basic goods and services because it is isolated internationally. That’s the alternative. So again, working on the internal character of this will help.

Now, it is my hope that a durable ceasefire in Gaza will begin to reverse some of the difficulties that Hamas’s illegal [even a legal victory is failure]coup d’état in Gaza brought. First of all, that there will be a way to deal with the smuggling so that arms are not flowing in; secondly, that there will be a way to put pressure on Hams (sic) to stop firing rockets against Israeli citizens; third, that there will be a reasonable opening of crossings, particularly Rafah and Kerem Shalom under the 2005 Movement and Access Agreement; and fourth, that there will be a process of Palestinian reconciliation that is based on the principles that are embodied in the November 26th Arab League resolution that effectively says there need to be elections for both the PLC and the presidency, but until then Abu Mazen ought to govern. And what is more, any government has to be – to adhere to prior agreements that the PLO has signed. That, I think, is the way ultimately out of Gaza. And if you get that in Gaza, then you have a West Bank and Gaza that you could imagine becoming constituent parts or that would become constituent parts of a Palestinian state that would work...

...In terms of Israel leaving Gaza, I think that the Israelis did the right thing in leaving Gaza in 2005. But unfortunately, the efforts to build up Palestinian institutions in Gaza really didn’t keep pace, ['keep pace'?]and maybe that’s something that we should have paid more attention to. I think Abu Mazen was focused on it, but frankly, they didn’t yet have a governmental structure. [no, they didn't care as long as Hamas didn't threaten their jobs and positions] It was a while before you get Salam Fayyad and his government, which is – you can say that these things should happen, but if you don’t actually have people who can execute, it’s difficult. And you now have a Palestinian government that can execute. You really didn’t have that in 2005-2006.

QUESTION: In the “do you regret” category --

SECRETARY RICE: Aren’t you going to say, “Aren’t you thrilled that? (Laughter.)

I am thrilled.