Jabotinsky Parts Ways With Weizmann

 After some two years that Ze'ev Jabotinsky had come to realize that Chaim Weizmann was too docile in combatting British reneging on the Balfour Declaration and especially after Weizmann did not back Jabotinsky when he commanded the Jewish self-defense unit in Jerusalem in April 192o, the break became unavoidable.

The first step was the White Paper of 1922.

Here is a description of the lead up to the fateful vote to accept it.

Source: Jonathan Kaplan's PhD Thesis - “Weizmannism” in the Zionist Movement during the 1920s

To make matters worse, the position of Zionism in public opinion had been considerably compromised at precisely the moment when British policy in Palestine was about to be debated in Parliament. This constellation afforded Hebert Samuel, who arrived in England in early May, a unique opportunity to press home the policy that he had been advocating since his first visit to Palestine in the spring of 1920. His approach had been rejected at the conference convened in Balfour’s home back in July 1921 but now that the ratification of the Mandate seemed so close to realization and the Zionist freedom of action was severely limited, it appeared that it might be possible to leverage the situation in order to win Zionist consent to his new policy.85

This was expressed in a statement written by Shuckburgh and Samuel, and signed by Churchill, that came to be known as “Churchill Memorandum.”86 The essence of the policy was a dual commitment: to the well-being of the Arab population of Palestine as well as to the continued development of the Jewish National Home. The goal in mind was not to create a “wholly Jewish Palestine.” The country was not to be transformed in its entirety into a Jewish National Home, but such an entity would be created in Palestine. Immigration would be limited by the economic capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants. However, it was emphasized that the Jews were in Palestine by right and not on sufferance, and the Jewish National Home would continue to develop. An elected Legislative Council was to be established to represent the local population. Samuel’s overall view was that with fair treatment and good will, Jews and Arabs could live together peaceably in Palestine:

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that a spirit of cooperation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.87

An advance copy of the memorandum was conveyed confidentially to Weizmann on May 27 and to the Arab Delegation on May 30. On June 3, a letter was sent to the parties with the polite but nonetheless unmistakable ultimatum that each express its agreement to conform with the new policy.88 In one of the clearest presentations of the Palestinian Arab case, the Arab Delegation rejected the document outright.89

After receiving the draft, Weizmann met with Samuel in an effort to effect changes in the wording of the memorandum, especially the deletion of the sentence which criticized the statement that “Palestine should be as Jewish as England is English.” However, Samuel rejected any alterations and Weizmann concluded that the Zionist Organization had no alternative but to accept the memorandum as it stood.90 Upon receiving the letter of June 3, Weizmann informed Shuckburgh that the Colonial Office would receive a positive answer from the Zionist Organization. Shuckburgh wrote to Samuel of Weizmann: “He was on the whole in good spirits, and is taking his basin of gruel with a better grace than I expected.”91

Weizmann’s initial reaction emphasized the document’s positive side: It is perhaps not exactly what we want but considering the great difficulties of the situation it is a satisfactory document. It might depress some of our exalted friends but on the whole it will be accepted loyally. In this document explicit recognition is given to the Z.O. as the Jewish Agency and so the Government has definitely committed itself to this course.92

Given the situation, Weizmann saw little need to deliberate extensively over the mater in the ZE. At the meeting of June 9th he went so far as to claim that the statement “did not represent any alteration of policy, and in the present circumstances they could only accept it.” A serious delay in responding could jeopardize the ratification of the Mandate. Ultimately, it was decided to convene a special meeting of the ZE together with the executive of the Actions Committee (AC), Dr. Arthur Hantke, Rabbi Dr. Hirsch Chajes and Robert Stricker, on June 18.93 Jabotinsky, who had just returned from the United States, also participated. At the conference, Weizmann explained that the Zionist response had to be given the next day in light of the debate on the Britain’s policy in Palestine that was scheduled to take place in the House of Lords some ten days hence. A postponement of the decision would have an effect on the debate and perhaps even put the Mandate at risk. The dominant feeling, shared even by Jabotinsky, was that the memorandum was a bitter pill that had to be swallowed.94  

A special committee was formed and by the next morning an assurance that the activities of the Zionist Organization would comply with the new statement of policy had been formulated, passed and delivered to the Colonial Office.95 Despite the fact that the statement would “be interpreted by the Jewish World as a whittling down of the Balfour Declaration,” Weizmann explained to Deedes that he had agreed “under the adverse circumstances.” However, no additional concessions would be forthcoming from the Zionist Organization.96 The statement of policy, which became known as the Churchill Memorandum, appended by the government’s correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization, was submitted to Parliament in the form of a White Paper (the Churchill White Paper) on July 1, 1922.97

85 Harold M. Simansky, “The Churchill Memorandum as a Product of Herbert Samuel’s Zionism,” typescript, Brandeis University (Waltham, Mass.: 1990); Friesel, “British Policy in Palestine,” 209; Reinharz, Making of a Statesman, 386-387.

86 Cmd. 1700. For an analysis of the Churchill Memorandum see: Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East; Kedourie, “Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine”; Friesel, Zionist Policy, 297-308; McTague, British Policy in Palestine, 207-215; Friesel, “Herbert Samuel's Reassessment of Zionism in 1921,” 213-237; Friesel, “British Policy in Palestine,” 190-217; Cohen, Britain’s Moment in Palestine, 129-130; Reinharz, Making of a Statesman, 388-389.

87 Cmd. 1700, 21.

88 NA CO 733/34; see Friesel, Zionist Policy, 302.

89 Musa Kazim al-Husseini and Jamal Shibli to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17.6.1922 in Cmd. 1700, 21-28; see Friesel, Zionist Policy, 305.

90 Minutes of the ZE, 9.6.1922, CZA Z4/302/7/I.

91 Shuckburgh to Samuel, 3.6.1922, NA CO 733/34, 25494.

92 Weizmann to Alfred Mond, 4.6.1922, WL, vol. 11, 109

93 Minutes of the ZE, 9.6.1922, CZA Z4/302/7/I. The Constitution adopted at the 12th Zionist Congress (1921) provided for an Actions Committee or broad executive body of 25 members in addition to the members of the ZE (including 3 members of the Financial and Economic Committee) and the Directors of the Zionist financial institutions – the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Jewish National Fund and the Keren Hayesod. See Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XII. Zionisten-Kongresses in Karlsbad vom 1. bis 14. September 1921 (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1922), 803.

94 Report of the Meeting, 18.6.1922, CZA KH 1/306; Friesel, Zionist Policy, 305-306.

95 Weizmann to Under-Secretary of State, 18.6.1922, WL, vol. 11, 117-118.

96 Weizmann to Wyndham Deedes, 29.6.1922, WL, vol. 11, 126.

97 Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine, Cable, 29.6.1922, Copy in WA.

And he continues:

In a private conversation in August 1922, Jabotinsky described to a friend his meeting with Weizmann earlier in the day: 

We both argued in a very intelligent, wonderful way. But, you know, I intuitively felt one thing: I cannot go in his ways, and one shouldn’t go in these ways, because they are bound to bring us to self-abdication. Weizmann believes that his way is that of a compromising realist, and mine is the way of a stubborn fantast, of a utopian; and I feel that his line is the line of renunciation, of subconscious Marannism, while mine is a difficult, stormy way, which will, however, lead more quickly to a Jewish State.3

After the AC refused on January 16-17, 1923 to vote on three of Jabotinsky’s proposals – his cri de coeur in the words of one researcher, Jabotinsky left the ZE.4 His letter of resignation called for a more forceful stance towards Great Britain, although strategic cooperation remained an underlying element of his approach.5

1 Anat Feldman notes that criticism of Weizmann’s policy served as the Revisionist party’s main ענת פלדמן, "המאבק על הנהגת התנועה הרוויזיוניסטית, זאב ז'בוטינסקי מול מאיר גרוסמן -1925 See. guideline .1933 ,"יהדות זמננו: ציונות, מדינת ישראל והתפוצות 14( תשס"א(: 100

2 Yaacov Shavit, Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948 (London: Cass, 1988), 33; Colin Shindler, The Triumph of Military Zionism: Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 40-42.

3  ,שלמה גפשטיין, זאב ז'בוטינסקי: חייו, מלחמתו, הישגיו )תל-אביב: ההנהלה הראשית של קרן תל חי, 1941 ,)98-97 quoted in Joseph B. Schechtman, Rebel and Statesman: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story – The Early Years (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), 424.

4 Jabotinsky proposed: “1. To inform both the Home Government and the Palestine Administration that the continuance of the present policy in Palestine threatens to ruin the Zionist movement financially, and to bring our enterprise in Palestine to bankruptcy. 2. To declare that the presence of anti-Zionists or anti-Semites in the British personnel of the Palestine Administration was contrary to the Mandate, and to instruct the Executive to insist on their withdrawal. 3. To proclaim, in view of the widespread  assumption that Zionism has renounced its ideal, that the Movement stands on the basis of its historic aim and that our obligations vis-à-vis the Mandatory Power admit of no other interpretation.” (JC,  .2.1923). See Shindler, Military Zionism, 42-43.

5 “…the Actions Committee has validated those tactics which threaten to wreak havoc on the movement and bankrupt the Jewish enterprise in Palestine. Underlying these tactics is the fundamental view that as long as we lack coercive measures or sanctions it is impossible to compel the British government to give us even those rights that have been officially authorized. I believe that this policy is mistaken. Whoever fights persistently and systematically for the full realization of his rights will earn the respect and the honor of the English people and its government, and after a drawn out struggle, will win justice as well. On the contrary, a policy lacking courage could cause demoralization among the authorities in both the east and the west. Therefore, I see it as my duty to struggle openly against these  harmful tactics and to thwart them though independent political actions…. It would be easier – and I have no doubt also morally justified

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Who Suggested Partition?

From this article:

In November 1933, Chaim Weizmann, the head of the Zionist Organization, raised the possibility of partition in Palestine in a meeting with Vito Catastini, the head of the mandates section of the League of Nations secretariat.29 

Catastini's apparent support of the idea perturbed members of the Colonial Office who felt that the subject lay beyond the League's purview. Weizmann seemed to think otherwise, discussing his idea for a territorial division with the head of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Marquis Theodoli, and with Italian head of state, Benito Mussolini, who was beginning to style himself as a protector of the Jews and came out strongly in favour of partition.30

29 This was certainly not the first time that a Zionist leader had suggested partition as a possible solution. The roots of partition in Zionist thought could arguably be traced back to the notion of transferring Arabs out of part or all of Palestine. See for an early example, Theodor Herzl, The complete dûmes of Theodor Herzl, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, NY, i960), 1, p. 88; or for one during the British mandate, TNA, GO 733/231/1. See also Tom Segev, One Palestine, complete: Jews and Arabs under the British mandate, trans, Haim Watzman (New York, NY, 2001), pp. 403-8.

30 Minute, O. G. R. Williams, 4 Dec. 1933; letter from Sir Eric Drummond, British ambassador in Rome, 13 Dec. 1933: TNA, GO 733/248/20. 

Footnote 30 is inexplicable as the idea of "partition" is keeping everyone, more or less, in place but simply dividing the territory.

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Chaim Weizmann and TransJordan

Ze'ev Jabotinsky demanded Palestine. All of Palestine. Including TransJordan.

That's what the 1923 Zionist Congress decided:

Trans- and Cis-Jordan are "one historical, geographic and economic unit" and "in accordance with the legitimate demands of the Jewish people", the Congress expects that an expression of such will be achieved in Transjordan and eventually it will be carried out.

He declared 

that the opening of Transjordania to Jewish settlement is an essential condition no longer opposed by the Transjordanian Arabs but by the mandatory administration.

“A Transjordania which would have the same population density as Palestine has room for one and a half million immigrants, while a Palestine on both sides of the Jordan would harbor five or six millions,” Jabotinsky asserted. “A political regime which would promote settlement instead of hindering it would in a few decades solve the tragic problem of the Jews without harming their non-Jewish neighbors.”

Jabotinsky's 1935 list of the obligations a friendly mandatory power to the Jews and of the Jews to themselves should included

1. A land reserve for agricultural colonization following a geological survey of uncultivated land in Palestine and a loan for reclaiming land.
2. A similar survey in Transjordania.

If not granted land, then Jews should be able to purchase them.

Unlike Chaim Weizmann, his rival, you may have thought.

Really?

He held, for a while at least, similar views.

Here - 

"Transjordania must be opened to Jewish endeavours"

Earlier, there was a scandal when the Mizrachi representative Yehoshua Farbstein revealed negotiations for purchase of lands on the east side of the Jordan River in which he was quite involved.

And here:

(For Weizmann background, see here.)

How much was Weizmann pro-Transjordan?

Well, he said in May 1926

I openly and explicitly stated here as well as in London that we see in Transjordania the eastern part of Eretz Israel. However, we will build the bridge across the Jordan not with soldiers, we will make our way there by Jewish work, with the plough and not with the sword, only through the good will of the two nations, the Jews and the Arabs, will we cross the Jordan.

He pressed the first High Commissioner Herbert Samuel on the matter and latter replied in a December 20, 1936 item:

Sir Herbert Samuel, first British High Commissioner for Palestine, explained last night why Transjordan was not included with the Holy Land under the Balfour Declaration. He told the Anglo-Palestine Club that a pledge had been given to king Hussein that Transjordan was, like Iraq and Hedjaz, to be included in the Arab domains.

The explanation was indirectly a reply to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, who recently raised the question in Jerusalem before the Royal Commission now conducting hearings there. Sir Herbert said the Arabs claimed that Palestine was also included in the Arab domains, but the British would not admit this.

And, as this book relates, he valiantly attempted to complete purchases but the British viewed that effort with displeasure and he never asserted the Jewish claim after that, as Herbert Samuel had declared in October 1934:

“The rumors that Transjordania will be annexed to Palestine are unfounded. Transjordania is a part of the British mandatory area and negotiations are now under way between the Government of Great Britain and Emir Abdullah, ruler of Transjordania, as to the conditions and form of administration of the country”

Weizmann eventually wilted.

The story:

History aside, Jordan is Transjordan is part of historic Palestine.

P.S.

Abba Hillel Silver, in January 1935, published a piece entitled "Land Hunger" which include this:

This calls for the opening up of Transjordania at the earliest possible moment for Jewish settlement. On this pivotal issue of Transjordania all the energies of the Zionist movement should now be concentrated. 

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Chaim Weizmann's Dalliances

In response to something I read in the Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, I sent in a letter on November 10th.

So far, it has not appeared so up it goes here:

Baron Leslie Turnberg is worried lest, as a result of the article on his book, "Beyond the Balfour Declaration" (Nov. 4), people would assume that Chaim Weizmann carried on dalliances while he was married. But he needn't, for he did, it would appear.

Commenting on Weizmann's letter sent to his wife Vera on February 11, 1925, the editor notes that "All was not well in his marital relations...the feelings separating the Weizmanns intensified and they ceased living a normal family life together".  He adds that Weizmann adopted a nomadic life-style at various London locations and European spas.  There was a "crisis" and Weizmann attempted vigorously to "rebuild the family relationship".  Vera had become suspicious of his friendship with other women and removed herself and children from his company.  Additional later letters reiterated his pleas to regain the former home situation.

Yisrael Medad

Shiloh

The comments on the letters:

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Jabotinsky Was a 'Fascist' and Weizmann the Moderate?

Think again:

Odd how prejudices set in.

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If One Yields on Territory, One Can Concede on People

Chaim Weizmann decided to accept partion in 1937.

And this is what he said on August 4, 1937 at the 20th Zionist Congress (p. 286):

If a leader decides to yield up and surrender territory of Eretz-Yisrael, he will eventually decide to concede on the people of Israel.

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Jabotinsky Won But Lost His Place on the Wall

I was at the Hebrew University yesterday for a conclave on Hillel Cohen's book on 1929 but that will be dealt with in another post.

On the way in, I walked over to observe this new wall

It commemorates the founding fathers of the university:

The simple fact is that in the period prior to World War I, someone else prominent not included was involved, Ze'ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky:-

The horrors of the1903 pogrom against the Jews of Kishinev had the profound effect of spurring Jabotinsky's Zionist pursuits. He became a pivotal force in organizing self-defense units and fighting for Jewish minority rights in Russia. Jabotinsky was elected as a delegate to the 6th Zionist Congress, the last in which Theodor Herzl participated. During this period, Jabotinsky championed the spread of Hebrew language and culture throughout Russia, as well as the establishment of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

To be specific, Jabotinsky was a member of the 'working committee' appointed following the 12th Zionist Congress of 1913 (it was actually the 11th Zionist Congress that adopted the first operative decision to proceed with the establishment of a university in Jerusalem).  That committee of five was supplemented by Jabotinsky along with Weizmann, Ussishkin and Wolffsohn. Jabotinsky was right up there with the rest (see Shmuel Katz's "Lone Wolf").

However, in the spring of 1914 he had a falling out with Weizmann who had had a change of mind (he groveled for Rothschild money) and preferred a research institute model rather than a university with a medical school, science and, as Jabotinsky urged, a school of commerce.  His letter of April 20th caused Weizmann to distant Jabotinsky from the project.  On June 7, the Working Committee met and Jabotinsky, who summed up the argument as between "a decisive revolutionary act and a plaything" lost the vote.

However, in early 1928, the university's own board of governors as well as its Academic Council admitted that due to "Revisionist agitation', they were opening the school year.  He had written in 1925 after the groundbreaking ceremony that the university was in danger of becoming a bluff if it did not seek to aid the Jewish students of Europe rather than becoming a show-case ivory tower.  In fact, during 1927-28, he had organized a campaign among those students to write to the university officials and Zionist leaders urging the idea that Jabotinsky had been promoting a decade earlier.

In the vote, Weizmann opposed the Jabotinsky idea but it won they day.

Nevertheless, as it appears, he lost his place on the wall:

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