After some two years that Ze'ev Jabotinsky had come to realize that Chaim Weizmann was too docile in combatting British reneging on the Balfour Declaration and especially after Weizmann did not back Jabotinsky when he commanded the Jewish self-defense unit in Jerusalem in April 192o, the break became unavoidable.
The first step was the White Paper of 1922.
Here is a description of the lead up to the fateful vote to accept it.
Source: Jonathan Kaplan's PhD Thesis - “Weizmannism” in the Zionist Movement during the 1920s
To make matters worse, the position of Zionism in public opinion had been considerably compromised at precisely the moment when British policy in Palestine was about to be debated in Parliament. This constellation afforded Hebert Samuel, who arrived in England in early May, a unique opportunity to press home the policy that he had been advocating since his first visit to Palestine in the spring of 1920. His approach had been rejected at the conference convened in Balfour’s home back in July 1921 but now that the ratification of the Mandate seemed so close to realization and the Zionist freedom of action was severely limited, it appeared that it might be possible to leverage the situation in order to win Zionist consent to his new policy.85
This was expressed in a statement written by Shuckburgh and Samuel, and signed by Churchill, that came to be known as “Churchill Memorandum.”86 The essence of the policy was a dual commitment: to the well-being of the Arab population of Palestine as well as to the continued development of the Jewish National Home. The goal in mind was not to create a “wholly Jewish Palestine.” The country was not to be transformed in its entirety into a Jewish National Home, but such an entity would be created in Palestine. Immigration would be limited by the economic capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants. However, it was emphasized that the Jews were in Palestine by right and not on sufferance, and the Jewish National Home would continue to develop. An elected Legislative Council was to be established to represent the local population. Samuel’s overall view was that with fair treatment and good will, Jews and Arabs could live together peaceably in Palestine:
The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that a spirit of cooperation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.87
An advance copy of the memorandum was conveyed confidentially to Weizmann on May 27 and to the Arab Delegation on May 30. On June 3, a letter was sent to the parties with the polite but nonetheless unmistakable ultimatum that each express its agreement to conform with the new policy.88 In one of the clearest presentations of the Palestinian Arab case, the Arab Delegation rejected the document outright.89
After receiving the draft, Weizmann met with Samuel in an effort to effect changes in the wording of the memorandum, especially the deletion of the sentence which criticized the statement that “Palestine should be as Jewish as England is English.” However, Samuel rejected any alterations and Weizmann concluded that the Zionist Organization had no alternative but to accept the memorandum as it stood.90 Upon receiving the letter of June 3, Weizmann informed Shuckburgh that the Colonial Office would receive a positive answer from the Zionist Organization. Shuckburgh wrote to Samuel of Weizmann: “He was on the whole in good spirits, and is taking his basin of gruel with a better grace than I expected.”91
Weizmann’s initial reaction emphasized the document’s positive side: It is perhaps not exactly what we want but considering the great difficulties of the situation it is a satisfactory document. It might depress some of our exalted friends but on the whole it will be accepted loyally. In this document explicit recognition is given to the Z.O. as the Jewish Agency and so the Government has definitely committed itself to this course.92
Given the situation, Weizmann saw little need to deliberate extensively over the mater in the ZE. At the meeting of June 9th he went so far as to claim that the statement “did not represent any alteration of policy, and in the present circumstances they could only accept it.” A serious delay in responding could jeopardize the ratification of the Mandate. Ultimately, it was decided to convene a special meeting of the ZE together with the executive of the Actions Committee (AC), Dr. Arthur Hantke, Rabbi Dr. Hirsch Chajes and Robert Stricker, on June 18.93 Jabotinsky, who had just returned from the United States, also participated. At the conference, Weizmann explained that the Zionist response had to be given the next day in light of the debate on the Britain’s policy in Palestine that was scheduled to take place in the House of Lords some ten days hence. A postponement of the decision would have an effect on the debate and perhaps even put the Mandate at risk. The dominant feeling, shared even by Jabotinsky, was that the memorandum was a bitter pill that had to be swallowed.94
A special committee was formed and by the next morning an assurance that the activities of the Zionist Organization would comply with the new statement of policy had been formulated, passed and delivered to the Colonial Office.95 Despite the fact that the statement would “be interpreted by the Jewish World as a whittling down of the Balfour Declaration,” Weizmann explained to Deedes that he had agreed “under the adverse circumstances.” However, no additional concessions would be forthcoming from the Zionist Organization.96 The statement of policy, which became known as the Churchill Memorandum, appended by the government’s correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization, was submitted to Parliament in the form of a White Paper (the Churchill White Paper) on July 1, 1922.97
85 Harold M. Simansky, “The Churchill Memorandum as a Product of Herbert Samuel’s Zionism,” typescript, Brandeis University (Waltham, Mass.: 1990); Friesel, “British Policy in Palestine,” 209; Reinharz, Making of a Statesman, 386-387.
86 Cmd. 1700. For an analysis of the Churchill Memorandum see: Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East; Kedourie, “Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine”; Friesel, Zionist Policy, 297-308; McTague, British Policy in Palestine, 207-215; Friesel, “Herbert Samuel's Reassessment of Zionism in 1921,” 213-237; Friesel, “British Policy in Palestine,” 190-217; Cohen, Britain’s Moment in Palestine, 129-130; Reinharz, Making of a Statesman, 388-389.
87 Cmd. 1700, 21.
88 NA CO 733/34; see Friesel, Zionist Policy, 302.
89 Musa Kazim al-Husseini and Jamal Shibli to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17.6.1922 in Cmd. 1700, 21-28; see Friesel, Zionist Policy, 305.
90 Minutes of the ZE, 9.6.1922, CZA Z4/302/7/I.
91 Shuckburgh to Samuel, 3.6.1922, NA CO 733/34, 25494.
92 Weizmann to Alfred Mond, 4.6.1922, WL, vol. 11, 109
93 Minutes of the ZE, 9.6.1922, CZA Z4/302/7/I. The Constitution adopted at the 12th Zionist Congress (1921) provided for an Actions Committee or broad executive body of 25 members in addition to the members of the ZE (including 3 members of the Financial and Economic Committee) and the Directors of the Zionist financial institutions – the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Jewish National Fund and the Keren Hayesod. See Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XII. Zionisten-Kongresses in Karlsbad vom 1. bis 14. September 1921 (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1922), 803.
94 Report of the Meeting, 18.6.1922, CZA KH 1/306; Friesel, Zionist Policy, 305-306.
95 Weizmann to Under-Secretary of State, 18.6.1922, WL, vol. 11, 117-118.
96 Weizmann to Wyndham Deedes, 29.6.1922, WL, vol. 11, 126.
97 Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine, Cable, 29.6.1922, Copy in WA.
And he continues:
In a private conversation in August 1922, Jabotinsky described to a friend his meeting with Weizmann earlier in the day:
We both argued in a very intelligent, wonderful way. But, you know, I intuitively felt one thing: I cannot go in his ways, and one shouldn’t go in these ways, because they are bound to bring us to self-abdication. Weizmann believes that his way is that of a compromising realist, and mine is the way of a stubborn fantast, of a utopian; and I feel that his line is the line of renunciation, of subconscious Marannism, while mine is a difficult, stormy way, which will, however, lead more quickly to a Jewish State.3
After the AC refused on January 16-17, 1923 to vote on three of Jabotinsky’s proposals – his cri de coeur in the words of one researcher, Jabotinsky left the ZE.4 His letter of resignation called for a more forceful stance towards Great Britain, although strategic cooperation remained an underlying element of his approach.5
1 Anat Feldman notes that criticism of Weizmann’s policy served as the Revisionist party’s main ענת פלדמן, "המאבק על הנהגת התנועה הרוויזיוניסטית, זאב ז'בוטינסקי מול מאיר גרוסמן -1925 See. guideline .1933 ,"יהדות זמננו: ציונות, מדינת ישראל והתפוצות 14( תשס"א(: 100
2 Yaacov Shavit, Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948 (London: Cass, 1988), 33; Colin Shindler, The Triumph of Military Zionism: Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 40-42.
3 ,שלמה גפשטיין, זאב ז'בוטינסקי: חייו, מלחמתו, הישגיו )תל-אביב: ההנהלה הראשית של קרן תל חי, 1941 ,)98-97 quoted in Joseph B. Schechtman, Rebel and Statesman: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story – The Early Years (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), 424.
4 Jabotinsky proposed: “1. To inform both the Home Government and the Palestine Administration that the continuance of the present policy in Palestine threatens to ruin the Zionist movement financially, and to bring our enterprise in Palestine to bankruptcy. 2. To declare that the presence of anti-Zionists or anti-Semites in the British personnel of the Palestine Administration was contrary to the Mandate, and to instruct the Executive to insist on their withdrawal. 3. To proclaim, in view of the widespread assumption that Zionism has renounced its ideal, that the Movement stands on the basis of its historic aim and that our obligations vis-à-vis the Mandatory Power admit of no other interpretation.” (JC, .2.1923). See Shindler, Military Zionism, 42-43.
5 “…the Actions Committee has validated those tactics which threaten to wreak havoc on the movement and bankrupt the Jewish enterprise in Palestine. Underlying these tactics is the fundamental view that as long as we lack coercive measures or sanctions it is impossible to compel the British government to give us even those rights that have been officially authorized. I believe that this policy is mistaken. Whoever fights persistently and systematically for the full realization of his rights will earn the respect and the honor of the English people and its government, and after a drawn out struggle, will win justice as well. On the contrary, a policy lacking courage could cause demoralization among the authorities in both the east and the west. Therefore, I see it as my duty to struggle openly against these harmful tactics and to thwart them though independent political actions…. It would be easier – and I have no doubt also morally justified
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