And Yet Another Non-Published Letter to the New York Times

 Sent on November 12:

Robert Malley and Phillip H. Gordon suggest that President Trump’s "proposed peace plan was...drafted without input from the Palestinians" and so, it was "dead on arrival" ("Trump Still Has 70 Days to Wreak Havoc Around the World", Nov. 11). Unfortunately, we are left to wonder why there was no input.

Was it because Palestinian Authority communications systems failed? Perhaps the Trump Administration made demands they considered outrageous, such as to halt funding the acts of terrorists and stop anti-Israel incitement in the schools? Maybe President Mahmoud Abbas refused to make any compromises or even to return to the negotiating table? Could it be that the PA is fearful of Hamas? Does Malley and Gordon actually know why?

Yisrael Medad

Shiloh, Israel

^

Malley Mauled and Mauling

In a book review in the NYRB,dealing with these books -The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab–Israeli Peace by Aaron David Miller, Negotiating Arab–Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East by Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky and Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East by Martin Indyk, - entitled How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, I found this brilliant piece of political prophecy:

Among the flurry of recommendations the next administration will receive, Obama could do worse than consider some simple advice. Don't rush. Take time, take a deep breath, and take stock. Who knows, fresh and more effective policies might even ensue.

Yep, written on December 17th.

Operation "Cast Lead" began a week later.

Time ran out on Obama and Malley.

But Malley is a bit more devious.

What does he want?

To encourage US ties with the more radical and extremist forces ("more dynamic") in the Middle East:

Where traditional US allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia once set both the agenda and tone of Middle East diplomacy, they appear worn out and bereft of a cause other than preventing their own decline. Their energy seems to have been sapped and their regional authority diminished. On issue after issue—Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Israel-Palestine—they have proved passive or, when active, feckless, unable to influence events or buttress their allies. Their close ties to Washington damage their credibility without being of much help to the US.

They are progressively upstaged by more dynamic players: those leading the charge against America's allies—Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas—and those—Qatar and Turkey—seeking to mediate between the two. All these developments challenge a US strategy that relies exclusively on so-called "moderate" Arab states and leaders, which are losing steam, in order to counter "radical" Islamist states and movements, which are gaining it.

The image of President Obama unveiling his vision of an Israeli–Palestinian settlement to overjoyed Arab leaders and universal endorsement may not, under the circumstances, be quite so alluring. A peace plan that has grown tedious by virtue of repetition is unlikely to generate popular enthusiasm; its backing by fading Arab leaders is unlikely to give it a boost.

The new president enjoys an enormous, perhaps unprecedented reservoir of regional goodwill. Yet it is goodwill based on hope that Obama can break from past American conduct and style, not reinforce them.

I've Been Reminded of Partition

Hugh Eakin has a short interview with Robert Malley in the NY Review of Books.

And that reminded me of a letter I wrote last year that never got published:

Robert Malley and Hussein Agha's article on a possible Israel-Arab peace arrangement ("Into the Lion's Den", May 1) asserts that the Palestinians rejected the 1947 UN partition plan "because at the time they formed a majority in and controlled most of Mandatory Palestine". That is a misleading statement.

The essence of partition was meant, as it had been back in 1937 when first promoted by the British as official policy, to separate territorially the Arab and Jewish communities. It was intended to resolve the violence that the Arabs initiated as early as 1920 and coninued in several waves in 1921, 1929 and in an especially murderous period between 1936-1939. Partition symbolized the British slide into a reneging on their obligations as outlined in the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations decision of 1923 to promote a Jewish National Home, originally in an area on both sides of the Jordan River. Their treachery was accomplished in 1939 when, in a White Paper, which Lloyd George described as an act of perfidy and against which Winston Churchill voted, despite he being a minister in the government, it was declared "His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State". The closing of the gates to immigration doomed millions of Jews to the Hitlerarian Holocaust.

The Arabs rejected partition because they assumed they could roll back the previous twenty years. They did not want the Jews to live as a sovereign and politically independent entity anywhere in the area they called "Palestine", a Latin name for a supposedly Arab country which had never existed and was envisioned by Christian Arabs. Muslim Arabs had first insisted on the idea of a Greater Syria, a concept Bashir Assad currently supports.

Malley's proposals revive those feelings that Jewish rights and the past twenty years can be ignored and rolled back again.

Malley Perverts History

The 1947 UN partition plan gave the Palestinians much more than any current proposal. Yet they rejected it because at the time they formed a majority in and controlled most of Mandatory Palestine.

The above, from a new article by the Pal. sympathizer Robert Malley and his sidekick, Hussein Agha, is true but misleading and actually, a perversion of history.

The partition was meant, as it had been back in 1937 when first promoted by the British as they slid into a reneging on their obligations as outlined in the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations decision of 1923, to separate territorially the Arab and Jewish communities. It was intended to resolve the violence that the Arabs initiated.

The Arabs rejected it because they did not want the Jews to live as a sovereign and politically independent entity anywhere in the area they called "Palestine", a Latin name for a supposedly Arab country which never existed and was envisioned by Christian Arabs.

They launched terror and murderous riots in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1936-39 and then began their war of agression in violation of the United Nations.

This statement, though, is quite correct:-

The 1993 Oslo Accords, most Palestinians will concede...never mentioned statehood or independence. It did not define boundaries or the fate of Jerusalem. And it did nothing to halt the settlement enterprise.

And another Malley error:-

Hamas may not be willing to recognize Israel, but it could accept coexistence with it.

This is not what the so-called intellectuals should be reading.

Boo! Bah! Humbug!

In Defense of Robert Malley

To the Editors:

Your readers may be interested in the following statement.

Mickey Bergman
President, Soleil Strategic Group

Over the past several weeks, a series of vicious, personal attacks have been launched against one of our colleagues, Robert Malley, who served as President Clinton's special assistant for Arab–Israeli affairs. They claim that he harbors an anti-Israeli agenda and has sought to undermine Israel's security. These attacks are unfair, inappropriate, and wrong. They are an effort to undermine the credibility of a talented public servant who has worked tirelessly over the years to promote Arab–Israeli peace and US national interests. They must stop.

We have real differences among us about how best to conduct US policy toward the Middle East and what is the right way to build a lasting two-state solution that protects Israel's security. But whatever differences do exist, there is no disagreement among us on one core issue that transcends partisan or other divides: that the US should not and will not do anything to undermine Israel's safety or the special relationship between our two nations. We have worked with Rob closely over the years and have no doubt he shares this view and has acted consistent with it.

We face a critical period in the Middle East that demands sustained, determined, and far-sighted engagement by the United States. It is not a time for scurrilous attacks against someone who deserves our respect.

Samuel (Sandy) Berger, Former National Security Adviser; Ambassador Martin Indyk, Former Ambassador to Israel and Egypt and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs; Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer, Former Ambassador to Israel; Aaron David Miller, Former Senior Adviser for Arab–Israeli Negotiations, Department of State; Ambassador Dennis Ross, Former Special Envoy of the President to the Middle East