Malley Mauled and Mauling

In a book review in the NYRB,dealing with these books -The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab–Israeli Peace by Aaron David Miller, Negotiating Arab–Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East by Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky and Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East by Martin Indyk, - entitled How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, I found this brilliant piece of political prophecy:

Among the flurry of recommendations the next administration will receive, Obama could do worse than consider some simple advice. Don't rush. Take time, take a deep breath, and take stock. Who knows, fresh and more effective policies might even ensue.

Yep, written on December 17th.

Operation "Cast Lead" began a week later.

Time ran out on Obama and Malley.

But Malley is a bit more devious.

What does he want?

To encourage US ties with the more radical and extremist forces ("more dynamic") in the Middle East:

Where traditional US allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia once set both the agenda and tone of Middle East diplomacy, they appear worn out and bereft of a cause other than preventing their own decline. Their energy seems to have been sapped and their regional authority diminished. On issue after issue—Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Israel-Palestine—they have proved passive or, when active, feckless, unable to influence events or buttress their allies. Their close ties to Washington damage their credibility without being of much help to the US.

They are progressively upstaged by more dynamic players: those leading the charge against America's allies—Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas—and those—Qatar and Turkey—seeking to mediate between the two. All these developments challenge a US strategy that relies exclusively on so-called "moderate" Arab states and leaders, which are losing steam, in order to counter "radical" Islamist states and movements, which are gaining it.

The image of President Obama unveiling his vision of an Israeli–Palestinian settlement to overjoyed Arab leaders and universal endorsement may not, under the circumstances, be quite so alluring. A peace plan that has grown tedious by virtue of repetition is unlikely to generate popular enthusiasm; its backing by fading Arab leaders is unlikely to give it a boost.

The new president enjoys an enormous, perhaps unprecedented reservoir of regional goodwill. Yet it is goodwill based on hope that Obama can break from past American conduct and style, not reinforce them.