Thursday, March 07, 2013

The Illegal 1939 White Paper

A bit of history on how the 1939 White Paper was illegal:-

The White Paper of May 1939*

102. The statement of policy issued by His Majesty’s government in May 1939, was intended to put an end to uncertainty as to the objectives of their policy in Palestine, and to prepare the way for the termination of the Mandate. The statement opened with a clear definition of the attitude of His Majesty’s government towards the maximum claims of both Arabs and Jews. Thus, after quoting the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration contained in the White Paper of 1922, they “now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.”

      At the same time they maintained their rejection of the Arab contention that they were pledged, by undertakings given during the war of 1914-18, to grant independence to the Arab population of Palestine:-

      “They cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.”
103. The objective of His Majesty’s Government was then stated to be

      “the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State….in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.”
104. Before such a State could be established, a period of transition would be necessary in which the mandatory would attempt to improve relations between the two communities and to build up the machinery of self-government. During this period, Palestinians, Arabs and Jews, would be placed in charge of the Departments of Government approximately in proportion to their respective population and introduced into the Executive Council. The hope was expressed that it might prove possible to establish an elective legislature. And at the end of five years “an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty’s Government” would make recommendations for the constitution of the future independent State. The period of transition would be designed to terminate in ten years. But:

      “If at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty’s Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. if His Majesty’s government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the cooperation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.”
105. Nothing was said in the White Paper on the constitution of the independent State, beyond the general principle that it must enable Arabs and Jews to share in government in such a way that the essential interests of each were safeguarded. The colonial Secretary, when he subsequently appeared before the Permanent Mandates commission, indicated two possible means through which effect might be given to this principle in the future constitution. There might, he suggested, be a federal system with equal representation in the central institutions for an Arab province and a Jewish province. Or, if the State was constructed on a unitary and not a federal basis, the constitution might provide that, on matters of importance, no decision could be taken unless a majority of the Arab and a majority of the Jewish members of the legislature were in agreement.

106. It was provided in the White Paper that the independent State should enter into treaty relations with the United Kingdom.

107. The statement of policy next dealt with the subject of Jewish immigration:-

      “In the view of the Royal commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognising the advantages to be derived form Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty’s Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty’s government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty’s government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish national Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.”

      It was accordingly provided that, after the admission of not more than 75,000 additional immigrants during the five years beginning in April, 1939, “no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.”
108. The last section of the White Paper dealt with the transfer of land form Arab to Jewish ownership.

      “The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, “while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced”, to encourage “close settlement by Jews on the Land”, and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated, that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab Land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land whilst in some other areas transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High commissioner will be given general powers to prohibited and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of Policy and the High commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.”
109. The policy expounded in the White Paper was bitterly condemned by all Zionist opinion. The Zionist Congress of 1939 denied its moral and legal validity, and declared that the Jewish people would not acquiesce in the reduction of its status in Palestine to that of a minority. The Arabs criticised the length of the period of transition, the provision for its possible prolongation, and the proposal that representatives of the mandatory Power should participate in framing the constitution of the independent State. nevertheless there were signs that the Arabs would, in practice, be ready to acquiesce in the application of the new policy.

110. The Mandatory’s new statement of policy was examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission at their thirty-sixth session in June, 1939. the commission reported that:

      the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate.”

They went on to consider whether the Mandate was open to a new interpretation with which the White Paper would not be at variance. Four of the seven members

      did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate, any contrary conclusion appearing to them to be ruled out by the very terms of the Mandate and by the fundamental intentions of its authors.”

The other three members “were unable to share this opinion; they consider that existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the Council did not oppose it.”

111. It was the intention of His Majesty’s government to seek the approval of the League Council for their new policy. This, however, they were prevented from doing by the outbreak of war in September.


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