Fear of casualties was paralyzing. "Public pressure against staying in Lebanon influenced the army, and trickled all the way down to the lowest ranks," he writes, deepening the phenomenon of holding fighting units to lower standards. "That phenomenon was devastating in my eyes. When each incident is examined separately, it is hard to recognize the extent of the problem. Stopping a mission for fear of an entanglement involving casualties sometimes appears the right thing to do. In the long run, lack of determination and a crumbling of values are received loud and clear by the enemy."
Who?
Brigadier General Moshe Tamir, head of the Central Command headquarters who was in Lebanon throughout most of the conflict; from a deputy company commander in Golani in 1985 up to sector brigade commander on the northern border at the time of the pullout. He later commanded the Golani Brigade at the height of fighting in the territories.
His book, "Milhama Lelo Ot" (published by the IDF's Maarachot), is the first attempt to analyze the army's functioning in this campaign. In fascinating prose and with impressive honesty, Tamir depicts the evolution of the fighting, from the first encounters with an unknown Shi'ite enemy, Hezbollah, through Operation Accountability in July 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996, the death of his friend and commander, Brig.-Gen. Erez Gerstein, to the withdrawal.
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