A "With Apologies" Cartoon

Borrowed from A.J. Singleton in The Spectator:

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And Now, It's 'Relocation'

In a section of the Washington Post entitled "Global Opinions", there's an op-ed - 70 years after partition, a two-state solution is still possible - composed by David Makovsky (who I know well).

It's theme: 

It isn't too late for a two-state solution. Bringing the land into focus proves it.

He suggests, or declares, that "partition is still feasible...territorial dimension is solvable" and he has a new website that uses civilian satellite imagery to provide "a better understanding of settler trends" for 

The interplay of geography and demography in the West Bank matters

Basically, he divides the population of revenant residents into various sub-group based of east or west of the security barrier.  He comes up with a figure of

just under 556,000 Israelis living inside, or west, of the security barrier and more than 97,000 living outside of the barrier.

It's not a perfect summing up but he then writes that if

in a two-state solution, there were an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians regarding the relocation of these settlers, the prospect of relocation would become increasingly difficult...Israel needs to align its settlement policy with a two-state approach that enables Israeli-Palestinian compromise...None of this suggests that the barrier would necessarily be the border in a final-status agreement. That border would remain to be negotiated by the parties.

I left there this comment:

The term "relocation" is employed.  As an aside, at least it is not "resettlement" with its historical echoes.I have but one question: do Arabs get relocated, too?Can parts of the Wadi Ara population be relocated?Or is it only Jews?Besides the question, I would suggest that Makovsky's plan would have a better chance to prove itself if it would proceed incrementally.  For example, first, an updated Begin-era autonomy/self-rule plan. Then a federation-with-Jordan plan. These would prove to all that the Arabs desiring an independent state of Palestine indeed have the desire, capability and wherewithal to maintain a state structure and its administration, halt incitement, stop terror, initiate peace programs, begin joint normalization projects, etc. Something has to be done other than creating ideas to undo 20 years of what the Palestinian Authority has wrought.

And then I added this:

Whatever the "solution", let's not forget that there was a Palestine Mandate. In 1922, the two-state solution was done and Jordan, geographically 75% of historic Palestine started off on its road to be an Arab state.The two-state solution was tried in 1937 and the Arabs refused.Again in 1947, and refused.A war by Arabs in 1967 was launched when no "occupation" existed nor were there any "settlements" as Jews had been ethnically cleansed from Judea, Samaria and Gaza (aka, the "West Bank" and Gaza) between 1920-1948.Has Makovsky solved those problems which caused the Arabs to reject the two-state solution previously, which would then facilitate a two-state solution today?

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Germany's Two-State Solution

Here's the headline:

You would think that if it didn't work out for them, why should they force it on Israel?

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No Foundation in International Law for the Two-State Solution

From a 1980 Yale Journal of International Law article:

"Palestinian Self-Determination": Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate 

by Eugene V. Rostow

There is no foundation in international law for the idea of a second Arab Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And it would be political and military folly for the West to force Israel to acquiesce in such a scheme. Establishing a new Arab state there would injure Western interests, and advance those of the Soviet Union, by strengthening the Soviet position in the region, and by increasing Arab dependence on Soviet protection. It would weaken Israel, which, since the fall of Iran, is the most important Western ally in the area.

Above all, such a policy would abandon the moral and political obligations towards Israel which the victorious Allies assumed in 1919, and reiterated through the United Nations Charter in 1945. Israel's legitimacy as a state rests on much more than the usual criteria of international law--de facto statehood; membership in the United Nations; recognition; the success of its armed forces; the weight of history; and so on. In 1922, the organized international community of the day, the League of Nations, with the special concurrence of the United States, which was not a member, established the Palestine Mandate. Through that Mandate, it invited Jews to come to live in Palestine as their national home, In reliance on that promise, the Jewish community in Palestine developed, and, with the approval of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations (the successor to the League), became the state of Israel. The solemn obligations of the international community to Israel implicit in these events survive not only as a special moral and historic element in Israel's status within the family of nations, but as a trust still applicable, with other norms and interests, to the task of fashioning a just and durable future for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  

For the West to betray those commitments would be to take another long step towards dissolving the world community organized as the United Nations into a condition of universal war.

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An Alternative Two-State Solution

I didn't expect this from someone whose career was as a tournament-winning professional golfer on the PGA TOUR and its Champions Tour. In 1965 he co-founded and helped lead the PGA TOUR Bible Study:-

From a review:

...the 3rd section discusses the future of the region in the light of Bible prophecy. Two key aspects of Kermit's case are that 1) God gave land to each nation, including Philistia, and 2) Israel NEVER ruled Philistia completely (i.e. never fully obeyed God's directive). Its greatest extent of control over Philistine territory came during the 20-year period of 96-76 BC during the rule of Hasmonean leader Alexander Jannaeus. From this, Kermit argues that modern Israel's occupation of the Plain of Philistia is contrary both to historical precedent and also to the express will of God (44, i.e. He'd given the land to the Philistines, later challenging the Israelites to take it [by trusting Him to give them victory in battle], but they failed to do so [i.e. their fear of the Philistines overcame their faith in God to deliver victory]).

His proposal involves carving out historic Philistia for a Palestinian state, from the usually dry stream "Wadi el Arish" in NE Egypt as its SW border to the seasonal stream "Nahal Sorek" in the NE (between Ashdod and Joppa/Tel Aviv), extending roughly 15 miles inland across what the Bible calls the "Philistine Plain" to the Shephelah (i.e. "lowlands"), to include all 5 historic Philistine cities of Gaza, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Ekron and Gath. Most of the land would come from Israel, with a small section in the SW coming from Egypt.

And he's still pushing the idea as an alternative two-state solution.

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What's Bad for You Is Not Bad for Me

So writes Shaul Arieli in Ha-Ha-Haaretz:

Once a concept becomes crystallized in the minds of the public, it’s very difficult to dislodge. Sometimes, its crystallization reflects a lack of thought; sometimes it is intentional; sometimes it is intellectual stagnation; and sometimes it’s all of these together. The fact that the State of Israel has no permanent borders greatly affects its conduct in the diplomatic arena with regard to resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. In the context of attempts to agree on Israel’s borders, the concept of the “settlement blocs” has crystallized into a fossil that no one has the strength to smash.
Over the past 20 years, this concept – which refers to adjacent Jewish settlements in the West Bank – has become an organizing principle in every proposed diplomatic plan. It has been present in all negotiations since then, and also in the unilateral measures Israel has taken.

Of course, the concept of a "two-state solution" is not in the same category, correct?

Left-wingers are not connected to their own frames of reference which are reserved solely for their political opponents.

Hypocrisy?


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Ross & Makovsky's Leap-of-Disbelief

Two wise men, Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, in the Washington Post:

But, of course, Israel would have to adopt a policy on settlements that credibly ended building outside of the blocs. In addition to Israel stating publicly that it would no longer build beyond the security barrier, we would need several private understandings to be able to fulfill our side of the bargain: First, Israel would not add construction in places on the edge of the security barrier, such as Ariel, which has 20,000 settlers and is likely to be a difficult issue in final negotiations. Second, Israel would not build in Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Third, Israel would accept the principle of territorial exchanges or swaps.

They write that in order 

to preserve the possibility of a two-state outcome, particularly with the Palestinians entering a period of uncertain succession.

Of course, if uncertainty is in the succession, why should Israel take a risk now that would place itself in an awkward, no, a very threatening security situation?  Would an acceptance of territorial withdrawal lessen Hamas' influence and prohibit support for its terror campaign, or would, gioven the Gaza precedent, increase the possibility and probability of terror?

Are these gentlemen really wise or seeking to fulfill their own outlooks and forcing them on a reality that cannot at all assure not only Israel's existence but the stability of the region?

They do make a correct point:

The administration’s inability to differentiate between settlement activity within and outside of those blocs has actually bolstered the Israeli right, because most Israelis draw a distinction between the two. The Obama approach is seen as dismissing Israeli needs.

And they pursue it

A new U.S. approach would acknowledge that building within the blocs does not change the contours of the “peace map.” While not formally endorsing settlement activity, it would nonetheless seek to channel it into areas that will likely be part of Israel in any two-state outcome. In 2008, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas implicitly acknowledged the principle of settlement blocs remaining part of Israel, offering 1.9 percent of this territory during negotiations in return for land inside Israel.

Abbas is worthless and unsupported and won't be around soon.  And an offer of 1.9%?

Oh, they know that:

That does not mean that Abbas would embrace a U.S. approach that drew a distinction between settlement-building inside and outside the blocs.

And what is their next leap-of-disbelief?

The Obama administration could offer several things that would matter to Netanyahu.First, the president could promise to veto any resolution on settlements (or perceived to be anti-Israeli) at the U.N. Security Council. Second, he could agree not to present to the council a U.S. resolution on parameters for resolving the conflict. Third, he could commit to pressing our European and Arab partners to denounce Palestinian efforts against normalizing Israeli­-Palestinian contacts, emphasizing that the Palestinian effort to de­legitimize Israel is inconsistent with a two-state outcome. 

"Could"?  Obama could, would do that?

Are they serious?

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GraphicZionism: Wrong-turn Cliffhanger

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If Only: State's Psaki on the New Two-State Solution

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Edgar Allen Poe on the Two-State Solution

A.

B.

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Israel, Jordan, Fatahland (Judea & Samaria) and Hamastan (Gaza).

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GraphicZionism: Contemplating the Two-State Solution

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More GraphicZionism: On the Two-State Solution

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Frank Gaffney on The Insanity of Yielding Yesha

Frank Gaffney explains why, in my opinion, a "two-state solution" is completely irrational and why surrendering the territory of Yesha is, in Frank's words, "insanity":-

 

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Worth Quoting on Two-State Possibility

“one of the most compelling aspects of the two-state solution is that a solid majority of both Palestinians and Israelis alike have shown, in virtually every poll taken in the past twenty years and more, that they are in favor of peace based on two states.” It’s time to lay this claim to rest. For one thing, it ignores recent polling in which the Israelis have fairly conclusively rejected even the minimalist picture of a Palestinian state. Thus in July 2013 the Peace Index poll found that “the majority of Jewish respondents, to different extents, is not prepared to concede to the Palestinians on any of the four problems that stand at the heart of the conflict,” namely borders, Arab refugees, Jerusalem, and settlement evacuations. The data of the August 2013 poll strengthen the “previous finding that there is currently no sweeping support for the two-state solution and indicate that the Israeli public is not losing sleep over the basic premise of the negotiations that without two states a bi-national reality will emerge.” Close to 77 percent of the Jewish public oppose Israeli recognition in principle of the right of return, with a small number of Palestinian refugees being allowed to return and compensation being offered for others. For another thing, when Palestinians think of two states, they think of a state that will look more or less like Israel, something that virtually no Israeli (or their supporters) wish.

Source

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GraphicZionism: Whose Bright Idea

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That Two-State Formula?

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Voices from the Harem

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With apologies to Jean-Léon Gérôme.

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Graphically on The Two-State Solution

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The Two-State Solution Question

The question that is on the table in relation to the future of Judea and Samaria is not the "Double D" - either lose Israel's democracy or via Arab demography lose Israel as a Jewish state - but rather this one, as expressed by Raphaella Segal here and slightly rephrased by me:

what is more manageable - a threat to Israel from annexing the area, which has 700,000 voting-age Palestinians, or the security threat stemming from a two-state solution with the topographical domination the new "Palestine" would control?

Ron Breiman, a friend, has published this today:

If we weren't slamming our heads into the wall but were rather opening them to new ideas, it would be possible to set the Jordan River as the border between Israel to the west and Jordan/Palestine to the east.  There are some who are scared of a demographic threat, claiming that if we don't withdraw from our land there will soon be an Arab majority west of the Jordan River. However, it is precisely for this reason that supporters of a Palestinian state should ensure that such a state won't absorb Arab refugees, who would cause there to be an Arab majority west of the Jordan River.

And there are those who utter the catchy slogan "them there, us here," referring to the Arabs who live in the land of Israel. This phrase is of course false and misleading. It means a "peace" based on the ethnic cleansing of Jews from Judea and Samaria and while keeping Israeli Arabs in Israel. Enlightened individuals and peace seekers should rule out ethnic cleansing, both of Jews and of Arabs. Anyone who advocates a ban on Jews living in Judea and Samaria isn't enlightened and isn't a peace seeker. Ultimately, such a "peace" would turn Israel into a non-Jewish and non-democratic country, and therefore devoid of peace.

There also other concerns that mitigate against the two-state solution, among them -

Will the Arabs recognize the Jewish national ethos?

Will they implement, until the arrangements are signed, peace consciousness educational programs to raise a new generation more willing to accept Israel and Zionism?

Will the "Palestinian identity narrative" of Israel's Arabs be rejected and reversed?

Will the PA's President Mahmoud Abbas drop the insistence that Israel must return fully to the June 4, 1967 borders and thus refuse to acknowledge that "territorial compromise" applies to both parties?

As for demography, which I have dealt with numerous times (here; and here, recently) this is from today:

The population of Israel is expected to reach 11.4 million people by the end of 2035, according to an updated forecast published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. According to a more optimistic estimation, it is possible that the population could reach 12.4 million people.
• 73% of the entire population will be Jewish by 2035
• 23% of the entire population will be Arab by 2035

...[out of a total of] 8.8 million. The Arab population will be 2.6 million -- 23% of the entire population (nearly one in every four Israelis). There will be 8.3 million Jews by the end of 2035 (73% of the entire population); the Muslim population will be 2.3 million (20% of the population); the Druze will count for 1.6% of the population with 185,000 people; and Christian Arabs will account for 1.3% with 152,000 people.

and supports to prognosis of data.

Here is Jeff Jacoby, writing about The myth of the inevitable Jewish minority in Israel in the Boston Globe:

Yasser Arafat liked to say that the ultimate weapon in his arsenal against the Jewish state was “the womb of the Arab woman.”...

...As the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics began its first census in the West Bank and Gaza in 1997, the bureau’s director, Hassan Abu Libdeh, assured The New York Times that the results would amount to nothing less than “a civil intifada.” In 2005, the bureau predicted that Jews would be a minority in “historic Palestine” (i.e., west of the Jordan River) by 2010. Now it says the tipping point will come by 2020.

Don’t count on it.

Arafat’s boast notwithstanding, Palestinian women, like women throughout the Muslim world, are bearing far fewer children than they used to. Within Israel proper, the birth rate among Muslims has trended steadily downward and stands now at 3.5 children per woman. It is even lower for Palestinians in the West Bank — just 2.91, according to the CIA Factbook...But while Palestinian birth rates have dramatically declined, Jewish birth rates in Israel have been heading up. Israel now has the highest fertility level of any modern industrialized nation. The fertility gap between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, a yawning 5.8 in the 1960s, is just 0.5 today. Defying longstanding conventional wisdom, writes former Israeli diplomat Yoram Ettinger, it is Israel’s Jewish population that is undergoing a remarkable surge, rising from about 80,000 births per year in 1995 to 130,000 in 2012. (The annual number of Israeli Arab births has held steady at between 35,000 and 40,000).

Don't gamble with Israel's future on unreliable statistics.

Or as Zehava Englard wrote:

Not only is the price of the One State Solution affordable, Israel can’t afford NOT to implement this plan of action.

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Two-State Solution for ... Syria?

Shall we partition Syria to solve the conflict?

Two states?  More?

Along ethnic-religious lines?

Or language lines?

Historical political divisions?

This could set a precedent.

If it works there, maybe it'll work for the Arab-Israel Conflict?

But I guess not.

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