“The issue of a Palestinian state is central to Israel’s reputation abroad, because so many governments and international organizations favor its establishment in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.”
and points out, as I have done, that
...it seems necessary to point out several historical facts, starting with this one: if so many governments, international organizations, and Arab nations have such a profound interest in a Palestinian homeland, why didn’t they work together to grant one to Palestinians when they had the opportunity? From 1948 through 1967, neither Jordan nor Egypt made any effort to establish a Palestinian state in either the West Bank or the Gaza strip. In fact, the Jordanians were in conflict with Yasser Arafat in the 1970s, with King Hussein eventually expelling him and Palestinians from Jordan.
And of course the PLO was founded in 1964, three years before Israel controlled the West Bank or Gaza. Israel was targeted for destruction long before the “occupied territories” and settlements ever became an issue...
And more: in 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians their cherished homeland; Arafat responded by declaring a second intifada. The Israelis did in 2005 (in Gaza) what no other nation — Arab or non-Arab — has ever done: allow Palestinians the chance for self-rule. In return for this unilateral concession, Israel found itself on the receiving end of thousands of rockets and mortar attacks.
He leaves out the fact that King Abdallah of Jordan wiped out any claim for a separate "Palestinian state" in 1949 when he maneuvered local request for him to assume sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. No Arab leader protested, well, efficiently except for the Mufti who had him assassinated in 1950.
Oh, well, Arab politics.
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"maneuvered local request for him to assume sovereignty"
Am still trying to figure out what this means.
As a result of the war, many Palestinian Arabs from the Jordanian-controlled areas found that union with Jordan was of vital importance to the preservation of Arab control over the “West Bank” territories which had not fallen to the Israelis. Consequently, in December 1948, a group of Palestinian leaders and notables from the West Bank convened a historic conference in Jericho, where they called for King Abdullah to take immediate steps to unite the two banks of the Jordan into a single state under his leadership.
On April 11, 1950, elections were held for a new Jordanian parliament in which the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank were equally represented. Thirteen days later, Parliament unanimously approved a motion to unite the two banks of the Jordan River, constitutionally expanding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in order to safeguard what was left of the Arab territory of Palestine from further Zionist expansion.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan now included nearly one and a half million people, more than half a million of whom were refugees evicted from Jewish-occupied Palestine. All automatically became citizens of Jordan, a right that had first been offered in December 1949 to all Palestinians who wished to claim it. Although the Arab League opposed this plan, and no other Arab government followed Jordan’s lead, the Hashemite Kingdom offered the possibility of normal life for many people who would have otherwise remained stateless refugees.
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The League's decision to establish a Palestinian administration fell short of Hajj Amin's demands for the establishment of a government. The League acted moderately to avoid putting undue strain on relations with Abdallah, but he, nevertheless, understood that the decision was meant to prevent his annexation of Palestinian territory. After laboring to take responsibility for the Palestinian problem out of the hands of the Palestinian leadership, Abdallah now found himself faced with an attempt by his opponents in the League to return that responsibility into their hands.
The League's offices were in Cairo, as were Hajj Amin and his colleagues in the Palestinian leadership. They had won a victory over Abdallah within the framework of the League. He still had the advantage in the field: his officers were in control of most of the Palestinian population. He exploited this to the full to undermine the legitimacy of the League's decision to establish an autonomous administration. The media under his control began a propaganda campaign to persuade the Palestinians that they were being left out of the process of deciding their own future.(29) Abdallah, who had assumed authority by virtue of the power he wielded, now cast doubt on the right of the League and the HAI to make decisions regarding Palestinian affairs without consulting the Palestinians under his army's control. It was clear that he was using the Palestinians themselves to abrogate the League's decision.
Hajj Amin had long been demanding the establishment of a Palestinian government, but Abdallah had been opposed to it and all efforts to persuade him had failed. In July, the Political Committee decided to establish an autonomous administration rather than a government. They were still hesitant, and perhaps hoped this would moderate Abdallah's policy of territorial expansion. But when it became clear that he meant to pursue his aims, the Political Committee, in the middle of September 1948, decided to change the institution's name from the 'Palestinian Autonomous Administration' to the 'All Palestine Government' (APG). Since the Jordanian army was in control of most of the Palestinian territory, the APG was set to convene in Gaza.(30) The term 'All Palestine' was coined to forestall any possible criticism by Abdallah that the establishment of a government meant acceptance of the partition plan.
On September 22nd, the HAI issued proclamation which constituted a real step towards the formation of a Palestinian government. It stated that on the basis of the League's decision, the Palestinians were entitled to decide their own fate; that 'all of Palestine - within the borders extant at the termination of the British Mandate' was to be an 'independent state'.(31)
It seemed that a Palestinian government was actually being established despite the opposition. But even at this late date, after the decisions had been made public, the League's general secretary tried to placate the angry King with vague and noncommittal pronouncements. He found it expedient to claim that the APG had nothing to do with Hajj Amin (even though he had participated in the preparation for the establishment of the APG with Ahmed Hilmi); he termed this government merely 'a temporary measure for the present situation'.(32) But Abdallah wasn't misled by these assurances and the other Arab leaders' hesitation didn't escape him. He decided to mount staunch opposition to the implementation of the Political Committee's decision to establish the APG. He gave two reasons for his position: one, that 'the Transjordanian army currently fighting in Palestine would not agree to anybody interfering with military authorities there'; two, that the establishment of the APG was 'against the wishes of the Arabs of Palestine'.(33)
This problem of representation brought up by Abdallah became the bone of contention between the Palestinian and Hashemite camps. Upon the initiative of the HAI, it was decided to hold a meeting in Gaza of Palestinian representatives from all parts of the country - in the shape of a national council to provide public support for the APG and its platform.
Abdallah's opponents in the League, led by Egypt, didn't try to prevent the gathering of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in Gaza. Such an anti-Hashemite demonstration was in keeping with Egyptian and Saudi policy. But under the circumstances - the war being at its height and Abdallah still threatening to conclude a separate agreement with nascent Israel - the Egyptians wanted to prevent a total rupture of relations with the King. For this reason they urged Hajj Amin to stay in Cairo and forgo the gathering of the national council in Gaza.
Though the Egyptian authorities denied him permission, Hajj Amin was determined to take his place at the head of this historic gathering - the declaration of independence and the establishment of a Palestinian government. In his memoirs he described in detail how he slipped across the border on July 27, 1948, with the help of the 'Free Officers' (who were to seize power in Egypt in 1952) and arrived in Gaza the following day.(34) The Palestinians in Gaza gave him an enthusiastic welcome. On the other ahdn, the Egyptian military authorities' reception was cool, at least by appearance. They refrained from allotting the council a venue for their gathering. The members of the APG, who had also arrived from Cairo, were forced to take rooms in a hotel, while Hajj Amin himself stayed at the home of Hajj Musa al-Surani, chairman of the Gaza branch of Higher Muslim Council.(35)
The Palestinian National Council convened on October 1, 1948, at the al-Fallah al-Islamiyah School, a derelict building that belonged to the Palestinian Muslim Waqf. Nevertheless the participants (75-80 municipal and village leaders had arrived out of the 150 invited, because of the Jordanian and Iraqi armies' refusal to permit delegates who resided in areas under their control to leave) were in a celebratory mood of historic achievement. Hajj Amin was elected President of the National Council as well as President of the Higher Council - a sort of presidential institution to stand above both the APG and PNC, the executive arm and the legislative arm, respectively.(36) The PNC continued in session through October 2-3, and came to an end with a number of decisions, including the adoption of the Sharifian flag of 1916, the choice of Jerusalem as a capital, general mobilization, and more. In addition, a bill establishing the government and the declaration of independence were adopted and signed by all the delegates.(37)
Abdallah's Response
Abdallah decided to answer the challenge posed by the Gaza gathering in kind. His agents were instructed to hold local caucuses for the purpose of both undermining the legitimacy of the PNC in Gaza and legitimizing the process of annexation by himself.
On October 1st, the very same day the PNC's deliberations began in Gaza, a 'Palestinian Congress' was convened in Amman. Mayors, tribal leaders and Palestinian notables were invited to the Congress. Also present was Dhuqan al-Husayn, the Jordanian military governor. The chairman of the Congress was Sulayman Taji al-Farouqi of Ramle, and Ajjaj Nuwyhed was elected secretary. After a series of speeches, a number of resolutions were adopted; the establishment of the APG in Gaza was ruled contrary to the wishes and interests of the Palestinians; Transjordan and Palestine were termed a single territorial entity that must remain a single political entity. It was also decided that a Palestinian government be formed only after the liberation of Palestine, and then in a democratic fashion.(38)
Another gathering was held on October 18th in Ramallah, upon the initiative of a group called the Hashemite Propaganda Association. The participants - local Palestinian notables - discussed the same issues brought up in Amman. The resolutions adopted were similar; King Abdallah was to be seen as the 'savior of Palestine', he was to be 'entrusted with the solution of the problem, by war or by peace' (this being a hint to Abdallah's opponents in the League that the option of a separate peace with Israel was yet viable). The gathering also called on Palestinian youth to enlist in the Jordanian army.(39)
Abdallah was willing to use less scrupulous methods in order to undermine the attempted establishment of a Palestinian government. Jamal al-Husayni, the intended APG Foreign Minister, set out for Palestinian concentrations outside the Gaza Strip to ensure maximum representation from these regions to the PNC in Gaza. Jordanian army authorities arrested him and prevented him from attending the gathering himself.(40)
The third such gathering was held in Jericho on December 1, 1948. In retrospect, the previous congresses seem merely a prelude to the Jericho Congress. It was an especially large gathering, with hundreds of representatives from all sectors of the Palestinian population, attended by religious leaders, the Jordanian military governors and many reporters. Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari of Hebron was elected President of the Jericho Congress.(41) In his speech, he railed against the establishment of the APG in Gaza and called on the King to annex Palestine to his Kingdom. He termed it a first step towards the unification of the Arab states. Finally he proposed that Abdallah be entrusted with the task of solving the Palestinian problem.(42) The resolutions adopted were in the spirit of the Presidents speech and included an other of allegiance (bai'a) to Abdallah as King of Palestine.(43)
The defeat of all the Arab armies, except Jordan's, in the war was already apparent at the time of the Jericho Congress. This is the reason for the feeling of helplessness which drove the Palestinian representatives at Jericho to seek refuge and deliverance from the King. But coercion was used as well; Jordanian military governors made sure that all the Palestinian representatives invited did attend. The atmosphere of coercion was most evident after the delegates to the Jericho Congress had dispersed. Abdallah heard a Radio Ramallah broadcast announcing that the decision to entrust him with the Palestinian problem was made conditional upon a commitment on his part to liberate all of Palestine. The King's ire was raised and the drafters of the resolutions were forced to change them the day after the closing of the Congress. After being amended, the resolutions included a call on Abdallah to solve the Palestinian problem as he saw fit.(44) Only then did a delegation set out for the King's Palace at Shuna and presented him with the resolutions of the Congress. The Jordanian government affirmed these resolutions at a special session.(45)
The Arab World's Response
The Arab world responded with a wave of protests at Abdallah's unilateral annexation. The League's General Secretary issued a condemnation, Arab radio stations expressed disapproval, and the leaders of the Ulama in Egypt gathered to refute in the name of religion Jordan's action.(46) But the Arab rulers, especially Egypt's, were mainly incensed with Hajj Amin al-Husayni.
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