Foreman vs. Medad

Here's David Foreman's version of events:-

It was one of David Ben-Gurion's most difficult decisions. After the establishment of the state, the provisional government resolved to unite all pre-state military factions into the newly formed Israel Defense Forces. On June 1, an agreement was signed whereby Menachem Begin's Irgun would be absorbed into the IDF and, as a result, would cease all independent arms acquisitions.

However, prior to acceptance of this agreement, the Altalena, a ship carrying arms and fighters for the Irgun, was scheduled to land at the Tel Aviv port on May 15, 1948. For fear of it being sabotaged en route, no cables were sent to the Irgun headquarters in Paris, which would have included information of the agreement.

After a delay in the scheduled departure, Begin informed Ben-Gurion that the ship had set sail on June 11 without his knowledge and was scheduled to dock on June 20. Ben-Gurion gave his consent to allow 20 percent of the arms to be transferred to the Irgun's Jerusalem Brigade, which was still engaged in combat. However, this decision was conditioned on Begin's commitment to first turn over all arms aboard the vessel to the IDF for distribution.

When the ship anchored off the coast of Kfar Vitkin, Brigade Commander Dan Even ordered Begin to surrender the ship's cargo. In the meantime, Ben-Gurion commanded acting chief of General Staff Yigael Yadin to mass troops and heavy armor off the Mediterranean shore to force Begin's hand. Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, making a clash inevitable; whereupon Ben-Gurion issued the order to open fire on the Altalena.

While there is much debate as to whether the confrontation could have been avoided, Ben-Gurion's decision not to tolerate a militia operating independently of a unified army was courageous. He understood that a paramilitary group acting on its own would have a devastatingly destabilizing effect on the new nation and its future as a democracy.

This historical backdrop has served Israel's public relations campaign well when it singles out the inability of the Palestinian Authority to disarm its paramilitary forces - Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, Izadin al-Kassam Brigade, Islamic Jihad and a host of other private armies.

Here's my version:-

David Foreman's history of the Altalena affair is a bit off-the-mark ("Counterpoint: Israel's fifth column", Jan. 17). His chronology is skimpy, misleading and ignores certain elements.

Already on May 15 after midnight, Menachem Begin informed Yisrael Galili, of the new Defense Ministry, of the existence of the ship Altalena and even suggested the Hagan purchase it. On May 17th, Mossad agent Z. Schind informed Galili that they were aware of the ship's existence for some time and suspected the British were aware of its existence. Whereas Foreman's chain of events would imply David Ben-Gurion being surprised only on June 11, that is not the case.

But more important, Foreman writes that "Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, making a clash inevitable; whereupon Ben-Gurion issued the order to open fire on the Altalena". It would be more correct to have written that faced with an ultimatum that contradicted the terms of the agreement Begin had concluded with Galili to land the boat at Kfar Vitkin, Begin sought to communicate with Ben-Gurion. IDF troops then opened fire at Kfar Vitkin beach, killing two Irgun men whereupon the Altalena upped anchor and set sail for Tel Aviv. There, Palmach men opened murderous fire on the ship and at men swimming in the water. Fourteen more Irgun men were killed at that location by small-arms fire. Ben-Gurion then order a cannon to fire on the Altalena even though Begin had withheld return fire from the boat.

In writing "While there is much debate as to whether the confrontation could have been avoided", Foreman avoids the main question: if Begin initiated informing the new government of the ship, had agreed to a major compromise over the distribution of the weapons, had agreed to land at Kfar Vitkin, a Mapai moshav, and that almost 90% of the arrivals disembarked and had set off already for Netanya, why did Ben-Gurion need to use military force when Begin proved that in deliberations he was willing to seek national unity?

Could it have been that he was seeking to destroy Begin and the Irgun as a political force or even eliminate Begin altogether?