a story of two nails:
^
In 1947, the UN would be voting on a plan of partition to solve the 'problem' of the Palestine Mandate.
What did the CIA think?
Here:
It is apparent that the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (and an international zone), with economic union between the two states, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 29 November 1947, cannot be implemented. The Arab reaction to the recommendation has been violent, and the Arab refusal to cooperate in any way with the five-nation United Nations Commission will prevent the formation of an Arab state and the organization of economic union. The Arabs will use force to oppose the establishment of a Jewish state and to this end are training troops in Palestine and other Arab suites.
^
Thanks to this story of the arrival from Germany in 1935 of the tourist ship, Tel Aviv, we know that flag of the mandate was not as many have claimed - the blue-and-white version similar to our current flag - but one with a Union Jack and a circle with 'Palestine' inside
Description in the Haaretz news item:A further addition to the visit of the three US Senators to Mandate Palestine in August-September 1936. See here and here.
867N.00/393
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
[Washington,] September 22, 1936.
Senator Copeland of New York called on the Secretary of State yesterday afternoon for the purpose, so he stated, of reporting to the Secretary the results of the observations he had made during the course of a recent visit to Palestine, accompanied by Senator Hastings of Delaware and Senator Austin of Vermont.
Senator Copeland stated that he had not sought or desired to be a member of the party making an unofficial investigation of conditions in Palestine, but had agreed to participate upon the understanding that he was to be free to express his views on the situation without any obligation to Mr. Hearst, who, so it appears, financed the trip. The Senator stated that he made this clear to Mr. Hearst himself, who accompanied the party as far as Naples, and that Mr. Hearst “naturally” acceded to Senator Copeland’s wishes in the matter.
After expressing his praise of the various Foreign Service officers in the Near East with whom he came in contact, the Senator recounted his experiences with British officials, including the High Commissioner in Palestine, who, according to the Senator’s own statement, granted him every facility for the purpose of making his investigations, even to the extent of furnishing armed troops on trains proceeding to various points in Palestine.
The Senator pointed out that he had conferred not only with Jewish circles in Palestine but also with representatives of various Arab groups. He expressed the view that the Arabs in Palestine had profited by Jewish immigration and by the introduction of foreign capital in the country, but he was emphatic in his view that the British authorities had been remiss in the execution of the terms of the Mandate and in having failed to effect a conciliation between the Jewish and Arab populations. He expressed the opinion that Great Britain, instead of devoting herself to her obligations under the Mandate, was using Palestine as a political football for her imperial purposes. He revealed, during the course of his conversation, that he intended to make public statements in the above sense.
In reply, the Secretary pointed out that our Consul General in Jerusalem is a thoroughly experienced Near Eastern officer who has served in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and had charge of Palestine there, and that we had kept ourselves constantly informed of all phases of the present situation. The Secretary furthermore expressed his confidence that the British Government was fully aware of the views entertained in Jewish circles in this country respecting [Page 451]the Palestine problem. He mentioned the fact that recent British reinforcements in Palestine have brought the number of British troops there to about 32,000. He pointed out to the Senator that, although there are in Palestine more than 10,000 American citizens, not one of them has as yet been injured and that all requests made by the American Consul General at Jerusalem for the protection of American nationals and interests in the country had been promptly accorded by the British authorities. He intimated to the Senator that, while keeping constantly on the alert in this matter, it might be delicate to make any demands upon the British Government as to the specific manner in which it should carry out its obligations under the Mandate. In this connection Mr. Hull referred to the debates in the House of Representatives at the time the Joint Resolution was passed in 1922 favoring the establishment in Palestine of the National Home for the Jews.20 He referred to the fact that the Resolution as originally drafted stated that this Government “pledges its support” to the establishment of such a home and that, at the instance of Mr. Hughes, then Secretary of State, the above expression was struck out and the Resolution was made to read that the United States “favors” the above-mentioned project.
Mr. Hull further reminded the Senator that any intervention on the part of this Government might bring forth a suggestion from the British Government that we assume responsibilities for the execution of the Palestine Mandate and recalled that at one time it had even been suggested that this Government accept the Mandate for Palestine. The Senator replied that he felt sure we would run no risk today of having the Mandate offered to us again, in view of the present weakness of the British Government as a result of the Ethiopian fiasco and the recent Anglo-Egyptian Treaty21 and the increased importance which Palestine had assumed in the defense of British imperial interests.
At the conclusion of his conversation with the Secretary, the Senator emphasized that he had only come to make a friendly visit upon the Secretary and to report on his visit to Palestine and stated that he was not requesting the Secretary to take any action in the matter. He did, however, feel that the Secretary would be justified, in view of present conditions in Palestine and in view of our Treaty with Great Britain respecting Palestine,22 in reminding the British Government of its responsibilities under the Mandate. He did not, however, ask the Secretary to take such action.
Wallace Murray
See Congressional Record, vol. 62, pt. 10, pp. 9799 ff.
Signed at London, August 26, 1936; for text, see British Treaty Series No. 6 (1937): Treaty of Alliance, etc.
Signed December 3, 1924, Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, p. 212.
The British Government believes that the Palestine Mandate expired with the demise of the League of Nations, its delegate to the Security Council’s Membership Committee said today.
The statement came in connection with debate on the application for membership in the U.N. by Transjordan, which was part of the Palestine Mandate. The British representative, Paul Falla, defended Britain’s unilateral proclamation of TransJordan’s independence by declaring that with the death of the League of Nations it devolved upon the British Government to either declare Transjordan independent or seek a trusteeship. It decided on the former course, he said, after consultation with the U.N. General Assembly. Falla made no reference to Palestine proper. Falla spoke after a statement by Soviet delegate Alexei N. Krasilnikov, who said that the Palestine Mandate had never been terminated, and consequently TransJordan’s status as an independent state was invalid. The Soviet spokesman said the regular procedures laid down for termination of a mandate had been violated by Britain’s declaration of Transjordan’s independence. The General Assembly resolution last year welcoming Transjordan’s independence was not sufficient to legalize violation of the Mandate, he added.He also challenged the validity of the Transjordan treaty with Britain, which allows the latter to maintain troops on Transjordan territory. Krasilnikov added that his opposition did not indicate any change in the friendly Soviet feelings towards the people of Transjordan and the Soviet desire to see them truly independent.
"THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND My Lords...It is quite true that the present legal position of His Majesty's Government in Palestine is that of a power occupying enemy territory. I am advised that, from a strictly legal point of view, the action taken by His Majesty's Government, through the Palestine Government, with respect to the Patriarchate is entirely legal; that is, that it cannot be questioned by the Courts and will be validated in due course by the necessary legal processes when the military occupation comes to an end. I am informed that the Ordinance regulating the affairs of the Patriarchate is perfectly legal, in that it is an order of the High Commissioner who is in the position of a competent military authority.
On the other hand, it is perfectly true that this action goes somewhat beyond that which is recognised by international jurisprudence as the normal functions of an ordinary occupying power. But I would represent to your Lordships that His Majesty's Government. is not an "ordinary" occupying power. It has been entrusted by the Supreme Council of the Allies with the administration of Palestine, pending the coming into force of the Treaty of Sevres, and consequently considered itself authorised, and indeed bound, to set up a civil administration in the country for the purpose of discharging the usual functions of Government...According to International Law a country in foreign occupation must be administered according to its own law, but the occupying Power can modify this law by orders issued by the competent military authority, and this has been done in regard to many matters in Palestine,..
LORD PARMOOR If I may say one word in answer to the noble Duke, I thank hint very much for the detailed answer that he has given to my Question, but if we look beneath the surface I think I am not going too far if I say that he, speaking on behalf of His Majesty's Government, admits that what has been done in Palestine cannot be regarded as legal under International Law, and will have to be validated by subsequent proceedings.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND My reply does not admit that it is illegal action. The words I used were: "I am advised that front a strictly legal point of view the action taken by His Majesty's Government, through the Palestine Government, is entirely legal."...I... made it clear that there are powers by which the High Commissioner, representing the military authority, can modify the law. "The occupying Power can modify the law by orders issued by the competent military authority," and therefore the action taken was in that respect legal.
"explores the colonial, social and political history of the creation of citizenship in mandate Palestine...situates the evolution of citizenship at the centre of state formation under the quasi-colonial mandate administration in Palestine. It emphasises the ways in which British officials crafted citizenship to be separate from nationality based on prior colonial legislation elsewhere, a view of the territory as divided communally, and the need to offer Jewish immigrants the easiest path to acquisition of Palestinian citizenship in order to uphold the mandate’s policy. In parallel, the book examines the reactions of the Arab population to their new status. It argues that the Arabs relied heavily on their pre-war experience as nationals of the Ottoman Empire to negotiate the definitions and meanings of mandate citizenship.
You write of a "Palestinian national movement" but at that time and well into the 1930s and more, the Arabs of Mandate Palestine sought to have the Mandate dissolved and instead, recognize their nationality status as Southern Syrians and to unite what they referred to as Palestine with Greater Syria. Even diaspora Arabs from the territory, as in the US, viewed themselves as such. (see my previous posts here, here and here)
Irregardless of what "Palestine", as a geopolitical was/is, how do you see that impacting on the question of citizenship?
...the question definitely is one that needs asking and one which I, and others, have given thought to before.
It's true that in writings and discussions in print and letters and in nationalist clubs and organisations and political parties of Palestinian Arabs into the 1930s there was a very real wish and effort for unity with Syria and a shared nationality status with the Syrian Arabs. However, in my opinion and from research on this and related historical themes, I would argue that the best way to even begin to approach how these Arabs saw themselves is by understanding that identity then (and now) for the Arabs (and Jewish immigrants, and non-Arabs in Palestine, too) was very flexible.
There were several layers to identity, and so it's impossible to generalise too much or even to pinpoint when particular nationalists realised that a common nationality and overthrowing the mandate was no longer attainable. I think that although the nationalist movement posited itself even into the 1930s as pro-unity with Syria, individuals inside and outside the movement saw themselves alternately as Palestinian, Syrian Arab, etc. Even into the 1920s there was still an identification with an Ottoman identity among some.
... I think identity was flexible and layered in Palestine for the Arabs and for the Jewish immigrants during the Mandate. During the 1930s, even though some ideas of a pan-Arab state were put forth to the British, this had a lot to do with anti-colonialism and a wider anti-Mandate movement and anti-colonial movement in the Middle East, India, North Africa. However, many Arabs in Palestine also believed that their situation was unique, and thus felt that the only way to end the Mandate was to emphasise a specifically-Palestinian territorial identity and struggle, just as in Syria there was a very strong pro-Syrian movement that emphasised a Syrian end to the French Mandate.
To the Editors:
Avishai Margalit errs in his book review essay [“Palestine: How Bad, & Good, Was British Rule?,” NYR, February 7]. He writes that the League of Nations Mandate over Palestine conferred on Britain was to prepare the country “to be a ‘national home for the Jews,’ without ‘impairing the civil and religious rights of the indigenous Arab people.’”
That is quite wrong as the Mandate decision does not include the phrase “indigenous Arab people.” The phrase that actually appears is: “nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” Arabs, as such, are not mentioned. Political rights were the prerogative of the Jewish people. Residency rights, religious rights, personal liberty rights were to be assured. But nothing more than that and certainly no state which was to be established in the territory of Transjordan, partitioned from the original Mandate area in 1922.
Yisrael Medad
Shiloh, Israel
Yisrael Medad is right about the wording of the League of Nations’ Mandate document. But since the “indigenous Arab people” (my expression) and “non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (the Mandate document expression) are coextensive, apart from 1 percent of others, it is a difference that makes no difference.
If wording counts, it is more important to remark that the Mandate document doesn’t mention “political rights” for the Jewish people in Palestine. The only reference to “political rights” is the rights of “Jews in any other country.” The expression “national home” lacks any juridical meaning, unlike, say, home rule. The Mandate document deliberately left vague what the rights of the Jews in Palestine are. It is Medad who gives prerogative political rights to the Jews in Palestine rather than the wording of the Mandate.
The interpretation Medad gives to the Mandate expression “civil rights” as confined to residency rights and personal liberty rights is again of his making. There is no reason to believe that “civil rights” in the Mandate document meant to preclude the rights of the non-Jews to citizenship in any future state in Palestine.
In Avishai Margalit's reply to me, admitting his error, he impugns to me an opinion I did not express nor, to make clear, do I hold, when he writes "There is no reason to believe that “civil rights” in the Mandate document meant to preclude the rights of the non-Jews to citizenship in any future state in Palestine", ("Palestine: What the Mandate Said", March 7, 2013).
My point was that that "future state in Palestine", at least west of the Jordan River, was to be a Jewish one. An Arab state in historic Palestine was not at all contemplated. However, due to Arab terror in Jerusalem in April 1920, when Jews were killed, and other violent agitation, Winston Churchill, as Minister of Colonies, decided during March 1921 to truncate the original Jewish National Home area. He created an Arab emirate in Transjordan and prohibited Jews from either owning land or settling there, a policy the League of Nations agreed to but only as a form of postponement (Article 25 of the 1922 Mandate decision). That policy surely discriminated against and precluded the rights of Jews who were indigenous to the country living in Hebron, Gaza, Nablus (Shchem) and Jerusalem for centuries. The future ruling family of what eventually became the Kingdom of Jordan, incidentally, originated in Saudi Arabia.
LORD CURZON thought that M. Berthelot was possibly not fully acquainted with the history of the question. In November 1917 Mr. Balfour had made a declaration on behalf of the Zionists. The terms of this declaration had been communicated by M. Sokolov, in February 1918 to M. Pichon, who, at that time, was head of the French Foreign Office...He thought it was impossible for the Supreme Council to determine, that day, exactly what form the future administration of Palestine would take. All they could do was to repeat the declaration which had been made in November 1917. That declaration contemplated, first, the creation of national home for the Jews, whose privileges and rights were to be safeguarded under a military Power. Secondly, it was of the highest importance to safeguard the rights of minorities; first, the rights of the Arabs, and then of the Christian communities...
...SIGNOR NITTI expressed the view that it...appeared to him that in principle the Powers were generally in agreement as to the desirability of instituting a national home for the Jews. The discussion had disclosed the fact that there was a divergence of opinion between the British and French delegations as to exactly what rights were to be reserved for the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. The subject, moreover, raised the whole question of the position of Roman Catholics in the East, which he did not think required a very elaborate solution. It was agreed that Palestine was to be under British control, and on behalf of the Italian delegation he begged leave to submit the following addition to the British text of the mandates:--
'Tout privilège, et toute prérogative vis-à -vis des communautés religieuses prendra fin. La Puissance mandataire s'engage à nommer dans le plus bref délai une commission special pour étudier toute question et toute réclamation concernant les différentes communautés religieuses et en établir le règlement. Il sera tenu compte dans la composition de cette commission des intérêts religieux en jeu. Le président de la commission sera nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.'
He was quite sure that all the members of the Supreme Council present shared the full confidence that he himself felt in the British Government in regard to the safeguarding of the rights and privileges of non-Jewish communities. He himself would like to see the president of the commission, which was proposed by the Italian delegation, to be appointed by the League of
Nations, in order to ensure complete impartiality.
M. MILLERAND said that, as regards Palestine, there were really three questions. The first was that there should be a national home for the Jews. Upon that they were all agreed. The second point was the safeguarding of the rights of non-Jewish communities. That again, he thought, offered no insuperable difficulties. The third was the question of existing traditional rights of non-Jewish bodies, and on that he would like to offer certain observations...He understood that in undertaking a mandate for Palestine Great Britain undertook, first, to establish a national home for the Jews in that country, and also not to neglect the traditional rights of the habitants generally.
SIGNOR NITTI said that they were all agreed on the question of establishing a Jewish home there.
SIGNOR NITTI said...that the United States Ambassador at Rome was in the ante-chamber, and had asked to be admitted to the meeting...He understood that if he attended it would be as an observer only, and not as a representative participant in their deliberations.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the United States Ambassador should be admitted to the Council Chamber and that the president of the Supreme Council should ask him exactly what his instructions were...
SIGNOR NITTI said that...The question now occupying the attention of the Supreme Council was the subject of mandates, and their present pre-occupation in the future of Palestine and the Zionists...
It was agreed –_________________________
(a) To accept the terms of the Mandates Article as given below with reference to Palestine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the process-verbal an undertaking by the Mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognized this protectorate as being at an end.
(b) that the terms of the Mandates Article should be as follows:
The High Contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognized as independent States...The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made...in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
La Puissance mandataire s’engage a nommer dans le plus bref delai une Commission speciale pour etudier toute question et toute reclamation concernant les differentes communautes religieuses et en etablir le reglement. Il sera tenu compte dans la composition de cette Commission des interets religieux en jeu. Le President de la Commission sera nomme par le Conseil de la Societe des Nations. [The Mandatory undertakes to appoint in the shortest time a special commission to study any subject and any queries concerning the different religious communities and regulations. The composition of this Commission will reflect the religious interests at stake. The President of the Commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.]
In regard to your question asking when and where Lord Balfour said the following about the Arabs, “Why are you complaining … etc.”...It appears that the aforementioned statement to the Arabs was made, not by Lord Balfour, but by Lord Robert Cecil who worked closely with Balfour as Assistant Foreign Secretary...
Lord Cecil made two memorable statements...The first was at a large public rally in London at the Opera House that took place on December 2, 1917 in celebration of the publication of the Balfour Declaration. At this rally he stated:
Our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judea for the Jews … and let real Turkey be for the Turks.
It is interesting to note that Cecil referred to Judea, the Jewish country of yore that flourished in the period of the Second Temple, rather than by its Roman-Greek name of Palestine...“Judea for the Jews” clearly meant no recognition of Arab national rights to Palestine just as Jews would have no national rights to “Arabian countries” or to Armenia. Please note also that Lord Cecil did not say “Palestine for the Palestinians” since no such nation was known or ever existed either then or now. Most of the Arabs of the land, whether it was called Palestine, the Holy Land, Judea or Israel, then identified themselves as Syrian Arabs...
...Coming to the main point of your query, it was Lord Cecil who wrote in a foreword to a book authored by J. de V. Loder that the Arabs have no cause for complaint on the Palestine question (Loder, The Truth About Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria, published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London (1923), p. 7). Here are his exact words (p. 217 of my book):
Only on one matter would I make some reserve – I am not sure that on the Palestine question I would take his (Loder’s) view. The Zionist policy seems to me of vital importance to the world. A nation without a country of its own is an anomaly, and anomalies bring trouble. Nor has the Arab State any ground of complaint. The recognition of a Jewish national home was part of the terms on which the Arab State was brought into existence, subject, of course, to the rights of individual Arabs being fully protected.
...Lord Balfour...did make a statement, as you have surmised, to the effect that the Arabs had no right to complain that Palestine would be made a home for the Jewish People. At a public demonstration held by the English Zionist Federation on July 12, 1920 at the Royal Albert Hall, London, to celebrate the conferment of the Mandate for Palestine upon Great Britain and the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, he justly noted:
… the Great powers … most especially Great Britain, has freed them, the Arab race, from the tyranny of their brutal conqueror… I hope they will remember it is we who have established the independent Arab sovereignty of the Hedjaz. I hope they will remember that it is we who desire in Mesopotamia … a self-governing, autonomous Arab State, and I hope that, remembering all that, they will not grudge that small notch – for it is no more geographically, whatever it may be historically – that small notch in what are now Arab [populated] territories being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it – but surely have a title to develop on their own lines in the land of their forefathers, which ought to appeal to the sympathy of the Arab people as it, I am convinced appeals to the great mass of my own Christian fellow-countrymen…
...None but those who are blinded by [religious or racial bigotry] would deny for one instant that the case of the Jews is absolutely exceptional and must be treated by exceptional methods…We may look forward with a happy gaze to a future in which Palestine will indeed, and in the fullest measure and degree of success, be made a home for the Jewish People (emphasis added).
This well-grounded quotation of Balfour appears in an anthology called Speeches on Zionism, edited by Israel Cohen, published by Arrowsmith, London, 1928; pp. 24ff.
...This is unlike the accusatory British attitude of today, especially recent Governments, both Conservative and Labour, who have erased from their memory any remembrance or knowledge of the rights inhering in the Jewish People which the Lloyd George Government, on behalf of Great Britain together with the other
Principal Allied Powers, recognised under the international law documents comprising the San Remo Resolution and the Mandate for Palestine. Balfour saw the Allied decision as a way of making amends for the Roman destruction of Judea eighteen centuries earlier as well as being a recognition of the historical connection of the Jewish People with Palestine to the exclusion of Arab pretentions.
This assertion is woefully inadequate for a scholar: "But how could a mass influx of Jews into Palestine not prejudice the "civil and religious rights" of existing non-Jewish communities there? The Balfour Declaration stands, along with the partition of India, as an icon to the micawberish policies of the British Empire at the start of its decline."
How? By they becoming citizens of the Jewish state which is what happened to the Arabs that stayed in the borders of Israel after 1948, preferring not to run away nor fight in a war of aggression in violation of the UN recommendation that indeed a Jewish state be established. That the state was to be Jewish was not in doubt; its borders in the end depended on Arabs losses after they sought to eradicate the nascent state.
"Civil and religious rights" are quite obviously not national nor political rights. The Arabs (actually the non-Jews, since that is the term used; Arabs never even being mentioned and that was purposeful) were not to gain such rights but only civil, personal and religious.
Mr. Cochran is subverting the history as well as the language employed.
For the record:
The 1922 League of Nations British Mandate for Palestine was a Class A Mandate, i. e, Palestine was to be administered by Britain AS A WHOLE until its citizens were able to assume democratic self-rule. By incorporating the Balfour Declaration the mandate did facilitate Jewish immigration to "secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home," but it did not call for the creation of a Jewish state or homeland in Palestine or any form of partition. As declared in the Churchill Memorandum (1 July 1922), "the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status."
Furthermore, regarding the British Mandate, as approved by the Council of the League of nations, the British government declared: "His Majesty’s Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State." (Command Paper, 1922)
That the Balfour Declaration "did not call for the creation of a Jewish state or homeland in Palestine" is a mis-comprehension of the legal process which decreed very much so that a Jewish homeland was to be established. That process was (a) Balfour declaration.; (b) deliberations at Versailles peace Conference 1919; (c) attempted Feisal-Weizmann agreement 1919; (d) San Remo Conference decision, April 1919; (e) League of Nations awarding of Mandate, July 1922, Sept. 1923. It was this string of decisions that decided that no Arab state would arise in Palestine but in Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia in addition to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
And again, British policy could not override League of nations and in 1939, Zionists went to Geneva to appeal against the British White Paper which completely subverted the essence of the Mandate. But WW II broke out, halting procedure.
Both Churchill and the MacDonald White paper rendered Balfour moot.
Ridiculous. British statements of colonial office or foreign office policies could not override a decision of a body such as the League of Nations. even the 1947 Partition plan of the UN was but a recommendation.
"The territory of Palestine was not defined until September 1, 1922 as a line "drawn from a point two miles west of... [Aqaba] up the center of the Wadi Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its juncture with the River Yarmuk; thence up the centre of the river to the Syrian frontier." This was the boundary between Palestine and Transjordan... the Balfour Declaration called for a Jewish national home in "Palestine" which later became defined, per above, as ending at the Jordan River..."
In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions...