Getting It Wrong on the Altalena Affair

This blog post appeared in the Times of Israel (having been translated from the Hebrew by the author and expanded) on the Altalena Affair here titled "Altalena Was the Moment Israel Chose to Become a State" and I wish to comment on some of it (I am not permitted to comment there).

The excerpts and my reactions:

Altalena’s enduring lesson is that sovereignty survives only when no camp, cause or elected authority is allowed to own a piece of the state.

The issue was not the state's sovereignty. It was the immoral ethical behavior of Ben-Gurion who decided, at the last moment, to alter an agreement's terms that had been reached in two different meetings on May 16, and June 16 and to lie to the government to ahcieve their agreement for the use of force.

On June 1, 1948, the Irgun, Menachem Begin’s pre-state underground organization, agreed to integrate into the newly created Israel Defense Forces. When Altalena arrived laden with arms, Irgun leaders sought to direct some to their forces in Jerusalem, which remained outside the June 1 integration arrangement, and some to IDF units composed of former Irgun fighters.

The Irgun did integrate and Irgun units had been in Jerusalem since 1931. So, too, the Hagana. Jerusalem was outside the state's sovereign borders. And begin didn't "seek". That was in the agreement's understanding.

A party, underground movement, commander or fighting force does not choose their destination. The state decides who receives them...

Again, that was in the agreement.

If the Irgun may decide where the arms it brought go, then tomorrow the Palmach, Lehi or any other armed formation inherited from the pre-state era can claim the same right. 

The arms were intended for the Irgun, in part. 20%. And the same privilege was awarded the Palmach until it was disbanded. In fact, it had a separate command from the IDF until November 7, 1948 due to Mapam's opposition. They, seemingly, were never criticized by the same people who criticize the Irgun for the same basic behavior.

Had Ben-Gurion blinked, the concession would have become precedent, leaving Israel with separate armed loyalties instead of one national army.

See above. There was: the Palmach.

The danger begins when a state applies that rule selectively — when some armed actors are confronted as a challenge to sovereignty while others are indulged because their cause, identity or politics are familiar.

His example of George Washington and Charles DeGaulle are silly because, until B-G ordered Dori to disband the Palmach in late September, three (!) months after the Altalena, selectivity was okay.

He goes on and drags in "settler violence" and priviate citizens funding IDF units (which has been ordered discontinued) which I will not get into.

^