The Text of the 2008 National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD)

As reported, former Sec'y of State Condoleeza Rice had a cable sent out with instructions and guidance for human intelligent-gathering goals regarding the peace process. 

The vast majority of the cable was actually directed at the Palestinian Authority and I strongly suggest you review the material there. It included these topics:

Palestinian Leadership and Governance
1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1)
2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1)
3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1)
4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1)
5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2)
6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1)
7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy (FPOL-4)
Palestinian Internal Security and Control
1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and Response (TERR-2)
2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security
Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2)
3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5)
4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4)
D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism
1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities (TERR-2)
2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian Terrorists (TERR-2)
3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1)
4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2)
E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure
1) Human Rights (HRWC-3)
2) Demographics (DEMG-3)
3) Water Management (ENVR-4)
4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5)
5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3)

But what was also intriguing and annoying and potentially damaging was what she wanted collected on the Israel side and, as Caroline Glick wrote that this was a

massive espionage operation against Israel

and

that the US is carrying out a deeply hostile policy against Israel in the face of massive public support for Israel in the US. That is, whereas two-thirds of Americans support Israel, a minority constituency in the US government treats Israel with scorn and hatred.

and she termed it

Rice’s spy cable

all of which lead to a situation whereby

US government officials will be able to continue to implement policies that treat Israel with the contempt due to a banana republic.

Having been engaged with US dipolomats, as well as those of many other countires since 1983 or so, while most of the targets outlined are quite legitimatre and can be culled also from newspapers and other media reports, the requests regarding IDF military operations such as

Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground and air units.

or

Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to terrorist attacks

is really outside the realm of normal diplomatic activity.

And to judge for yourself, here is the relevant Israel-connected sections of cable's text (minus the material on the PA):-

R 311525Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, RIYADH
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000
S E C R E T STATE 116392
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2033
TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPAL PREL PTER XF

SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN ISSUES

REF: A. 08 STATE 001379
B. 08 STATE 64936
Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages Department personnel at post to assist in compiling Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2).

A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues. The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).

...B. (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline - priority issues:
A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process
1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with Israel (SRCC-1)
2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1)
3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process (SRCC-1)
4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1)
5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process (SRCC-1)

...F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions
1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace Process (LEAD-1)
2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1)
3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1)
4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism (FMCC-2)
5) Settlements (SRCC-1)
6) US and International Community (FPOL-3)

F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions

1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace Process (LEAD-1).
--Government of Israel (GOI) leadership's negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process.
--Israeli leaders' perceptions of and relations with Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts. Evidence of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with Palestinian leaders.
--Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations with the Palestinians.
--Israel's decision-making process for launching military operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks.
--Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to terrorist attacks.
--Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors toward the US and its counterterrorism policies. Israeli thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics, including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and conduct of the peace process and negotiations.
2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1).
--Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and "end of claims".
--GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").
--Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs, toward Israeli-Palestinian talks. Efforts by opposition parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence government positions on the peace process.
--Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and movement, in particular, access and movement with economic consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages.
3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1). --Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of military strengths and vulnerabilities.
--Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists, including the potential for conflict with their state sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon.
--GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final status issues.
--Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the context of final status issues.
--Israeli views on a future regional security pact.
--GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves.
GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and external influences on decision-making.
--GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement unilateral security measures over Israeli - and Palestinian-controlled areas.
--Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information on Israel's treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees, including interrogation methods.
--Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli population emigration from Israel.
4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism FMCC-2).
--Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground and air units.
--Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars.
--IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Lebanon.
--Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli views of security.
--IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel's northern border or inside Lebanon or Syria.
--IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale, and operational readiness.
--IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations.
--Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the territories on IDF readiness.
5) Settlements (SRCC-1).
--Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpostgrowth and construction.
--Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology, motivations and who they claim to represent.
--Divisions among the various settlement groups.
--Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies.
--Settlers' relationship with the Israeli political and military establishment including their lobbying and settlement methods.
--Golan settlers' views of any potential peace agreement with Syria.
--Support for settlers within Israeli society.
--Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more active.
--Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli government regarding, security fences and settlements.
6) US and International Community (FPOL-3).
--Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach; indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the US.
--Attitudes of key political and military officials concerning the state of the relationship with the US.
--Plans to influence views and positions of academics, journalists, and business, religious and professional
organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship.
--Views of and responses to role of the Quartet.
--Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the UN and other international fora.
--Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and European Union countries; relations with Russia, China, Turkey, Pakistan and India.

What do you think?

^

Famous Last Words

Secretary Rice: And on the settlements, I think we’ve made stronger statements about the Israeli settlements than at any other time in American—for an American administration. But what has to happen is that they need to determine these borders so that everybody knows what’s in Palestine, everybody knows what [is] Israel, and that’s what we’ve focused on in the negotiation.

Question: I think your predecessor, James Baker, though, actually went as far as urging Congress to freeze the loans—the housing guarantees.

Secretary Rice: Well, in fact, one of the things that has happened that seems to have been little noticed is that much of the support to the settlement movement has ceased from the Israeli government. You know that there—if you look at the support for the—there were these guarantees, loan guarantees. The Sharon government got rid of those. So in fact, some of that’s already happened.

Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Agence France-Presse, December 22, 2008


Oh, well.

It's amazing what one democratic election can do.

One.

Two.

Three.

Condi Had "Indirect" Responsibility for This Shooting

As predicted (here), the removal last April of the Rimonim checkpoint at the demand of Condi Rice has led to a shooting.

...33-year-old Moshe Avitan, was driving on the Alon Highway with his wife, Sarah, who took the wheel of the car after the shooting and drove to the entrance of Kochav Hashahar. The man was airlifted from there to Jerusalem's Hadassah
Hospital on Mount Scopus, where he underwent an operation. After an initial
investigation, police said the shots were fired from a passing vehicle in a drive-by attack.

It was clear that would happen:

The removal of the Rimonim checkpoint - which connects Ramallah with Jericho - on Monday has created a number of headaches for the IDF's Central Command and its commander, Maj.-Gen. Gadi Shamni. From a military perspective, the checkpoints are a crucial tool in the war against terror, with troops catching Palestinians on a daily basis trying to cross them carrying weapons or explosives.

Officials close to Barak admitted on Monday that the lifting of the roadblock was accompanied by a number of security risks. But, they said, the risks were "calculated."

As demonstrated by the 35-page report that Barak presented US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with on Sunday, Israel's primary objective with the gestures is to bolster PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his government in Ramallah. This is being done in face of the growing Hamas threat in the West Bank and the terror group's takeover of the Gaza Strip in June.

Bolstering Abbas comes with a degree of danger. The lifting of 50 dirt roadblocks, as well as the Rimonim Checkpoint, will allow Palestinians to travel on roads they did not have access to in the past. Weapons smuggling will most likely increase, and there is a fear in the IDF that drive-by-shootings will as well.

Sue, Again; And Condi Admits Hamas is Guilty

Remember my comment on Sue's inability to get her geography right?

Well, she plows ahead on another subject with Condi Rice:

Yes, Sue.

QUESTION: Where does this fit in with the general, sort of, ceasefire agreement? How much longer do you think that Israel is going to continue pounding Gaza? I mean, the death toll is already above a thousand people who have been killed. So could you put this in the context of a larger agreement?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, you know that we have wanted to have an immediate and durable ceasefire, and we’ve been working aggressively toward that goal. [Condi's still aggressive, eh?] We are hoping that as the elements of durability [there's a buzz word. Bill Safire, where are you?] begin to come into place that the need for continued operations can cease. We know that, after all, Hamas is responsible for this. They’re the ones who refuse to extend the Egyptian ceasefire, the Egyptian tahadiya, and we are – the front line of this – the U.S. effort is, I think, important here, but the front line, of course, is what the Egyptians are trying to do in their mediation. We’ve been in very close contact with them as well as with the Israelis and with others, and hope that that effort is bearing fruit. But we see this as supportive of that effort.

The M O U - For the Record

Signing Ceremony of the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding

or is that a Misunderstanding? (see below this excerpt)

Treaty Room
Washington, DC
January 16, 2009

...

SECRETARY RICE: ...The current crisis in Gaza was instigated by Hamas, a terrorist group that has called for the destruction of Israel, and refused to extend the calm, and still holds Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier, who was captured.

The Israelis cannot be expected to live under daily threats, nor should Gazans be put at risk by Hamas’s reckless targeting of Israel or endure the brutality of life under Hamas. Hamas has presided over the degradation of safety and well-being of innocent Palestinians since it seized power in a violent coup against the legitimate Palestinian Authority 18 months ago.

We’ve said repeatedly that the continued supply of armaments to Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza, including by some in the region, is a direct cause of the current hostilities. It is, therefore, incumbent upon on us in the international community to prevent the rearmament of Hamas so that a ceasefire will be durable and fully respected. There must be an international consensus that Gaza can never again be used as a launching pad against Israeli cities.

This Memorandum of Understanding that we will sign today responds to that need...


FOREIGN MINISTER LIVNI: ...Israel is fighting today against the Hamas terrorist organization that has taken Gaza hostage and continues to target the citizens of Israel. We are fighting Hamas that continues to hold Gilad Shalit and even denies him ICRC access.

I’ve said from the outset that ending the fighting in Gaza will not be achieved by agreements with terror, but with effective arrangements against it...Israel left Gaza Strip years ago. When we left, Hamas claimed that terror made us leave. But the truth is that it was the hopeful peace that made us leave Gaza, and terror that forced us, and forced our soldiers, to come and fight in Gaza today.

After years of restraint, Israel has shown that it will no longer tolerate attacks on our citizens, and that there will be high price for terror from Gaza against our citizens...

...even after the fighting ends, we reserve our right to act to defend ourselves against those activities in Gaza, including weapons smuggling and buildup of military capabilities. But this can be prevented by actions of the international community, according to this MOU. In this MOU, we have agreed on a series of actions with regional and international players in order to complement Egyptian actions and end the flow of weapon to Gaza...

I don't really understand this.

Remember this?:-

Consider this almost two year-old news item:

America transfers $23 million worth of aid to Egyptians, agrees to send engineering teams to assist in locating smuggling tunnels; budget also for building sturdier fence on Gaza-Egypt border

...American officials have agreed to a $23 million aid package from which most will go towards purchasing technology to prevent the fence from being perforated and for locating underground smuggling conduits, according to information received in the Israeli political circuit...the US intends to send teams from the US Army Corps of Engineers to the Egyptian side of the Gaza-Egypt border in the near future. Theses teams will assist Egyptian forces deployed along the frontier pinpoint the locations of smuggling tunnels west of the border in the Rafah area.

and this

Angry at Hamas' ability to fire rockets at Israel, the United States last year allocated $23 million to help train Egyptian officials to stop the smuggling into Gaza through tunnels at a border plagued by crisis and corruption.

Months later, there is little noticeable effect: Smuggling has continued at a robust pace, allowing Hamas militants in Gaza to gain rockets to shoot at Israeli citizens. Israel's military says about 300 tunnels ran under the Gaza-Egypt border before its military offensive began Dec. 27. Since then, Israel has bombed dozens of them.

The story of the U.S.-funded program and its lack of impact on the problem is a cautionary tale of how hard it has been to control Gaza's border with Egypt _ at a time when patrolling that frontier and stopping the weapons flow are once again hot issues as mediators seek a cease-fire in Gaza.

Condi Going "Aggressive"

In the transcript of the press stakeout of Condoleezza Rice in the Benjamin Franklin Room yesterday, I caught this blooper by a Sue (could that have been Sue Pleming from Reuters?):

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the bombing of the UN warehouse in Lebanon today?...

Lebanon? Er, that was Gaza City, no?

And Rice replies:

...As to the unfortunate circumstances – incident at the UNRWA warehouse earlier, I did speak with my Israeli counterparts about it. There is great concern on their part. It was, they say, an error that it happened. It does demonstrate the very dangerous nature of the kinds of fighting that’s going on and the events that we’re in.

I guess she didn't know where it happened either?


And then there was an inaudible question which, from the answer, concerned the ceasefire which came after McCormack said:

Thanks, guys.

which elicited this response:

SECRETARY RICE: I am continuing to work on it. You know that we’re all seeking a cease-fire. We’re aggressively working toward that cease-fire. And we’re trying to help put the pieces in place so that it can be durable.

Pieces? Like Humpty-Dumpty?

Condi vs. Olmert, Round Four (and Who Is Dennis Kucinich?)

It seems that Haaretz knows, after making inquiries with people uninvolved in the spat between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that it is his version of the lead-up to America's vote on last week's Security Council resolution that is closer to the truth than hers.

Here's the story:-

Last Wednesday, the only proposal on the council's table was a completely one-sided Libyan resolution. Since it was clear to everyone that the United States would veto it, Israel had no reason to worry. But then, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former senior World Bank official, decided that this was the moment to make use of his Washington connections.

Fayyad persuaded the Americans to support a softened version of the resolution, which called for a prompt cease-fire, hoping that such a resolution would speed up the ongoing truce talks. He asked the British and French for help, and they agreed. Rice signaled her French and British counterparts, Bernard Kouchner and David Miliband, that she was on board.

European diplomats, UN officials and a senior PA official all said Thursday that as of last Friday night it was clear to almost everyone that the U.S., like the other 14 Security Council members, would vote for the softened resolution. They said Rice had promised as much to her European colleagues.

In Jerusalem, however, officials went to sleep thinking the Americans had only agreed to support a 48-hour humanitarian cease-fire. At 1 A.M., final confirmation came from New York: The U.S. had promised that no cease-fire resolution would be brought to a vote any time soon. An hour and a half later, however, it became clear that not only was the Security Council due to vote on a cease-fire resolution at any minute, but Rice had ordered America's UN ambassador to support it. Olmert promptly telephoned U.S. President George Bush to complain about Rice's behavior and demand that he restrain her. What Bush said to Rice remains unknown. What is known, however, is that the U.S. suddenly changed its vote from "yes" to "abstain."...

And I also would like to know what Condi replied to this patsy, Ohio Democrat Dennis Kucinich, who made an:

assertion...that Israel's use of U.S.-supplied weaponry against Hamas constitutes a violation of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act.

That law states that U.S. weaponry must not be used to, in the words of the statute, to increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, but does permit use of arms for what the law calls legitimate self-defense.

Pelosi did not have an immediate detailed reaction to Kucinich's statement. Congressman Kucinich's office declined to provide information Thursday on whether U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has responded to a letter from the lawmaker on the matter.

Er, Rep. Kucinich, it does read "legitimate self-defense".

He's a busy bloke, aint he? He's been a hospital orderly, newspaper copy boy, teacher, consultant, television analyst and author. And Cleveland's mayor, too.

Then there's this:

Kucinich Speaks Against Israel Resolution

Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) today spoke out against a resolution affirming U.S. support for Israel’s military action in Gaza. While a firm supporter of the people of Israel and a critic of rocket attacks by Hamas militants, Congressman Kucinich led opposition against the incomplete resolution.

H.Res. 34, “Supporting Israel in Its Battle with Terrorist Hamas,” is incomplete because it does not address the humanitarian crisis of Palestinians in Gaza, fails to insist on an immediate ceasefire, and neglects Israel’s potential violation of the Arms Export and Control Act which governs U.S. arms exports to foreign countries.

Well, there are many things that could be an influence on his political outlook, like His father, a truck driver, was of Croatian ancestry or that his third wife, Elizabeth Harper, a British citizen, is 31 years younger than Kucinich. But this is really funny: the book "Best and Worst of the Big-City Leaders, 1820–1993", by Melvin G. Holli, in consultation with a panel of experts, placed Kucinich among the ten worst big-city mayors of all time for reasons of temperament and performance. He signed a letter of solidarity with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2004. He voted against the impeachment of President Clinton, by the way. (Elizabeth?)

And wait, it gets better. Kucinich voted against the Rothman-Kirk Resolution, which calls on the United Nations to charge Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with violating the genocide convention of the United Nations Charter based on statements that he has made. Kucinich defended his vote by saying that Ahmadinejad's statements could be translated to mean that he wants a regime change in Israel, not death to its people and supporters.

This is funny: on October 30, 2007, NBC's Tim Russert cited a passage from a book by Shirley MacLaine in which the author writes that Kucinich had seen a UFO from her home in Washington State. Russert asked if MacLaine's assertion was true. Kucinich confirmed and emphasized that he merely meant he had seen an unidentified flying object, just as former US president Jimmy Carter has.

More relevant info:

Dennis Kucinich addresses Arab-American voters in Dearborn, Michigan, October 28, 2007

CAIR executive director Nihad Awad thanked Kucinich for his rousing keynote speech at CAIR's annual fund-raiser addressing issues of concern to Muslim-American voters in 2004.

And James Zogby noted Dennis Kucinich for the most dramatic policy on Middle East issues in November 2007.

Condi Gets It Right And Then Gets It Wrong

From the transcript of her meeting with the Washington Post editorial board, with, of course, my comments in bracketed italics:

But the real issue that we’re seeing played out now in Gaza is what’s going to be on the other side of that boundary. It is going to be a capable state that is able to deliver security and well-being for its own people and willing to fight terrorists in its midst? That’s really the essential question. [yes, and based on the experience of the past 2.5 years, is Hamas to be involved in that state-building enterprise?]

And the last year of Annapolis has focused as much on that question in the West Bank as it has focused on what the boundaries of the state will be. They’ve been co-equal parts. [co-equal? should not one come before the other so that the Gazan experience, and similar experiences in the past, such as the rejection by the Pals. way back in the 1920s of any state-body if the Zionists still are able to get theirs, not be repeated for failure?]That’s why Palestinian security forces are more professional now and more capable now than they were in 2001, ‘2, ‘3, ‘4, ‘5 or ‘6. [and they have a very long way to go] It’s because there’s been a concerted effort to make those forces professional and capable, not a bunch of armed thugs running around with cell phones calling themselves security forces in nine different organizations paying patronage to Yasser Arafat. [oh, really? so that's what they were doing under Bill Clinton's presidency. And Hillary is beinging back Bill's Boys (I hope the gals get left out of things this time)?] That was the nature of Palestinian security forces in the past. [nature, you finally got it right, Condi] These are professional security forces, trained in Jordan, that are taking up their security responsibilities in places like Hebron and Nablus and Jenin. [that's a lot of pooh-pooh]

Secondly, Salam Fayyad often says that he is building the state even under occupation, though he would be the first to say – and I would agree with him – the occupation has to end in order for that state to really emerge. [not really. first get all your acts together: human rights for you own 'citizens', liberites, transpancy, no more embezzelment, etc.] But that’s why he is focused on good governance, on budget control, on a social system for the people, on an educational system that doesn't incite. The institutions of a Palestinian state are, in fact, coming into being. [we're still waiting]

So I think there’s been a lot of work done to deal with what probably ultimately is going to determine both the creation of that state and its well-being, which is its internal character. It helps, too, that Salam Fayyad and Abu Mazen are devoted to democracy as their – the basis of their legitimacy. [another, 'oh, really?']

Now, Gaza, unfortunately, is under quite a different kind of regime. It’s under Hamas, which shows us what it could look like if you’re not very much focused on what the internal character of the state is. It could be [could be? it will, it will] a launching pad for terrorist activities against Israel, which Israel, rightly, will not countenance. It could be a place where the schools are being turned to a hard Islamic – Islamist agenda. It could be a place where gangs and thugs run the streets smuggling weaponry in from Iran. And it could be a place where the people can’t receive basic goods and services because it is isolated internationally. That’s the alternative. So again, working on the internal character of this will help.

Now, it is my hope that a durable ceasefire in Gaza will begin to reverse some of the difficulties that Hamas’s illegal [even a legal victory is failure]coup d’état in Gaza brought. First of all, that there will be a way to deal with the smuggling so that arms are not flowing in; secondly, that there will be a way to put pressure on Hams (sic) to stop firing rockets against Israeli citizens; third, that there will be a reasonable opening of crossings, particularly Rafah and Kerem Shalom under the 2005 Movement and Access Agreement; and fourth, that there will be a process of Palestinian reconciliation that is based on the principles that are embodied in the November 26th Arab League resolution that effectively says there need to be elections for both the PLC and the presidency, but until then Abu Mazen ought to govern. And what is more, any government has to be – to adhere to prior agreements that the PLO has signed. That, I think, is the way ultimately out of Gaza. And if you get that in Gaza, then you have a West Bank and Gaza that you could imagine becoming constituent parts or that would become constituent parts of a Palestinian state that would work...

...In terms of Israel leaving Gaza, I think that the Israelis did the right thing in leaving Gaza in 2005. But unfortunately, the efforts to build up Palestinian institutions in Gaza really didn’t keep pace, ['keep pace'?]and maybe that’s something that we should have paid more attention to. I think Abu Mazen was focused on it, but frankly, they didn’t yet have a governmental structure. [no, they didn't care as long as Hamas didn't threaten their jobs and positions] It was a while before you get Salam Fayyad and his government, which is – you can say that these things should happen, but if you don’t actually have people who can execute, it’s difficult. And you now have a Palestinian government that can execute. You really didn’t have that in 2005-2006.

QUESTION: In the “do you regret” category --

SECRETARY RICE: Aren’t you going to say, “Aren’t you thrilled that? (Laughter.)

I am thrilled.

Rice, Olmert, Bush & The UN - For The Record

On the tiff in an interview With Mike Schneider of Bloomberg TV:-

QUESTION: Back once again with the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her last few days here at the State Department. We saw newspaper headlines which have surprised, shocked, and disturbed many people, remarks made purportedly by the prime minister of Israel, ostensibly made in the southern part of the country saying that he was unhappy about the direction the U.S. was going to take regarding a resolution in the Security Council, and that he called up the U.S. and said he didn’t want to speak with you, he wanted to speak with the President. He interrupted a President’s speech, he got him on the phone, and basically ordered that we not follow through on a course that you wanted to follow through on, according to him, in the Security Council regarding a resolution on what’s happening in Gaza. How much of that is true?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, I don’t know if the prime minister was – I hope – quoted out of context, because the story that I read in the newspaper is fiction.

QUESTION: You had – what did you want to do with that resolution? We abstained.

SECRETARY RICE: The President and I talked about the resolution, about the importance of allowing the Council to send a signal even though the United States believed that the resolution was premature. And I had made very clear that I thought the resolution was premature, and there were also concerns about a resolution that had Israel, a member-state of the United Nations, and Hamas, which is a terrorist organization, you don’t ever want there to be any equating those two.

And so we talked. We talked about abstention as a good option. And I was quite aware of the President’s call to Prime Minister Olmert. Of course, Prime Minister Olmert is not at all aware of what the President said to me. And I repeat, his rendering of this is fiction – if, in fact, that was his rendering of it. And I want to give him the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps it’s not exactly what he said.

QUESTION: Well, you also find yourself being criticized by former Ambassador Bolton, who said that the U.S. should veto --

SECRETARY RICE: There’s not much new in that, Mike. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Why do you think that is – I mean, there are some people who think that the U.S. should not just abstain in the situation, but should continue to do what it’s done in the past, which is to say a member-state, Israel, is being rocketed by a terrorist organization and they deserve the right to self-defense.

SECRETARY RICE: I think we’ve said precisely that, that --

QUESTION: Why not veto then?

SECRETARY RICE: No, the resolution does not in any way say that there’s no right to self-defense. In fact, what the resolution says is there should be an immediate and durable ceasefire. And by the way, that had been American – the American position for days that we were seeking that kind of ceasefire. What will make a ceasefire durable? Hamas has got to stop rocketing Israeli cities. What will make a ceasefire durable? Something has to be done about the ability of Hamas to smuggle arms in with Iranian backing through tunnels that have been created there.

QUESTION: Are we going to get more cooperation out of the Egyptians on this matter?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, the Egyptians, I think, want to do the right thing here. We are providing some assistance through the Army Corps of Engineers, have been for some time. So a durable ceasefire is in everybody’s interest, because the one thing that you want to be very clear about is that the United States wants Israelis to be safe, it also wants Palestinians to be safe. And we have spoken also very forthrightly about the humanitarian needs there, which I think Israel is trying to address.

But we were very clear. Hamas started this. Hamas started this when they refused to extend Egypt’s – the calm that Egypt had negotiated.

QUESTION: You mean the truce that had --

SECRETARY RICE: But we abstained on this resolution because we wanted it to allow the Council to go ahead and speak even though we believed that it was premature.

And on diplomacy, peace and whatnot:

QUESTION: President Bush has said that one of the goals of his last year in office was to have some sort of Mideast peace agreement in place. President Clinton, in the last few days of his administration, finally, in frustration, realized that he could not achieve the same thing. Do you – as you leave this office, do you think that, realistically, there’s any chance of working this thing out in --

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, I do. I do. And I think that the foundation that was laid at Annapolis, which, by the way, is now enshrined in the Security Council Resolution 1850, which says that the two parties should negotiate as they have been doing. The representative – the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, President Abbas, has been negotiating with the prime minister, with Prime Minister Olmert, and also Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister. They’ve made quite a bit of progress. They don’t have an agreement yet, but they have made progress.

QUESTION: But does he – does Abu Mazen have the clout – I mean, there were those who say he’s been – that Hamas prior to this was actually being degraded, that it was weak, it was – its stand in the polls, it was low, and that, in fact, it’s been bolstered by what’s happened here, and Abu Mazen and Fatah have been weakened.

SECRETARY RICE: Well, you hear that, but if you look at the West Bank, the Palestinian people have got to be able to see that the West Bank economy has actually been growing for the first time in years. It’s far more peaceful. Nativity Square in Bethlehem, where in 2002, completely by accident, an Israeli tank shell hit the Church of the Nativity – just a few months ago, Salam Fayyad, the Prime Minister of the Palestinians held an outdoor dinner for an investment conference for more than 1,200 people. And so the Palestinian security forces, which are being trained in Jordan and taking over responsibilities in Hebron and in Nablus and in places like this – this is a different place.

If you contrast that with Gaza, where you have Hamas throwing people off of roofs and then getting down and praying, where you have them trying to make the schools as Islamist as possible, where you have them engaging in policies that have isolated Gaza, I think that’s a contrast that the Palestinian people can see.

But yes –

QUESTION: But what are they going to do about it?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, it’s a good reason –

QUESTION: What can they do about it?

SECRETARY RICE: It’s a good reason that hopefully the ceasefire, a durable ceasefire, can take place.

QUESTION: And that Hamas is what? Is eliminated from the scene, or –

SECRETARY RICE: No, I don’t think you’re going to eliminate Hamas by military means. But it’s a matter of showing that Hamas’s dark vision for the Palestinian people is not the only one, and it’s not the one that the Palestinian people want. And we have to remember, again, Mahmoud Abbas was the elected President of the Palestinian people. He still is. And he has a lot to show for his engagement on a basis of negotiation and peace with the rest of the world.

Olmert maintains his story:

Ehud Olmert's bureau maintained on Wednesday that the outgoing prime minister had correctly described moves that led to a United Nations resolution on a truce in Gaza, despite a United States rejection of his account, Israel Radio reported.

The U.S. State Department on Tuesday flatly rejected Olmert's assertion Monday that he had convinced the Bush administration to abstain from last week's resolution calling for an immediate truce between Israel and Hamas in the coastal strip.

Rice Robustly Responds

And even the Pal. rep backs her up.

State Dept: Israeli PM flat wrong on Rice

The State Department on Tuesday flatly rejected an assertion by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert that he caused the Bush administration to abstain from last week's U.N. resolution on Gaza and that the abstention embarrassed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Spokesman Sean McCormack said the comments attributed to Olmert "are wholly inaccurate as to describing the situation, just 100-percent, totally, completely not true" and suggested that the Israeli government might want to clarify or correct the record...

...McCormack, who pointed out that he was with Rice at the United Nations during the negotiations and vote, denied Olmert's characterization.

"She was not at all embarrassed or ashamed of the actions that we took," he told reporters. "Secretary Rice's recommendation and inclination — the entire time — was to abstain.... This idea that somehow she was turned around on this issue is 100-percent completely untrue."

...Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad Malki said he had been surprised by the U.S. abstention.

"We were told that the Americans were going to vote in favor," he said Friday, a day after the vote.

But when Rice came in to the Security Council chamber, she informed the Saudi foreign minister with an apology that she would abstain and would clarify later that the U.S. supported the resolution nonetheless, according to Malki...

Condoleeza Rice Caught Out Harassing Israel

Israel's officialdom is extremely upset.

The words coming out from the mouths of ministers over the media here is that Condoleeza Rice 'betrayed' Israel and tried to 'steal a vote' against Israel in the UN when her bosses weren't looking.

Here's a bit of background:

Israel's prime minister said Monday that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was embarrassed after being ordered to abstain from voting for a United Nations ceasefire resolution that she helped arrange.

A U.S. official denied the claim.

Israel had described the resolution calling for a halt to the Gaza fighting as unworkable because it did not guarantee Israel's security, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said he was key in persuading the United States, a close ally, to abstain.

...Olmert said he told Bush that the United States should not vote in favour, and the U.S. president then called Rice and told her not to do so.

A senior U.S. official disputed the account.

"The government of Israel does not make policy for the United States," the official said on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the diplomacy.

and this:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was visibly frustrated when the White House told her to veto a resolution demanding a Hamas-Israeli cease-fire - a resolution she had spent three days negotiating.

and this:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is defending the U.S. decision to abstain on the U.N. Security Council resolution approved late Thursday calling for an immediate cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Rice said the resolution, approved by all 14 other council members, could have been more supportive of Egyptian-led Gaza mediation efforts.

Rice had a direct hand in the three days of debate at the U.N. that produced the resolution. And, though it contained language the United States had sought, calling for a durable and fully respected cease-fire, the Secretary said Washington had continued reservations about its wording and timing.

In a talk with reporters, Rice suggested the Council should have withheld action until Egypt's mediation effort had produced some specific steps to curb arms smuggling to Hamas.

...The pro-Israel U.S. lobbying group AIPAC Friday...said it was disappointed the Bush administration had, in its words, succumbed to Arab pressure in bringing the U.N. measure to a vote while more promising Franco-Egyptian diplomatic efforts were under way.

I guess she's harassing us, humiliating us.

Harassment? Humiliation? Now, where'd I hear that before?

Ah, here:

On October 11, 2006 in a Keynote Address to the American Task Force on Palestine, Secretary Condoleezza Rice claimed that Palestinian Arabs feel “daily humiliation of occupation.” Palestinians say they feel humiliated and harassed when Israeli authorities search them and their belongings; when they are prevented from “travel[ing] more freely” because of checkpoints, roadblocks, closures, curfews and security concerns.

(and thanks to Eli Hertz for that source)