...I gave a speech to AIPAC about why the two-state solution is in Israel’s interest. Forget the Palestinians and the Arabs; why is it in Israel’s interest? And just very briefly, there are three big reasons: demography, ideology, and technology.
If Israel is to remain a democratic Jewish state, then they have to come to grips with their own Arab citizens as well. And if they’re going to remain a secure, democratic Jewish state, they’ve got to come to grips with the technology that is advancing as we speak that will make every part of Israel less secure unless they have some kind of resolution. And if they have any long-term view about how to live with their neighbors, then they’ve got to deal with the ideology that is rejectionist, that is bred and exacerbated by the failure to come to grips with the two-state solution.
So that may not be the way Israeli Government sees it. But it’s only through those kinds of in-depth conversations, really centered around core issues like responsibility, that can be tied into a nation’s self-interest that you can actually make any progress.
Well, Madame Secretary, the real core issue is the Arab recognition, acceptance and willingness to coexist with a Jewish national polity, to give it geographical space to view that reality as non-threatening.
I think that if Israel follows your thinking, while the tensions rise in relation to short-term difficulties, Israel can better deal with the long-term problems.
In the pre-1967 era, Israel was no "occupier" nor were there any "settlements" but today, those are the main issues. But is the communities are dismantled and Israel is forced to withdraw from areas it knows belongs to the Jewish national home and moreover are essential for its security, what problems is solved that brought about the 1967 war?
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Even though I do support a two-state solution I must admit I don't get this argument that unless Israel gets a Palestinian state fast it will be destroyed or collapse. After all, Israel is out of the Gaza Strip, nobody is talking about annexing the West Bank, which is under a different regime altogether, and even the demagraphic trends (especially if one only counts citizens of Israel) aren't going in the claimed direction.
So I'm not being facetious. What is the factor that is going to lead to this doom? It can't be the idea of Israelis being brutalized by the "occupation" since that is one-twentieth of the 1967-1993 level.
Is this argument fallacious or am I missing something?
A colleague says that if the problem isn't "solved" the world will increasingly demand a one-state solution. But in practical terms I don't see that happening either.
And of course such a solution wouldn't change anything about Hizballah, Hamas, Iran, or other Islamists, nor would it even reduce their base of support.
I can also talk at length about the risks of a peace agreement with two states. But that's not my point here.
To repeat: I would be happy to have a peace agreement with the Palestinians establishing their state on modified borders, with all refugees resettled in Palestine, no foreign armies permitted in, recognition of Israel as a state (Jewish is better but I'll take as a state), and end of conflict.
But unless they are ready to meet reasonable terms like these is there some desperate factor forcing us to rush or die?
I'd be fascinated to hear people discuss and explain this.
A question of terminology: what is the problem solved by the “two-state solution” that you support?
I know that the PLO used it as terminology for a situation in which the problem of Palestinian statelessness was resolved by a Palestinian state alongside rather than in place of Israel. I know that in PLO lingo, it is contrasted with the “one state solution” in which Palestinian statelessness is resolved by replacing Israel. (Just as an aside – one of my pet peeves is Israelis using this terminology without noting the perversity of accepting that it makes Palestinian statehood non-negotiable, while rendering the continued existence of Israel something that is dispensible and to be negotiated).
But what do you mean by it? What is the problem resolved by a “two-state solution”? I understand that the Europeans mean by this that control by a PLO army of a Jew-free and IDF-free West Bank, perhaps together with European-American recognition of the state of Palestine already recognized by 100+ states, will magically end the Arab-Israeli conflict and perhaps even broader Muslim hostility. But among thinking people who understand that this is fantasy, what is the problem that the “two-state solution” solves? Or is “two-state solution” simply a euphemism for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank (together with requisite expulsion of Jewish settlers) by formal agreement with the PLO? And if that’s what it is, what are the gains that are supposed to accrue to Israel as a result of that withdrawal/expulsion/agreement?
I don’t mean this question to be facetious, any more than you do. Your question is about the ideal timing for this move, but I don’t think that can be answered without first defining what the move is supposed to accomplish.
Incidentally, regarding “world” demands (I presume this means Europe), it’s not clear to me if/when western Europe will endorse the destruction of Israel, but I am sure that, all things being equal, it’s more likely to happen after the withdrawal/expulsion/agreement fails to magically end the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it becomes obvious that a new magic solution is required, preferably one that doesn’t involve hostile European interactions with Muslims.
Let us NOT get off into a discussion of precisely what kind of solution we want. That is endless. I have a very very specific question:
When Israelis say that Israel must get a two-state solution or vanish, what possible justification can there be for such a claim? And what do you think of the justifications given? Is this as irrational as I think.
Again, I beg you all not to get off into a discussion of the "right" solution to the conflict.
I’m not trying to get into a discussion of desired solutions, or even whether any such exist.
I’m just pointing out that any discussion that involves trying to understand the statement that “Israel must do X or die” has to understand what are the existential dangers that X rescues Israel from.
If X is magic solution to all problems, then the statement is rational if one believes there is any existential problem at all. For instance, if one believes the “two-state solution” will permanently stop Iran and its allies from desiring Israel’s destruction, then the “two-state solution” will end any existential risk to Israel from the Iranian nuclear program.
If X is a solution to only some problems, then one must believe that one or more of these problems is going to be existential in the near future and that X is the only available solution to them.
Any way you examine it, it’s necessary to understand what the “two-state solution” is and is supposed to accomplish before one can evaluate any statement that the “two-state solution” must be implemented in order to rescue Israel from some existential danger.
The demographic/apartheid argument for "sign or die" appears to be something like this.
1. Demographics are such that in the very near future, Jews will be a minority between the Jordan River and the sea (never mind that that's inaccurate).
2. At that point, Israel if Israel fails to grant all Arabs in that area (including Gaza) citizenship and the right to vote, it will make Israel "apartheid" (never mind why that constitutes apartheid)
3. If Israel doesn't grant citizenship and becomes "apartheid," all states of the world (including the US) will stop trading with Israel and Israel will rapidly collapse economically.
4. If Israel does grant citizenship, all Arabs will take it (never mind the precedent of Jerusalem), and rapidly vote (never mind number under 18, or voting participation rates) to get rid of all aspects of Jewish identity in the state, causing Israel as a Jewish state to vanish.
5. If Israel signs a piece of paper with the PLO, Israeli refusal to grant citizenship to all Arabs between the river and sea as demanded by #2 above will no longer be "apartheid." Therefore, neither #3 nor #4 will happen.
The magic of the PLO agreement here is that it alters the definition of "apartheid,” because it is clear that the agreement is not anticipated to change the demographics (except perhaps to add more Arabs to the area from the river to the sea through immigration to “Palestine” or by “return” to Israel), nor is it anticipated to alter Israeli law on citizenship. Of course, the definition of apartheid for this argument is rather, shall we say, creative, to begin with.
The predictions of the future in #1, 3 and 4 are also, to say the least, dubious.
Given that, it's hard to see how the argument can be viewed as rational. But that's about the best I can understand it.
But it doesn't need to be rational. For those who promote it needs to be made to be a cudgel against Israel putting full responsibility on Israel. Presumably, the assumption is that since Israel's a democracy it will respond to pressure.
The unacknowledge flip side is that it absolves the Palestinians from any responsibility to compromise or make peace; lows Israel's enemies to dictate the terms of its legitimacy; and, of course, gives veto power (when Israeli concessions are sufficient) to the extremists.
I don't see why points 1, 3 or 4 are dubious.
1) No one is saying in the "very near future," Jews will become a minority between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. They are correctly saying that the Palestinian population is growing faster than the Jewish population. Perhaps millions of American Jews (the only Diaspora community that is big enough to shift the balance) will pick up and come to Israel, but I certainly wouldn't be Israel's future on that. The birthrate among Israeli Arabs is falling but is still considerably higher than the Jewish birthrate:
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200911266
And that doesn’t include West Bank Palestinians. In any case, the day of reckoning doesn't come with the Palestinians constitute 50.1% of the population as per my next two points.
3) Technical definitions of what constitutes Apartheid will not save Israel from de-legitimization or quite possibly isolation. In the 21st century you cannot claim to be part of the community of democratic nations a systematically deprive even a minority (forgetting a majority) of people of your country the right to vote or full citizenship. Whether we think global opinion is fair, it exists and Israel has to contend to it. We do not have the luxury (if you want to call it that) of being a pariah state. Perhaps international reaction to Israel’s annexing the West Bank would be muted, but I wouldn’t count on it.
4) I don't know what the grassroots Palestinian reaction would be (as distinct from the leadership), if Israel unilaterally annexed the West Bank and offered all Palestinians citizenship. Certainly, if the Palestinians accepted, there would now be a large non-Jewish minority, and ultimately probably a majority. Israel would no longer be a Jewish state in any real sense of the word, unless there was some attempt to disenfranchise the Palestinians in a de facto manner (thereby correctly opening Israel up to charges of imposing a Middle East Jim Crow regime). If the Palestinians didn't accept citizenship that would simply demonstrate (correctly) to the world that Israel has forcibly annexed the West Bank against the wishes of its majority. The fact that Israel did something like this 40 years ago on a smaller scale in Jerusalem is ample evidence that it wouldn’t win international support or acceptance.
Giving the Palestinians their own state would solve these problems in every sense of the word. (Of course, it creates new security problems for Israel, which is why I don't recommend rushing into an agreement, but that is a separate matter.) To suggest that Israeli rule over an unwilling minority/majority is somehow going to be accepted by the international community in perpetuity defies all experience and logic.
To contend that Israel does indeed face a demographic threat and that it doesn't have carte blanche to do the Palestinians whatever it chooses is quite rational and based on the facts at hand. The problem is that it is uncomfortable for anyone who wants a simple answer to the Palestinian problem.
1. Yes, at present, the Muslim population in Israel is growing faster than the Jewish population. There is no reason to think that even if current trents of births, deaths, immigration and emigration continue unchanged into the next two decades this will lead to a 50.1% Arab population between the river and the sea. I'm sure Yoram Ettinger's crowd will be happy to go through the numbers with you, or you can check out www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS65.pdf. Additionally, as I recall, there was something in the news a few years ago about an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. In fact, if are ready to set aside the population of Gaza -- which is clearly territory from which Israel has already withdrawn -- the numbers are even starker: trends would have to change dramatically for Arabs to constitute a majority of Israel+West Bank in the next 50 years.
3. Israel has not granted West Bank and Gaza Arabs citizenship for 43 years and still manages to have trade relations with the United States, Europe, the Far East etc. It is true that there is a strong movement towards economic sanctions against Israel in Europe these days, but it appears to bear no relationship to the percentage of Arabs under Israeli control not offered Israeli citizenship. That number declined significantly in 2005, without undermining the sanctions movement; in fact, if anything it aided it.
The question is not whether technical definitions of "what constitutes Apartheid will not save Israel from de-legitimization or quite possibly isolation." The real question is whether signing a seventh or eighth peace agreement with the PLO will save Israel from deligitimization or isolation. The deligitimization/isolation efforts have been under way for many years. They don't rely on population percentages, are not deterred by peace agreements with the PLO or Israeli withdrawals from territory, and are no more deterred by the fact that Israel is not currently apartheid than they will be bolstered by any claims that Israel will be non-technically apartheid when the Arab population grows further.
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It is difficult to see why the hypothetical growth of the Arab population within Israel+West Bank+Gaza to 50.1% instead of the current 40% will provide the magic touch making sanctions universal and automatic. It is difficult to see why sanctions will not happen until the number is 50.1%. It is, in fact, difficult to see how the population numbers will affect the sanctions movement in any way.
4. It is indeed hard to know what would happen if Israel did in the West Bank what it did in Jerusalem. Maybe the West Bankers would accept citizenship in large numbers. Maybe they wouldn't. Certainly Israel would be condemned. It's difficult for me to see why an Israel that was 67% Jewish would no "no longer be a Jewish state in any real sense of the word" while the current 80% Jewish Israel is, although perhaps you have a compelling argument to make.
But all this is besides the point. You proceed as if demonstrating that Israel will have trouble on its hands if Arabs constitute 50% + 1 of the population is equivalent to demonstrating the utility of an agreement. This is far from the case.
It is completely unclear to me why you believe that "Giving the Palestinians their own state would solve these problems in every sense of the word."
The problems you mention are delegitimization and isolation of Israel. Recognition of the state of Palestine by an additional 60 or so countries, even when coupled with another Israel-PLO agreement and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, doesn't seem very likely to resolve either of these problems. European/American recognition of Palestine will not change the fact that there are currently 22 Arab League states (already including Palestine) and 56 Organization of the Islamic Conference states (also already including Palestine), who control the Asian and African regional groupings at the UN and are perfectly capable of maintaining a hostile attitude to Israel. It's a good bet that Richard Falk, Jimmy Carter, et al will continue supporting sanctions against Israel even in the wake of further recognition of Palestine etc. In fact, I'll be their sanctions movements will be even more popular as time passes and the West Bank remains a home for terrorist groups with a third world economy, high emigration and constant border tensions with its neighbors.
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While the future cannot be predicted with certainty, the last 2 decades have seen more than a hundred countries recognize the state of Palestine, a number of Israel-PLO peace agreements, several Israeli withdrawals, the founding of a de facto state of Palestine in Gaza which has all the legal ingredients of statehood (permanent population, territory, government and the capacity to carry on international relations), the upgrading of Palestine's participation in the UN and its accession to international treaties like the Geneva Convention and - in part - the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Despite all these developments, the delegitimization and isolation of Israel are greater than at any time since the 1950's. It's hard to see why anyone would think there's a magical solution to delegitimization and isolation in a new deal. To use your phrase, it "defies all experience and logic."
You also mention two other problems: "Israel does indeed face a demographic threat and that it doesn't have carte blanche to do the Palestinians whatever it chooses."
It's not clear to me how the agreement resolves these two problems either.
Yes, you are right: Israel doesn't have carte blanche to do the Palestinians whatever it chooses today (does anyone claim otherwise?). Will it have carte blanche after an agreement? Of course not. More to the point: will it have more options or fewer options, better options or worse options? I'm betting fewer and worse, and if you have an argument that more and better, we've yet to hear it.
And I don't understand how you think an agreement will alter any "demographic threat"? Do you mean the absolute numbers? I think it's pretty clear that no agreement will reduce the number of Arab babies, and if anything, will increase the number of Arabs between the river and sea? Do you mean the way the world looks at the Arab population between the river and sea? I think the experience of perpetually occupied Gaza shows that all Arab population anywhere between the river and sea will be considered under Israeli control where useful for an anti-Israeli argument, irrespective of any developments on the ground. Do you mean that Israel will avoid being "apartheid" by the peculiar definition stated above? I hardly think so: as you say, no one cares about technical definitions. Israel will be considered just as apartheid before and after an agreement (which will be discounted as forced upon the Palestinians by superior Israeli power and fundamentally unjust in perpetuating Israeli apartheid). How is the agreement supposed to "solve" the "demographic threat"? What will happen to "solve" it?
PS. Israel cannot "give" the Palestinians their own state. States exist when entities have a permanent population, territory, government and the capacity to carry on international relations. Israel can give the Palestinians these elements -- as Israel did with the PA in Gaza, and yet the PLO can claim not to be a state. Better yet, it can simultaneously claim to be a state and not a state, as the PLO has done since 1988, with great success.
if the drastic demographic premonitions of Israel's Arab population are true (okay, they aren't but this is an exercise in what if), and a 51%+ possibility exists within pre-1967 borders, then what difference does it make if we keep the territories or not? whatever is planned for the territories, aka "apartheid", will become realized within Israel in another 10, 20, 30 years.
what is the response from the concessionists to that?
Very simple: Inside Israel the non-Jewish, primarily Muslim, population is about 20%. Inside "greater Israel," it is 40%. That alone is a significant demographic difference. In any event, Isreali Arabs have been given (at least formally) equal rights and have largely accepted their status as Israeli citizens. West Bank Palestinians have not and I don't think anyone (settlers included) want to give them citizenship and certainly not anything lapproaching equality.
Non-Jewish birthrates in Israel have been falling and will probably continue to fall. That trend can be encouraged by doing more to fully integrate Israel's Muslim population by ensuring them de facto equal rights and giving them equal opportunities, creating an urban middle class culture. All around the world, when that happens, birthrates plummet. I don't suggest doing this simply as a strategy for reducing the non-Jewish bithrate, but because it is a) the right thing to do, b) and is economically necessary. To do the same thing in the West Bank would be much more difficult and, of course, would entail according Palestinians there equal rights and opportunities. Then, of course, you now will have a heavily Palestinian-minority state, no longer a predominantly Jewish one.
The demographic timebomb in a wider sense is already upon us: According to Tel Aviv University's Dan Ben-David, about half the elementary school-age population in Israel is either Arab or haredi and, unless someting changes, that figure will reach 78% in 2040. Before "greater Israel" becomes a majority-Arab country, we will become a majority Arab/Haredi country. Haredim are Jews but for all practical purposes they contribute little to the state militarily (almost all shun army service, and none of them become career officers) and economically (the don't work and when they do their contribution to the most dynamic and critical parts of the economy are infinitesimal). Israel's survival will be jeopardy.
Israel has occupied the West Bank for 43 years without suffering too many consequences primarily for two reasons. 1) It has always been defined as an "occupation," meaning it legal under international law and will some day come to an end. No Israeli government, even those that favored settlements, ever sought to annex the West Bank. 2) The global community's tolerance for such a situation was much higher five decades ago than it is now. South Africa didn't run into widespread approbation for Apartheid until the 1980s. World opinion and standards change. Amnesty International was formed only in 1961 and didn't enjoy the status it has today until much later; Human Rights Watch didn't exist in 1967. You can argue that world opinion isn't fair to Israel, but it exists and has to be contended with.
There are three arguments here, none of which demonstrates that Israel must sign or die:
1. There is a large Arab minority in Israel+West Bank. If Israel were to incorporate the West Bank, which is not really on the table, it would have a “heavily Palestinian-minority state” which is potentially problematic.
2. Haredi population is growing as well which means that if Haredim continue to opt out of the workforce at current (shrinking) rates, Israel will have an economic problem
3. “World opinions and standards” have changed, making it more hostile to Israel.
All three statements are true and irrelevant.
1. Signing a PLO deal neither increases nor decreases the problems with incorporating the West Bank, and does not affect the miniscule likelihood of such incorporation in the near future.
2. Haredi participation in the workforce will not be affected by an agreement. The discussion of a Palestinian-Haredi majority is rather silly; unless there were some real likelihood of a Palestinian-Haredi civil war, the challenges posed by the minorities are incomparable. (By the way, Haredi workforce participation is increasing – is there any reason to discount this trend?)
3. Another agreement will not change the trends of world opinions and standards. If history is a guide, any agreement will ultimately worsen Israel’s situation after the Palestinians’ situation fails to improve dramatically, which will, of course, be Israel’s fault.
Nor do any of the statements affect Winky’s argument: if what makes Israel “apartheid” is the number of Arabs between the river and sea compared to the number of Jews, irrespective of the scope of Israeli control or any Israeli withdrawals, then demographics, and not withdrawals or agreements, is the only factor that can affect Israel’s “apartheid” status.
As an aside, I don’t know what you mean when you say “It has always been defined as an ‘occupation,’ meaning it legal under international law.” Who has defined it as such? Not Israel. Why does that make it more or less “legal”? And even if “international law” clearly defined Israel’s status in the West Bank as belligerent occupant, for what parties has legality been the defining feature of international relations with Israel and since when? (I can think of lots of parties that use the rhetoric, but no one for whom it is actually a defining feature.). And, by the way, if international law is the key feature, why the hostile response to Israeli self-defense? Why supply illegal aid to Hamas-controlled Gaza? Why do you say that “defining [Israel’s presence in the West Bank] as an ‘occupation’” means it “will some day come to an end”? Is that a legal argument? (If so, it is incorrect). Is it an empirical claim? Not only is the Russian occupation of the Kurile Islands 65 years old and going strong, the Gaza experience is quite clear that the “occupation” will continue as long in world opinion as the Arab world says, which is forever, or until Israel ends. What’s the empirical support for this? Or legal support for this?
I respond below point by point:
1. Signing a PLO deal neither increases nor decreases the problems with incorporating the West Bank, and does not affect the miniscule likelihood of such incorporation in the near future.
A: I’m not sure what point you are making. Creating a Palestinian state (the two-state solution) will turn the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza into citizens of their own country. Whether such a Palestinian state would accord them more democracy or civil rights than they had under Israeli rule isn’t relevant as far as global opinion is concerned, but then it is no longer Israel’s problem. Obviously there are security issues involved in Israel’s agreeing to a Palestinian state, and what precludes making a deal right now. But that doesn’t mean that the alternative perpetual rule over all the Palestinians from the river to the sea is a solution either.
2. Haredi participation in the workforce will not be affected by an agreement. The discussion of a Palestinian-Haredi majority is rather silly; unless there were some real likelihood of a Palestinian-Haredi civil war, the challenges posed by the minorities are incomparable. (By the way, Haredi workforce participation is increasing – is there any reason to discount this trend?)
A: I raised the issue of the Haredim for very good reasons, all connected with Israel’s ability to survive in a one-state, two-state and any other situation. The demography issue isn’t simply one of pure numbers (number of Jews vs number of Arabs). The bigger issue is whether Israel will be strong enough to defend itself politically, military and economically. Will its citizens be loyal, act with sufficient unity of purpose and belief, and be prepared to make sacrifices for the good of the country. As of today, the answer is yes and indeed this has been a key asset in Israel’s survival since before 1948? An Israel comprised of a large and growing Arab and Haredi minority (much less majority) would weaken the advantage. If half the country can’t or refuses to serve in the army or it is so poorly educated that it can’t make use of advanced equipment, this is a serious security threat. Likewise, Israel has to be able to create competitive and global industries in order 1) to cover our heavy defense burden, 2) ensure a minimum amount of military autonomy (on a technological level), 3) ensure a reasonable standard of living for its people, and 4) creates businesses and industries overseas (such as there are today) that regard Israel as a crucial asset.
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To put it bluntly, we will not be able to man a tank corps and send it off into battle if it comprises mostly Israeli Arabs and Haredim. Neither group is less than fully committed to Israel and identifies with Israel society. Nor will either group will be able to start up high technology companies, multinational companies because they are poorly and/or improperly educated and do not belong to the larger Israeli society whose values, etc. have made what we have accomplished to date possible.
Mind you, these are strategic threats in their own right. But by annexing the West Bank, thereby putting an end to the two-state solution, we magnify them by increasing the demographic threat.
2. Another agreement will not change the trends of world opinions and standards. If history is a guide, any agreement will ultimately worsen Israel’s situation after the Palestinians’ situation fails to improve dramatically, which will, of course, be Israel’s fault.
A: This is not true. Although the Oslo process is largely discredited, the fact remains that it was a watershed for Israel. The secondary and tertiary Arab boycotts collapsed, enabling the Israeli economy to expand quickly and (as it turns out) absorb hundreds of thousands of immigrants. It bought Israel the better part of a decade of growing acceptance and legitimacy , which has now been lost by the unraveling of the Oslo process. It hardly seems logical to argue that Israel’s diplomatic situation will improve if it holds on to the West Bank under current conditions indefinitely and without offering any horizon to its Palestinian population.
Nor do any of the statements affect the other argument: if what makes Israel “apartheid” is the number of Arabs between the river and sea compared to the number of Jews, irrespective of the scope of Israeli control or any Israeli withdrawals, then demographics, and not withdrawals or agreements, is the only factor that can affect Israel’s “apartheid” status.
A: The basis of the “apartheid” charges are that Israel rules over a disenfranchised population. Personally, I don’t accept the accusations because 1) Israel has no ideology that consigns Arabs to the status of an inferior population. Israeli Arabs have the same status of Israeli Jews under the law and to the extent they suffer discrimination it is not essentially different than in any other multi-racial/ethnic society. 2) As of now, the West Bank is occupied, so Israel isn’t required to offer Palestinians the same rights as it own citizens. Of course, if Israel annexed the West Bank and denied Palestinians equality as a matter of policy (e.g., refused them citizenship or offered them some kind of second-class status), it would then be open to charges of Apartheid. The fact that there might not be any Apartheid-like ideology in Israel would be irrelevant since de facto policy was to treat Palestinians as second class citizens or worse.
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More A: Re “occupation.” Even the Israeli government (including the Supreme Court) regards the West Bank as occupied territory, as does every government in the world that has an opinion on the matter. While I have heard opinion, expressed in this forum and elsewhere, that it is not occupied territory, I don’t find the case very convincing. International law wasn’t written with all the permutations of the area’s complicated history, so the case isn’t black and white. In any event, the argument that there is no occupation in my view is akin to people in America who say that the income tax is unconstitutional. I’m sure there are arguments to made about its unconstitutionality, but in the real world once the Supreme Court says it is constitutional that’s what it is. If the Israeli government and everyone else in authority says the West Bank is occupied, so it is. Occupation is not an act of nature, it’s a social construct and so it has been constructed. Furthermore, the reality is that there are millions of Palestinians living there who won’t become quiescent because someone has an elegant case for why they are not occupied.
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